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Chapter 1
Introduction
Globalization is a central topic of current economic and public debate. The term glob-
alization is associated with the increase of trade volumes, investment flows, outsourcing
activities and the expansion of multinational enterprises. However, a commonly accepted
definition does not exist and other characterizations intertwine different contemporaneous
trends, such as, increased transport facilities, faster and cheaper communication technolo-
gies, changes in labor conditions, and even cultural change. No matter which definition is
used, there is a common urge to know how globalization affects our economic and social
conditions.
Trade liberalization is a main component of economic globalization and as such, there
is much interest about the positive and negative effects it may cause. However, trade
policy reforms have been a recurring public issue for over a century and economic integra-
tion between developed countries had already expanded significantly during the postwar
period. The interesting new element associated with globalization is the ever-increasing
integration of developing countries into the process, which has been clearly noticeable
since the 1980s. In addition, the recent spell of wage inequality and unemployment in
OECD countries has added interest to the consequences of trade openness.
As with any critical and heavily disputed public issue, many diverse and contradic-
tory opinions exist. Mainstream economists and financial international organizations
claim that trade liberalization and capital mobility have increased economic growth in
those countries that have successfully integrated into the world economy. Moreover, these
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improved economic conditions have allowed these developing countries to reduce poverty
(World Bank, 2002). On the other hand, many different observers1 claim that economic,
political and social conditions in developing countries are worsening as a consequence of
these enhanced trade volumes and foreign direct investment activities. In OECD coun-
tries, some economists and politicians blame globalization for the recent increase in the
wage dispersion between skilled and unskilled workers.
Who is right? The debate is still open and as with any complicated and controver-
sial issue, it would probably not vanish soon. Moreover, global trends do not affect each
country identically and economic globalization can be better described as a set of oppor-
tunities and threats that we must deal with. Indeed, it seems clear that the current trend
of increased international relations is only increasing with time. This does not mean that
it cannot revert, as it already did at the beginning of the last century, but reinforces our
need to understand it better in order to act accordingly.
On its own, income inequality is a pervasive topic in the public agenda. We are
concerned about the distributional impact of economic policies and the consequences they
may have for poor households. Many economic reforms and most structural adjustment
programs are directed to enhance economic growth as an instrument to reduce poverty
and increase general living standards. In the meantime, these policies also change —
in different degrees— how personal income is finally assigned. While not all economic
policies worsen income inequality and complementary redistributional instruments exist,
the ensuing trade-off between these efficiency and equity issues is a central concern for
policy makers and the general public. Another example of distributional distress is the
considerable academic and political interest in the recent surge of wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers.
Encompassed in this rather general framework, the concrete contribution of the present
compilation of articles is to analyze some of the interactions between international trade
and income inequality. Trade openness is fundamental to global economic integration and
its distributional impact is of considerable interest in the global agenda. However, in this
1Here we can include anti-globalization activists, international NGOs, but also prominent economists
as the Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz (2002).
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particular topic we find again the same divergent opinions that predominate in the larger
globalization debate. Some of the contradictory views are based on methodological and
definitional differences and thus, it is important to start our discussion by delimiting the
scope of our study.
The particular income distribution level experimented by each country is a complex
phenomenon that includes economic and non-economic issues. For instance, factor en-
dowments, technologies, market structure and consumer preferences are some economic
factors that determine income inequality. However, the final outcome is also conditioned
by non-market institutions, such as the political system, governmental policies, the factor
ownership structure, social and historical conditions and the legal system. Thus, as econo-
mists we have limited analytical tools to explain how income distribution is determined
(Atkinson, 1997). Moreover, trade liberalization is only one of many inequality determi-
nants and it is generally not considered as a main factor. Therefore, in this dissertation
we analyze the marginal effect of international trade on the distribution of income.
A further delimitation is that we study only country-specific inequality. When Sen
(2002) refers to global inequality and poverty, he claims that it is the central economic
issue related to globalization. Indeed, global inequality is higher than in any particular
country and absolute poverty affects between a quarter and half of the world population,
depending on the definition used. These figures are disturbing, but global redistribution
is a topic that exceeds the scope of the present work. Country-specific inequality is still
the main priority for national governments and households seldom evaluate inequality
beyond their own country. Thus, within-country inequality remains the main element of
the distributional debate, although it may not be the most pressing issue from a global
perspective.
It has been acknowledged that an important part of the globalization debate between
economists and non-economists can be attributed to the definition and measurement of the
different variables, and the framework of analysis.2 For instance, an important distinction
to be made is which kind of inequality we are measuring: absolute or relative. Almost
2Kanbur (2001) has observed that some of the globalization disagreements can be divided in two broad
groups. Group A or "Finance Ministry" and Group B or "Civil Society". Among academics, economists
would generally be included in Group A. Ravallion (2003) also analyzes some of the methodological
discrepancies between different researchers.
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always, economists refer to the latter, which is implicit in most of the common inequality
indicators (e.g. Gini coefficient, Atkinson indexes, and share ratios). On the other hand,
Ravallion (2003) argues that many non-economists think of inequality in absolute terms.3
A shift between these two ways of perceiving inequality creates very different results. For
example, any growing economy with constant relative inequality experiences increasing
absolute inequality. In what follows we study only changes in relative inequality and do
not consider absolute inequality at all.4
An important complication present in trade liberalization analyses is to separate its
effects from other economic policies. Trade liberalization is not easily defined and it is
commonly pursued in conjunction with other economic and structural reform policies, i.e.
competition policies, public finance reforms, labor market reforms and privatization of
public utilities. Moreover, we treat trade openness and trade liberalization as equivalent
concepts, both referring to the changes in the level of openness. When possible we try to
analyze the isolated impact of trade liberalization on income inequality. Nonetheless, it
is not always possible to separate the impact of specific economic policies and our results
acknowledge these limitations.
Finally, it is relevant to highlight that we are analyzing global trends between trade
liberalization and income inequality. Our theoretical models and empirical tests are built
to isolate general relationships between trade and inequality using cross-country and panel
data. While these trends are very important to understand, they do not replace country-
specific analysis that account for national characteristics and particular economic condi-
tions. For instance, Devarajan and van der Mensbrugghe (2000), Hertel et al. (2000),
and Ianchovichina et al. (2000) have applied computational general equilibrium models
to examine the impact of trade reforms on poverty and income distribution for specific
countries. However, our results provide important policy lessons for the implementation
of medium and long-run development strategies and provide a broad understanding of the
distributional effects of openness.
3For example, Amiel and Cowell (1999) report that 40% of the students in experiments done in the
UK and Israel think of inequality in absolute terms.
4The absolute case is in fact not very interesting from an economic point of view. Sustained growth,
even when not substantial, requires steady relative inequality declines to maintain absolute inequality
constant. Provided that national inequality is generally stable, absolute inequality will be increasing
almost in every country with positive growth rates.
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Once the scope of this dissertation is delimited, we focus our attention on our main
topic and in the following paragraphs we present an outlook of the thesis.
The relationship between trade reform and equity is an old topic of economic research.
In their seminal paper of 1941, Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson presented a the-
orem that directly linked changes in tariff protection with the functional distribution
of income using the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework of international trade. The
Stolper-Samuelson theorem remains the main theoretical result in trade theory related to
income distribution. In Chapter 2 we present an extensive survey of the literature that
followed and tested its empirical consequences. The linkage between trade and the per-
sonal (or household) distribution of income is a less studied issue, although some recent
contributions acknowledge its increasing importance.
Complementing the trade literature, there has been a recent surge in the topic of
income distribution that has prompted a new wave of publications (Atkinson, 1997).
There is a sizeable literature regarding the interaction between income distribution and
other economic variables, such as growth, poverty, trade and economic policy. Most of
the theoretical models have turned their attention to the interactions between growth and
inequality (Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa, 1999; Bénabou, 1996; Edwards, 1997),
the impact of trade on inequality (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1989; Cline, 1997; Wood,
1994) and the linkages between the economic and political systems (Alesina and Rodrik,
1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1995).
In Chapter 2 we present a thorough literature survey of the particular relation between
trade and income inequality, for both the functional and the personal distribution. There
we outline the recent trends in national and international inequality and overview the
recent debate concerning the impact of trade on wages. This debate focused on the
functional distribution of income and in addition, we survey those studies that explored
the relations with the household distribution.
A crucial limitation in the study of income inequality is the coverage and quality of the
available data. An important step forward was achieved with the introduction of a cross-
country inequality data set by the World Bank (Deininger and Squire, 1996). Moreover,
this dataset prompted the appearance of a series of econometric studies. Many of these
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studies have focused on the growth-inequality relationship (Deininger and Squire, 1998;
Barro, 2000), while others have been assessing the evolution of national and international
inequality (Li, Squire and Zou, 1998; Sala-i-Martin, 2002a and 2002b).
Although the dataset compiled by the World Bank has been extensively used, it has
important caveats that have been recently addressed by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001).
A distinctive characteristic of inequality observations is that they differ on concept mea-
sured (i.e. income or expenditure), reference unit (e.g. person or household) and the
primary source of information. Given the scarcity of national income surveys, the group-
ing of observations with different definitions becomes a critical concern of any inequality
dataset. One of the main critiques of the Deininger and Squire dataset has been made
precisely on the method used to group heterogeneous observations.
In an attempt to construct a dataset that can overcome some of the problems asso-
ciated with this fact, in Chapter 3 we propose a new methodology to group heteroge-
neous inequality observations. The new dataset is based on existing secondary inequality
datasets, but our grouping procedure yields distinctive and new inequality time-series.
This approach diminishes the measurement error inherent to inequality data sets and by
extension, to the outcome of inequality empirical tests. As an added contribution, we use
parametric estimations of the Lorenz curve to calculate alternative inequality indexes and
absolute poverty estimates. The inequality dataset constructed in Chapter 3 is the basis
to the empirical tests that follow in Chapters 5 and 6.
The main objective of Chapter 4 is to overcome the relative dearth of theoretical
models that link trade to the household distribution of income. In particular, we construct
a theoretical model associating tariff changes with personal income inequality. We use an
ownership matrix to map general equilibrium results from the functional to the personal
income distribution. In addition, we employ a Sen-type social welfare function (Sen,
1974) to associate different inequality indexes with particular social welfare functions,
and this allows us to relate tariff changes directly to social welfare. Next, we embed
income inequality indexes into a general equilibrium trade model. Within this general
theoretical setting, we use two specific standard trade models (Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson
and Ricardo-Viner) to obtain particular ownership matrices and trade results. This last
step allows us to directly analyze the impact of tariff changes on the household distribution
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of income and this provides a number of observations that are latter empirically tested
in Chapters 5 and 6. Finally, we use the social welfare effects of our general equilibrium
setting to explore how the inclusion of distributional concerns by the policy-makers can
affect the political economy of tariff formation.
Chapter 5 is a combination of the theoretical model outlined in the previous chapter
and our inequality dataset. Here we empirically test the propositions that result from both
trade models in a cross-country regression centered on 1994.5 Our results are compatible
with the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem: higher tariffs are associated with
increased income inequality in poor labor-abundant countries and with lower inequality
in rich capital-abundant countries. Furthermore, the relationship is monotonically de-
creasing, suggesting that in middle-income countries import protection does not have an
unambiguous effect on inequality. Thus, using a full range of countries where endowment
abundance is related to per-capita income levels, we reconcile the Latin American ex-
perience with the Stolper-Samuelson predictions. Previous studies had found that trade
liberalization had worsened the distribution of income in this region, contradicting the
theorem (Davis, 1996; Robbins, 1996a and 1996b). However, most of the region is charac-
terized by middle-income economies, which are not labor-abundant in a global sense but
only with respect to developed economies.
The last chapter works again with our new inequality dataset, but now we use cross-
sectional time-series econometric estimations to run an empirical reassessment of the well-
known Kuznets curve. In 1955, Kuznets observed that income inequality tends to increase
in the early stages of development and decreases later. Thus, the evolution of inequality
within countries follows an inverted-u pattern. In the recent literature that employs the
Deininger and Squire dataset, the curve has been regarded as an empirical regularity
(Higgins and Williamson, 1999; Barro, 2000). Our own empirical tests confirm these
previous findings. However, when we take into account that the quality of the income data
is intrinsically better for richer countries and worsens with per capita income levels, we
find that the inequality pattern is better described by a cubic form. Concretely, we find the
familiar inverted-u curve in the initial income range, but for higher income levels (reached
5This year is selected due to the availability of tariff data. Comprehensive tariff data for a wide
selection of countries only exists until the late 1980s.
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by developed countries only until the 1980s and 1990s) inequality is again increasing.
This result is a consequence of the latest surge of inequality in OECD countries, which
has been widely documented (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000; Atkinson, 2003).
Additionally, in this chapter we test if trade liberalization has affected income in-
equality when panel estimations are used. In this case, the lack of tariff data forces us to
use other openness indicators (e.g. the Sachs and Warner index, adjusted trade volumes
and import duties data). While these indicators have important shortcomings, we expect
that they can capture some of the trade liberalization effects. However, we do not find a
significant effect of openness on income inequality.
We conclude in Chapter 7, where we present a summary of the main findings of
this dissertation and key policy implications that can be drawn from our results. It is
important to remark that each chapter has been written as an independent self-standing
paper and thus, there are some overlapping themes between particular chapters.
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Chapter 2
Literature Survey on the Effects of
Trade Liberalization on Income
Inequality
2.1 Introduction
The equity effects of globalization have become a central topic of academic and policy
debate. While there is not a conclusive definition of this concept, it is associated with
increased trade, foreign direct investment, the expansion of multinational enterprises,
the diffusion of new communication technologies and the internet, among other global
trends. This increase in global integration is not a new phenomenon, but as all significant
events it is something that affects society as a whole. This is testified by the increase
in anti-globalization protests, as well as the intensive political and economic debate that
surrounds many globalization issues.
This paper surveys the literature concerned with the distributional effects of trade
liberalization. Trade openness is an essential part of globalization and its interrelationship
with income inequality is a relevant issue in the global agenda. The increase in the
volume and scope of international trade has been an essential part of the recent surge in
the patterns of global integration. Many observers have pointed out that openness has
deteriorated world poverty and increased income inequality. In contrast, other sectors have
9
refuted such effects. Among the last, economists have in general presented an optimistic
view of the effects of trade liberalization.
However, it is important to keep in mind that this topic can be analyzed from differ-
ent perspectives. Sen (2002) claims that inequality is the central economic issue related
to globalization. However, he defines inequality as the current high levels of global in-
equality and poverty, and finds less interesting the marginal changes that globalization
may have caused. Indeed, global inequality is higher than in any particular country and
absolute poverty affects between a quarter and half the world population, depending on
the definition used. In particular, Sen argues that the main issue is how the benefits
from globalization are distributed, not if everyone is simply better-off with globalization.
Nonetheless, within-country inequality is still the main concern of national governments
and most citizens evaluate inequality only with respect to their local and national com-
munity.
The interaction between trade and income inequality is a complex problem and econo-
mists have a partial role to play. The outcome of the market economy is conditional on
several economic factors, as endowments, technologies and market structure. But these
are not the only determinants and inequality is much influenced by non-market institu-
tions. E.g., political, social, legal and other institutions have critical distributional effects.
Therefore, as economists we can analyze some of the mechanisms at play, but not all. In
particular, although we find the remarks of Sen relevant, we limit our survey to the mar-
ginal changes in inequality caused by trade openness. The length and number of papers
analyzed can give an idea of the large literature that is contained within these limits
and the broader issues relating to globalization and worldwide inequality are beyond our
analytical scope.
With these considerations in mind, we can also highlight that we deal with the eco-
nomics of globalization. It has been acknowledged that an important part of the debate
between economists and non-economists can be attributed to the definition and mea-
surement of the different variables, and the framework of analysis.1 For instance, an
1Kanbur (2001) has observed that some of the globalization disagreements can be divided in two broad
groups. Group A or "Finance Ministry" and Group B or "Civil Society". Among academics, economists
would generally be included in Group A. Ravallion (2003) also analyzes some of the methodological
discrepancies between different researchers.
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important distinction to be made is which kind of inequality we are measuring: absolute
or relative. Most economists usually refer to the second, which is implicit in most of the
common inequality indicators (e.g. Gini coefficient, Atkinson indexes, and share ratios).
On the other hand, Ravallion (2003) argues that many non-economists think of inequality
in absolute terms.2 This creates very different inequality results indeed. For example,
any growing economy with constant relative inequality experiences increasing absolute
inequality. In this survey, when we refer to income inequality we are exclusively dealing
with relative inequality and do not consider absolute inequality at all.3
Furthermore, globalization has been associated with multiple international phenom-
ena, many of which are not directly related to trade liberalization (i.e. competition
policies, market power issues, international capital movements, environmental and social
standards). While some of these policies are implemented simultaneously with openness,
when possible we try to analyze the isolated impact of trade liberalization on poverty
and inequality. Nevertheless, one of the conclusions of this study is that the simultaneity
of policy reforms makes this task a difficult one and in general, we have to discuss the
effects of entire economic reform packages. Moreover, we treat trade openness and trade
liberalization as equivalent concepts, both referring to the changes in the level of openness.
Overall, the main results and conclusions are conditional and in some cases tentative.
There are important theoretical cavities and empirical tests are blurred with data limi-
tations, econometric specification problems and measurement error issues. Hence, many
studies directly contradict each other and consensus is not reached in many of the issues
involved. Nevertheless, some general ideas do remain strong and are generally accepted,
despite the noise surrounding the results.
We start our analysis with an overview of national and international income inequality
trends. An outline of the main empirical facts provides a necessary departure point in
the analysis of the relationships between income equity and trade policy. In section 3 we
present a general theoretical framework and then we survey the well-studied debate on
2For example, Amiel and Cowell (1999) report that 40% of the students in experiments done in the
UK and Israel think of inequality in absolute terms.
3The absolute case is in fact not very interesting from an economic point of view. Sustained growth,
even when not substantial, requires steady relative inequality declines to maintain absolute inequality
constant. Provided that national inequality is generally stable, absolute inequality will be increasing
almost in every country with positive growth rates.
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how trade liberalization affects wages. This section is finished with an empirical survey
on how openness influences the personal distribution of income. Section 5 presents a
summary of our main findings.
2.2 The evolution of national and global inequality
2.2.1 Inequality measurement and data problems
Inequality measurement is a theoretical and empirically difficult exercise. On one hand,
inequality is represented by the second moment or dispersion of incomes and there are
several different indexes that can be used to summarize this information into a single
value (i.e. Gini coefficient, Atkinson indexes). Additionally, the use of different indexes
has different welfare implications (Dalton, 1920; Kolm, 1969; Atkinson, 1970).
Empirically, there is a dearth of consistent and systematical performed income surveys
for most of the countries. This fact considerably limits the number of comprehensive
inequality time series for many regions. Finally, many inequality observations are not
strictly comparable, since we can measure inequality of different income definitions (e.g.
Net and Gross) and also, of consumption and expenditure information.
Several attempts have been made to bridge these limitations and produce large and
relatively comparable inequality panel data. The most notorious is the dataset presented
by Deininger and Squire (1996). Using three basic quality criteria, these authors gathered
single inequality series for a large number of countries. This dataset has been widely
used in the empirical literature and hence, most of the studies that involve inequality
are dependent on the quality of this dataset. Although the Deininger and Squire (DS)
dataset reduced the implicit measurement errors, it did not solve all of them. Atkinson
and Brandolini (2001) explain some of these unresolved shortcomings from inequality
data. Thus, it is important to bear in mind that the empirics of inequality are permeated
by measurement error problems.4
4For a comprehensive analysis of inequality data measurement issues, see Chapter 3.
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2.2.2 National and international inequality trends
Within-country inequality is characterized by heterogeneous experiences. However, there
are some patterns that have been identified. Using fragmented historical evidence for
a few developed countries, Kuznets (1955) observed an initial increase in the levels of
inequality in the early stages of development and afterwards, a steady decrease. This
observation gave birth to Kuznets inverted-u curve. In the last decades, however, the
experience in OECD countries has reverted the decreasing tendency expected for rich
economies. Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) and Atkinson (2003) identify and inequality
U-pattern for these countries after the Second World War. The lack of relevant historical
data and relevant inequality time-series for many developing countries, does not allow a
similar analysis for this broader group of countries.
However, the most relevant observation concerning income inequality is that within-
country variation is much less important than between-country variation (Li et al., 1998).
Latin America and African countries usually have the higher inequality levels, while coun-
tries from the former communist block and OECD countries experience significantly lower
income inequality. Using the DS dataset, these authors argue that income inequality is
a relatively stable phenomenon and there are no systematic patterns in country expe-
riences. In addition, the significant between-country difference suggests that inequality
determinates change slowly and differ between countries. For instance, initial endow-
ments, development levels, educational attainment, economic policies and demographic
factors have all been identified as important determinants of income inequality and we
treat these issues in detail in different sections of this survey.
2.2.3 Global inequality
Combining within-country and between-country inequality weighted by population, one
can obtain global inequality. This is, the dispersion of incomes among all the individuals
in the world. Lindert and Williamson (2001) report that global inequality has risen in the
last two centuries. This increase has been driven mainly by between-country inequality
changes, spurred by accelerated growth from OECD countries. Within-country inequality,
as explained above, has changed episodically during this time and no clear trend emerges.
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This conclusion is also reached by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), who report that
inequality has been increasing since the 1820s, but has been relatively stable after the
Second World War.
However, when analyzing global inequality in the last two decades, the results are
mixed. In general, one can find studies that claim that inequality has increased and
others reporting the contrary. Nevertheless, this major divergence is explained by mea-
surement issues (Ravallion, 2003) and when sound measurement methods are used, the
conclusions are less vague. For instance, Svedberg (2001) and Milanovic (2002) review
most of the studies and have summarized the main differences. They claim that the
critical issue involved is how to measure income and inequality. Some studies use GDP
per capita adjusted by PPP and others do not adjust and use instead GDP per capita
calculated with exchange rates. Moreover, inequality is sometimes measured by quintile
shares (assuming no within-quintile inequality), while others do not even assume within-
country inequality. Other important distinctions are provided by the time period used,
the inequality indicators and the weight and selection of countries.
A first attempt to create a consistent estimation of global inequality was given by
Milanovic (2002) who based his estimations using only national household surveys and
adjusting income by PPP. With this methodology he can include about 84% of the world’s
population. However, he can only study two years: 1988 and 1993, and finds that the
Gini coefficient has increased from 0.63 to 0.66 between both years.
However, the generally accepted result is presented by Sala-i-Martin (2002a,b). He
uses PPP adjusted income, several comparable inequality indicators and the DS dataset,
which provides significant world coverage and a large panel database. He finds that within-
country has been slightly increasing but that this effect is upset by the strong decrease
in between-country inequality. Thus, he reports that global inequality has been declining
between 1980 and 1998. Cross-country inequality is driven mainly by the experience of
China, which has had large growth rates in the past two decades.5 The different outcomes
5A limitation in the analysis is that he assumes no within-country inequality for those countries with-
out inequality information and constant inequality for those years were there is no inequality observations.
Therefore, his estimates are crude and approximate. However, the possible bias created by these limita-
tions is not expected to change the general results, given the strong influence of China and the relative
small weight of the missed observations for which the assumptions are made.
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between Sala-i-Martin and Milanovic can be mainly explained by the use of consumption
and income, respectively, as the main inequality concept measured.
2.3 Trade and income distribution
The interest on the effects of trade liberalization on income inequality has been revived
by two important events. The first one, which has received much of the attention, has
been the increase in the wage differential in the United States.6 The second has been
the significant trade liberalization processes in many developing countries in the last two
decades. The analysis of both events has been concentrated on the empirical viability of
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In addition, this has increased the number of alternative
explanations that have been proposed to associate trade with income inequality.
This section begins with a small general equilibrium model in which we outline some
determinants of the personal distribution of income. From this theoretical framework we
can better understand how trade policy can affect income inequality. Then we introduce
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which is the main theoretical instrument used to analyze
the link between trade and income distribution. However, the theorem is aimed at the
impact on the functional distribution of income and therefore, we first focus on this
aspect. Afterwards, we report the empirical evidence linking openness with the household
distribution of income.
In addition, we present a survey of the vast literature dedicated to the connection
between trade liberalization and wage inequality. With this background we have a better
understanding on how the theorem fares empirically.
2.3.1 Theoretical reference framework
The following section is based on the work of Bourguignon and Morrisson (1989, 1990) and
Spilimbergo et al. (1999). We assume perfect competition in the factors and final goods
markets, well-behaved production and utility functions, I individuals and J factors of
6This phenomenon has also been observed in the United Kingdom. In other OECD countries, the
main concern has been the increase in the unemployment rates of unskilled workers (Desjonqueres et al.,
1999)
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production, a closed economy, and no government. We can then construct a simple model
relating income distribution with economy-wide endowments. First, aggregate supply is
given by:
Q = F (E) (2.1)
where the vector Q represents total output, the vector F represents production func-
tions, and E is the vector of total factor endowments. With perfect competition in the
factor and final goods markets, flexible factor prices and full employment, we obtain:
W = P · F 0(E) (2.2)
where P is the vector of domestic prices, F 0(E) is the vector of marginal productivities
and W is the vector of factor prices. Here we assume constant returns to scale. The
demand for final goods shown in equation (2.3) closes the general equilibrium system.7
P = P (Q) (2.3)
Plugging (2.1) in (2.3) yields:
P = P (E) (2.4)
Substituting equations (2.1) in (2.2), and assuming that preferences are equal for every
individual but productivity may differ across factors, we get:
W =W (E,F 0(E)) (2.5)
We can think of the vector F 0(E) as a measure of the productivity of each factor and
an indicator of technological progress. We call this vector φ, to express this more general
idea of factor productivity, thus:
W =W (E,φ) (2.6)
7In this case the utility function is homothetic. If it wasn’t, then the final income distribution will
affect aggregate demand.
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At this point we drop our closed economy assumption and assume the country is
relatively small and domestic prices are determined by international prices: P = Pw+T .
Where Pw is the vector of world prices and T is the vector that represents the degree
of distortions to international trade created by transport costs, tariffs and other barriers.
To leave the government out of the analysis, we will assume these are transport costs and
other non-governmental trade barriers that create a difference between the domestic and
the international price.
Thus, the analogous of equation (2.4) will give:
Pw = Pw(Ew) (2.7)
where Ew is the vector of world endowments. Following (2.2) we can now construct:
W = Pw(Ew) · φ · T (2.8)
Equation (2.8) needs the Factor Price Equalization (FPE) condition to hold. However,
this condition is violated, among others, by the presence of non-traded goods and it is hard
to sustain empirically (Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995). Therefore, we do not assume FPE
and the internal factor endowments determine some final goods prices and also influences
the internal factor prices. Under these conditions we obtain:
W =W (Ew, E, T, φ) (2.9)
This equation determines the vector of factor prices and from here we can obtain the
functional distribution of income. In addition, to move towards the personal distribution
of income we can use the following equation:
yi =
X
j
wj(E,Ew, T, φ)Ejωij (2.10)
where yi is the personal income of individual i, wj is the factor price of j, Ej is the total
endowment of j in the economy. Finally, ωij is the share of factor j owned by individual
i, with
P
i ωij = 1.
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We use the Gini coefficient as a representation of the income distribution of the country.
Additionally, S is the matrix of coefficients ωij that represents the ownership structure
of the economy. As noted by Spilimbergo et al. (1999) the matrix S is determined by
historic conditions and may differ quite dramatically from country to country. We can
now focus directly on inequality:
Gini = g(Y ) = g (E,Ew, T, φ, S) (2.11)
where total income Y =
P
i yi.
Although (2.11) includes several variables, it is clearly an incomplete model to explain
income inequality. However, as pointed by Atkinson (1997) and Spilimbergo et al. (1999),
such a complete model is not yet available.
There are several ways in which the model can be enhanced. Bourguignon and Morris-
son (1989) drop the assumption of flexible factor prices and full employment to obtain a
Keynesian approach, where demand plays a key role and has an interdependent relation-
ship with income distribution. Trade also affects income distribution via the exogenously
determined foreign demand. As well, there may be some dynamics between the final
distribution g(Y ) and the aggregate demand function. We can also extend equation
(2.11) by introducing imperfect competition, economies of scale, governmental interven-
tion, economic growth dynamics and political economy issues. Some of these inequality
determinants are mentioned in following sections.
However, the lack of a formal model to analyze the rich variety of interrelations is a
main theoretical limitation in the study of income inequality. In particular, since equa-
tion (2.11) is a partial theoretical representation of the link between trade openness and
inequality, we can be omitting variables that may change our theoretical results. In par-
ticular, we expect that governmental policies are both crucial for trade outcomes and the
final household distribution of income.
In any case, our objective is not to explain how income distribution is determined.
Thus, we retain this simple model and we use the vector T as a measure of trade liberaliza-
tion. Hence, equation (2.11) becomes a clear theoretical representation of the relationship
between trade and income distribution, although we must bear in mind its limitations.
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For the purpose of this survey, it is used to classify the different papers that try to explain
such relationship.
2.3.1.1 The Stolper-Samuelson theorem
The main theoretical instrument used to asses the relationship between trade and income
distribution is the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.8 This theorem is directly derived from the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model. The standard assumptions of the model and
its definition are detailed by Francois and Nelson (1998):
• Rational behavior by households and firms.
• Complete, perfectly competitive markets.
• Two countries with balanced trade.
• Both countries possess identical tastes, represented by identical homothetic de-
mands.
• Two production factors, endowed in fixed quantities in each country.
• Both factors have uniform quality, are perfectly mobile between sectors and perfectly
immobile between countries.
• Two goods, each requiring strictly positive inputs of both factors to be produced.
• Both countries share the same technology, represented by linear homogeneous, twice
differentiable, and strictly concave production functions.
• Factor-intensity: At all relevant factor prices, each good uses more intensively one
of the factors.
• Factor-abundance: For given endowments, each country is taken to be relatively
abundant on one of the factors.
• International trade in goods is costless.
8Stolper and Samuelson (1941). Bhagwati (1959) restated the original theorem to solve some theoret-
ical difficulties.
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The theorem states that an increase in the relative price of one of the goods will raise
the return to the factor used intensively in the production of that good, relative to all
other prices; and lower the return to the other factor, relative to all other prices. It is
important to remark that the real factor return is increasing for the favored factor and
thus, there is an unambiguous gain from the price increase. This result is possible given
the “magnification” effect of the price increase, i.e. ∂w∂p > 1.
9 Although some of the
assumptions are considered strong and sometimes violated in reality, the theorem is one
of the most elegant and intuitive results derived from general equilibrium models.
The distributional implications of trade policy are easily derived from the theorem.
For instance, trade liberalization is generally associated with a decrease in tariffs, which
in turn affects directly the prices of goods and hence, changes relative factor prices and
inequality.10
In principle, the theorem is directly related to the functional distribution of income.
Nonetheless, it is usually generalized to include the personal distribution. Consequently,
there has to be some assumption regarding factor-abundance and the matrix ownership to
generalize its effects. In particular, it is assumed that developing countries are relatively
abundant in labor or unskilled labor and that these are equally distributed in the country.
On the other hand, capital or skilled labor are abundant but not equally distributed
in developed countries. Thus, trade liberalization in developing countries increases the
returns to labor and reduces the returns to capital. Since labor is equally distributed,
then the overall effect is a reduction in inequality. In the developed world, it has the
opposite effect: an increase in the returns to capital and higher inequality.
With regard to our reference framework, the theorem gives a clear theoretical link
between final goods prices, factor endowments and factor prices. The simplicity and
strong intuitive conclusions of the theorem are very appealing and the Stolper-Samuelson
remains as the most accepted theoretical approach to the relationship between trade and
income distribution.11
9This is a direct consequence of the zero-profit condition of the general equilibrium system.
10For a complete exposition of the application of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to trade, see Deardorff
and Stern (1994) and Cline (1997).
11However, the original article was initially treated as a theoretical curiosity given its strong assumptions
and was regarded as impractical to deal with concrete trade policy (Deardorff and Stern, 1994; Cline,1997)
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Nevertheless, there are other factors at work which can influence the results. For
developed countries, redistributive policies and the endowment of asset earnings can have
important effects on the personal distribution. In developing countries, unemployment,
trade composition and the endowment of human capital are all variables that can hinder
the results (Litwin, 1998). Another difficulty involved is the already mentioned strong and
demanding assumptions of the theorem. The departure from some of these assumptions
can undermine or even reverse the Stolper-Samuelson results. In the following section we
address the main considerations that have been used to challenge the theorem.
2.3.1.2 Theoretical issues revising the Stolper-Samuelson results
The direct and indirect empirical tests of the theorem are plenty. We analyze in detail
these studies below, but at present we can state that there are many studies with mixed
results and some clearly invalidate the theorem. For instance, Davis (1996) presents a
short review of studies for developing countries were he states that there is enough empiri-
cal evidence to call the case an anomaly. Hence, many papers have focused their attention
at explaining the possible theoretical issues that can clarify this apparent anomaly. How-
ever, there is not a clear agreement on the empirical evidence and the following departures
from the main model only illustrate the theoretical possibilities that have been studied.
It is important to remember that some papers use the functional distribution of income
(i.e. wage differentials) and others use personal income distribution indicators (i.e. Gini
coefficient and Lorenz curves) to test the theorem. Hence, not all the explanations apply
to each case.
There are several theoretical propositions in the literature to explain how the Stolper-
Samuelson results can be offset. Some of them are not critical to the theorem, but others
are. These can be divided into three broad groups: the theoretical explications that deal
with the functional distribution of income; market structure issues; and those authors that
use theoretical explanations to address changes in the personal distribution of income. We
deal with each in the following sections.
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Theoretical explanations addressed to the functional distribution
In the first group we can name several explanations that refine and/or generalize the
theorem by dropping one or more assumptions.
Factor intensity reversals. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem requires technology
to be identical across countries and that each good does not change its factor-intensity.
Analytical work on production functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES),
showed that in the face of a sufficiently large shift in relative factor prices, goods can
switch over from being intensive in one factor to being intensive in the other (Bhagwati
and Dehejia, 1994). They also mention that empirical work has shown that this can be a
distinct possibility.
The Metzler paradox. When the foreign offer curve is inelastic, an increase in
the tariff may actually decrease the price of the protected good. This is achieved through
a large improvement in the terms of trade. Thus, the tariff increase actually lowers the
returns to the scarce factor (Metzler, 1949). However, the data does not suggest that this
has happened (Francois and Nelson, 1998).
Higher dimensions of factors and goods. When the number of factors and
goods is increased, the definition of factor-intensity and factor-abundance is ambiguous.
Yet, Ethier (1984) demonstrated that with the same number of goods and factors, every
good is a “friend” to some factor and an “enemy” to some others. Therefore, the increase
in the price of a friendly good will raise the price of the factor to which the good is friendly
and decrease the price of the factor to which the good is an “enemy”. Nevertheless, there
are few chances of identifying global or natural friends and enemies. The alternative that
can be used is to identify friends and enemies on average and hence, the strong results of
the theorem are undermined, but still valid in a broad sense.
Intermediate goods. As explained in Francois and Nelson (1998), the introduction
of inter-industry linkages alters the mechanism that transmits the effect of goods prices
to factor prices. In particular, the changes in goods prices are transmitted first to value
added prices, and then to relative factor prices. In this case, the theorem will hold when
goods are still assumed to be homogenous. However, the recent literature on trade with
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inter-industry linkages emphasizes on intermediate product differentiation and in this
setting, the Stolper-Samuelson result may no longer hold.12
Non-traded goods. The presence of national goods with prices not determined by
world prices can attenuate the results of the theorem. A change in world prices affects
the price of non-traded goods through the market clearing conditions, but in this case the
price and output can change to restore equilibrium. Thus, the production and intensity
shifts that yield the wage increase are not assured (Winters, 2000a).
Specific Factors. This is the well-known Ricardo-Viner trade model. In this setting
we have three production factors and two are specific to each sector. The third factor,
usually labor, is mobile between sectors. Under these conditions, the distributional results
are more complicated than in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The wage of the specific
factor increases when the relative price of that good rises, with the inverse result for the
other factors price. Labor prices increase, but proportionally less than the increase in
the final goods price and in general there are no simple generalizations concerning the
changes in real wages.
Hence, in this setting it is hard to draw straightforward conclusions about the distrib-
utional impact of tariff reductions. The distribution of land and capital, which are usually
taken as the specific factors, is not easily generalized and the impact on labor wages can
be insignificant in some cases.
Factor immobility across sectors. In this case, the identity of the industry in
which the factor was employed determines the changes in factor prices. This issue relates
to the Ricardo-Viner specific-factor model. However, the inconvenience can be solved by
using a weaker version of the “friends and enemies” argument. Hence, assuming that
capital is sector specific and labor is mobile, each good is friend to its own specific capital
and enemy to the other (Deardorff, 1993).
Non-diversification. Bhagwati (1959, 1998) presents the case when the non-diversification
assumption is dropped. In the 2x2 model, when a country specializes its production in
one of the goods, both factor prices increase as the price of the specialized good raises.
12The net effect of trade on wages will depend critically on global variety and scale effects related to
specialization of differentiated goods (Francois, 1996; Puga and Venables, 1997).
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He labels this the “lifting-all-boats” effect, since the asymmetrical effects on factor prices
central to the Stolper-Samuelson result disappear.
Technological change. In the HOS model, technology is assumed to be constant
and equal among sectors and countries. Relaxing this assumption yields several possibili-
ties. First, if technologies are different among countries, Desjonqueres et al. (1999) argue
that what remain critical are the rates of technological progress. However, they show that
the Stolper-Samuelson results still hold in general.
Secondly, when global technology is changing then the results of the theorem can be
reversed. In particular, sector-biased technological change has been the main argument
in explaining the wage dispersion process in the United States. This issue is analyzed in
depth when we review the wage inequality debate.
Capital Mobility. Another of the assumptions that can be relaxed is that of immo-
bility of factors between countries. In particular, this rules out foreign direct investment
(FDI). Some authors have acknowledged the important distributive effects of outsourcing
by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in developing countries.13 Given the sharp increase
in the volume of FDI from the North to the South in recent years, this is a persuasive
explanation for the apparent Stolper-Samuelson anomaly in the South. We analyze this
topic further in the section concerning market structure issues.
Diversification cones. Finally, we present a compelling theoretical explanation to
revise the Stolper-Samuelson results in developing countries. In a world with wide diver-
gences in relative endowments, global FPE is ruled out. Instead, countries are grouped
in “diversification cones”. Inside each cone, countries have similar relative factor endow-
ments and produce the same range of goods. Hence, there is local FPE and specialization
in certain goods. In this setting, countries compete within their own cone and trade
liberalization will increase the price of the locally abundant factor in the cone14 and the
theorem’s results must be revised. The main idea of the theorem is still valid, but the
reference group for which to compare relative factor abundance is no longer the global
economy, but each country’s own diversification cone.
13See for example, Feenstra and Hanson (2004).
14Dixit and Norman (1980).
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Using this idea, Davis (1996) modifies the original HOS model by including many
countries, three goods and two factors. In particular, a LDC can be labor-abundant in a
global context, but capital-abundant in their diversification cone. In this case, the change
in factor prices is the opposite to the anticipated changes predicted by the conventional
generalization of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
Theoretical explanations dealing with the personal distribution
As mentioned above, the Stolper-Samuelson was originally intended to deal only with
the functional distribution of income. Nonetheless, some authors extend the basic theo-
rem’s results to analyze the impact of trade on the personal distribution of income.
The following set of papers explains some shortfalls of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
to deal with the personal distribution of income. In relation to our reference framework,
this group of authors mainly looks after the dynamic interaction between the relative
initial endowments in the economy and the ownership matrix. Using these interactions,
they explain the influence of trade liberalization on the personal distribution of income.
The ownership structure. Spilimbergo et al. (1999) state that the ownership
matrix is mainly determined by the initial relative endowments and that it varies across
time and countries. They observe that some factors can be accumulated without restric-
tions (land and capital), but others have a natural limit (skills and education). Therefore,
when a country is mainly endowed with the first kind of factors, income distribution can
be very unequal. On the other hand, economies endowed with the second kind of factors
are expected to be more egalitarian.
Therefore, the initial endowment is not only influencing inequality through the Stolper-
Samuelson mechanism, but it can also determine the initial level of inequality. Moreover,
unequal distributions can create political and institutional mechanisms to maintain the
status quo and the interrelations that this generates are further analyzed below.
Dynamic framework. Fisher (2001) incorporates a dynamic framework to the
analysis. This is a major improvement, since it is then possible to study the interac-
tion between income distribution and the ownership matrix. This author uses a set of
two factors: unskilled labor that is equally distributed to all agents and wealth, which is
unequally distributed. By wealth he refers to an array of assets: human capital, capital
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holdings, land, natural resources and any other asset that can be used as a production
factor and yield a monetary return. Each agent lives a single period and earns the wage
of his unskilled labor and the wealth he was bequeathed, then he has a random marginal
propensity to consume and bequests to his sole descendant. He uses the Lorenz curve to
study the personal income distribution and concludes that long-run inequality is deter-
mined by the interest rate. The intuition is that in a steady state all assets will receive the
same return as physical capital. Thus, a decrease in the interest rate diminishes the rel-
ative importance of wealth with respect to unskilled labor and improves the distribution
of income.
The impact of trade on personal income distribution will depend on the behavior of
the interest rate after trade liberalization. To model trade, he uses a dynamic specific-
factors model. He concludes that trade liberalization in a land-abundant country will
increase inequality and decrease it in a labor-abundant country. This result can be used
to explain the empirical evidence that land-abundant Latin America has faced an increase
in inequality after trade liberalization. Furthermore, when trade liberalization is comple-
mented with capital mobility, the previous results are counterbalanced and in the long
run the country’s inequality is equal to world inequality.
Political and Institutional Explanations. The last group of contributors
pays more attention to the direct effect of political and institutional interactions with
the ownership matrix. They do not focus on how the factor endowments affects S, but
instead, they analyze the changes that trade liberalization and globalization create on the
political and institutional conditions of the country and how this affects income distribu-
tion through S. This is a more heterodox point of view, but cannot be disregarded, given
the importance of institutional conditions in the distribution of income. When the govern-
ment is introduced to the equation, it is obvious that institutional changes are important
in determining income inequality —through redistribution policies, market interventions
and labor market regulations.
First, a direct link is provided by the way in which the government redistributes tariff
revenues. In our reference framework, we have not explicitly dealt on how this can be
done, although one can assume that it is redistributed in a way in which distribution is
not altered. However, once the government is in the equation, such an assumption must
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be revised. In many developing countries tariff revenues are important income source
for the government and thus, its redistribution can have a measurable impact on income
inequality. In addition, trade liberalization significantly reduces this income source and
the previous benefactors are hurt.
Another point of view is voiced by Cornia (1999), who presents some economic and
specially, non-economic analysis. He states that there has been a recent surge in inequality
worldwide15 and that this episode seems to be related to changes in economic policies
and ideology, which reflect a shift towards liberalization and globalization. He gives a
number of stabilization and structural adjustment policies, related to the “Washington
Consensus” that may have caused this increase. Among others, financial liberalization,
the rise of financial rents, privatization and the distribution of industrial assets, changes
in labor market institutions, and changes in the tax and transfer system that have eroded
the redistributive role of the state.
Accordingly, Robinson (2000) stresses the institutional and political determinants of
inequality and how globalization interacts with these. He numbers three main relation-
ships between globalization and income distribution. First, the economic behavior that
determines factor prices (i.e. the Stolper-Samuelson effect). Second, he considers that
property rights may be treated as endogenous and argues that globalization affects the
income distribution by altering the ownership of assets. Third, he says that globalization
influences the equilibrium of institutions and policies at a given time.
He presents historical and political evidence suggesting that the impact of globalization
on inequality depends much on the institutional and political situation of each country and
region. He concludes that political institutions primarily determine income distribution
in Latin America, while trade and globalization play a complementary role to this, but are
not the main influence. In other words, the ownership matrix and the interactions created
by private and public interactions play a crucial role in the whole analysis. Implicit in his
argument, is the fact that some production factors, such as land and natural resources,
15He uses a 77-country database and some national and regional studies. However, as mentioned above,
Sala-i-Martin (2002a,b) presents a more convincing methodology, which contradicts the perception that
global inequality is increasing.
27
have large non-competitive profits that create political and institutional pressures to alter
the ownership matrix.
Finally, there is a sizeable literature concerned with the endogenous determination
of tariffs.16 Under this setting, the interaction of political institutions with trade policy
creates an integral relationship between both variables. Thus, the political institutions
influence on income inequality through tariffs can be increased or tampered, depending
on the specific political characteristics of each country.
Of course, such type of relationships can include other policies which also affect trade
and inequality. For instance, competition policy and the political and legal issues con-
cerned with FDI and MNEs. It suffices here to acknowledge such relationships and the
potential impact it can have on the outcome of trade policy on the distribution of income.
2.3.1.3 Market structure issues
An important critique to the traditional HOS model has been its inadequate explanatory
power in some areas. As explained by Helpman and Krugman (1985) standard trade
theory has failed to account for empirical evidence in developed countries in four main
issues: trade volumes, trade composition, the volume and role of intra-firm trade and
direct foreign investment, and finally, the welfare effects of trade liberalization. They
argue that these theoretical shortfalls can be explained by incorporating increasing returns
and imperfect competition in the analytical framework. In this way they explain the
large trade volumes among countries that are relatively similar, two-way trade in goods
with similar factor intensity, the little resource reallocation that some trade liberalization
episodes have created and the positive welfare effects of increased productivity due to
trade.
Although they only mention one interaction between economies of scale, trade and
income distribution, their analysis suggests a large scope of possible interactions. In the
following paragraphs we detail some of the arguments presented in the literature.
First, we must remember that the zero-profit condition is critical to the unequivocal
results of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The introduction of imperfect competition and
16See for example, Grossman and Helpman (2002).
28
other market structure issues may render this condition unattainable. Accordingly, the
results of the theorem may not hold.
Economies of scale
We can distinguish two approaches to model scale economies. The “old” method uses
economies of scale that are external to the firm but internal to the industry. In this
setting, we can still work with perfect competition. The “new” approach works instead
with imperfect competition, since economies of scale are internal to the firm.
With the “old” approach it is straightforward to observe that economies of scale can
reverse the Stolper-Samuelson results. An increase in production raises the marginal
productivity of both factors and hence, both factor prices can increase (Panagariya, 1980).
However, the final effect on the real factor returns depends on the parameters of the general
equilibrium model.
Using the new approach, Krugman (1981) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) employ
economies of scale to give an example of the influence of trade on the distribution of
income. In general, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is still at work, but the introduction
of economies of scale and product differentiation adds additional effects. The final outcome
over the relative factor payments depends on three aspects (Oliveira-Martins, 1994):
• Initial relative factor endowments
• The degree or extent of economies of scale
• The elasticity of substitution between varieties (both domestic and imported) of a
given product
The first point is the familiar Stolper-Samuelson result. The bigger the endowment
differences, the volume of trade will increase and each country will specialize more in
the good which intensively uses the abundant factor. The second and third effects are
consequence of the incorporation of economies of scale and may reverse the first effect. As
the economy moves towards free trade, the market demand will increase and economies
of scale can be exploited, increasing the returns to both factors. The third effect, which
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measures the preference for product diversity, determines the level at which the economies
of scale may operate.
Krugman (1981) finds that if products are sufficiently differentiated, both factors im-
prove their wages. Moreover, this result also holds when countries have a sufficiently
similar initial factor endowment. Through these findings, he explains the lack of distrib-
utional effects produced by North-North trade liberalization.
Accordingly, Oliveira-Martins (1994) observes that there is a trade-off between economies
of scale and product diversity. When there is strong product differentiation, there is less
competition and it is easier to exploit economies of scale. As products tend to be more
homogenous, competition increases and potential gains from scale economies are ham-
pered. He also argues that intra-industry trade does not substantially affect factor wages.
Instead, it is inter-industry specialization which causes the Stolper-Samuelson results.
Based on this theoretical framework, Oliveira-Martins empirically tests the relation-
ship between trade and wages in the OECD countries. He finds that industries with low
product differentiation have a higher import penetration. Besides, the wage differential
is bigger than in industries with high product differentiation. As expected, industries
with strong differentiation usually have scale economies and higher industrial concentra-
tion. In this example, market power and economies of scale tamper and may reverse the
Stolper-Samuelson results.
Pro-competitive effects of trade
When firms in a specific sector have market power, they are producing less than in
the perfect competition benchmark. If trade increases competition in the sector, output
increases and this benefits the wages of the relatively abundant factor (Bhagwati and
Dehejia, 1994; Richardson, 1995). Additionally, the non-economic profit generated in
non-competitive industries can be distributed in different ways. Mainly they are taken
by the capital owners, but in highly unionized sectors, it can be shared with the workers.
Both issues affect relative wages and income inequality.
Hanson and Harrison (1999) find evidence that the trade reforms in Mexico and Mo-
rocco reduced the profit margins in both countries. Currie and Harrison (1997) also
reported this result for Morocco. Thus, the reforms brought pro-competitive effects to
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these economies and under these conditions, factor prices share the adjustment strain
together with profit margins. In Morocco it was purely profit margins which decreased,
leaving wages unaltered. For Mexico, the changes came mainly in a reduction in the wages
of protected and highly unionized workers.17
A similar argument was advanced by Borjas and Ramey (1995). They based their
explanation on the statistically strong correlation between the wage differential and the
imports of durable goods in the United States, the fact that workers in the durable goods
industries were mainly unskilled and highly unionized, and that there is a high concentra-
tion and profits in these industries. Before trade liberalization and the increase of imports
(or decrease in exports), the owners shared the high profits with the workers, through ne-
gotiations with the unions, and the workers had above-average wages. With the increase
in trade, profits decreased, as well as the wages for unskilled workers. This explanation
also allows the inclusion of the effects of unions on the distribution of non-competitive
profits, which was stressed by Freeman (1991) as an important wage determinant.
However, this analysis has been criticized and has important shortcuts. The relative
weight of the workers from the durable goods sector with respect to the total working
force does not seem to be high enough to explain the whole behavior of wages in the
United States. In addition, there is a relatively small percentage of unskilled labor force
that is unionized in the manufacturing sectors in the United States (Bhagwati, 1998).
Furthermore, Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) do not find a decrease in the premiums paid
to unionized workers in manufacturing sectors. Nevertheless, this is an interesting market
structure approach to the problem and stresses the importance of profit margins for the
distributional effects of trade.
Oligopolistic competition
More recently, Neary (2001) uses an oligopolistic competition model to explain the wage
differential episode. He assumes that there is a domestic and a foreign firm, which compete
in two stages: first they decide their investment levels and then the production quantities.
With trade liberalization, the domestic firm is no longer protected and both firms engage
in aggressive investment to cut down the other firm. Thus, competition fostered by trade
17This is consistent with the findings of Revenga (1997).
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liberalization creates investment incentives for both oligopoly firms. Provided that this
investment is skill-intensive, the relative demand for skilled workers will increase and this
will widen the wage differential. The results of this model are consistent with the three
stylized facts of the wage debate, which are presented in the corresponding section below.
Furthermore, this model provides a promising use of imperfect competition models to
explain the relationship between trade and income distribution.
Incorporating market structure into the theoretical reference framework
By allowing non-competitive profits, we can enhance equation (2.11). Using equation
(2.8) we include a non-competitive profit function vector (π) that is determined by firm
markup levels (m) . For instance, π =
P
n πn (m) , with πn(0) = 0 and π
0
n(mn) > 0; where
n = 1, . . . , N is the number of firms in the economy. Then we have:
W = Pw (Ew) · T · φ · δπ (2.12)
where δ is a vector of profit distribution that represents the bargaining power or
institutional mechanism through which each factor owner receives part of the firms’ non-
competitive profits. Among others, this includes the presence and power of unions, and
labor and capital market institutions. However, it excludes specific factors of production
that may be responsible for the firms’ profits (i.e. patents, copyrights), which will be
incorporated in the factor productivity vector φ and will have an independent return.
Assuming that the profit function is identical across industries and countries, income
distribution will be given by:
g (Y ) = g (E,Ew, T, S, φ, δ,m) (2.13)
When we incorporate economies of scale, the factor productivity will be a function
of the economic activity of the firm λn, the production function and endowments: φn =
φ (λn, Fn (En)), with
∂φn
∂λn
> 0, when there are increasing returns to scales and ∂φn∂λn < 0
with decreasing returns. Under imperfect competition, equation (2.9) changes to:
W =W (Ew, E, T, φ, δ,m, λ) (2.14)
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With overall increasing returns to scale we have ∂W∂λ > 0; and
∂W
∂λ < 0 with decreasing
returns. Incorporating both imperfect competition and economies of scale gives:
g (Y ) = g (E,Ew, T, S, φ, δ,m, λ) (2.15)
By reasons previously explained, equation (2.15) is still an incomplete attempt to
describe how income distribution is determined. For our purposes, it theoretically incor-
porates market structure issues in the link between trade and income inequality.
Multinational enterprises
Multinational firms also play an important role in the link between trade and income
inequality. On the HOS setting firms are not explicitly treated, but there is much intra-
firm trade in world markets and MNEs are important international trade actors with an
ever increasing influence (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Since the 1960s, MNEs began
to penetrate domestic markets in a global scale and strategic alliances among firms have
increased trade in technology (Richardson, 1995). According to Sachs and Shatz (1994),
the empirical evidence points to a significant relation between trade volumes and the
presence of MNEs in developing countries.
Outsourcing activities conducted mostly by MNEs is one of the main explanations
employed to understand the recent episode of wage dispersion. Two papers by Feenstra
and Hanson (1995a, 1995b) study the trade reforms in Mexico and find evidence of an
increase in the wage differential. Moreover, this rising wage gap is associated with changes
internal to industries and even internal to plants. They explain this phenomenon by
introducing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the outsourcing of local production
by MNEs. They depart from the HOS model by introducing intermediate goods and
the full specialization of countries in some goods. In this framework, without factor
price equalization between countries, the North specializes in inputs that are relatively
intensive in skilled labor and the South specializes in inputs that are relatively intensive
in unskilled labor. Then the flow of capital provided by the MNEs shifts some unskilled-
intensive production (from the viewpoint of the North) to the South, were it is regarded
as skilled-intensive. This mechanism increases the wage differential in both regions.
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They also find that FDI growth is positively correlated with the relative demand for
skilled labor, which supports the hypothesis that outsourcing by multinationals has been
a significant factor in the increase in the relative demand for skilled labor in Mexico
and they expect this hypothesis to hold for other countries, as well. These papers give
support to the idea that MNEs are playing an important role in the functional distribution
of income, through an increase in the relative demand of skilled workers in both developed
and developing countries.
Closely related to the outsourcing hypothesis, is the skill-enhancing-trade hypothesis
proposed by Robbins (1996b). He argues that trade liberalization accelerates capital
inflows and technology transfers from the North to the South. As a consequence, these
inflows increase the productivity of skilled labor and this widens the wage differential in
developing countries.
Markusen and Venables (1996) arrive at similar conclusions. They adapt a formal
model of MNEs and scale economies to address distributional effects. They find that the
increased participation of MNEs can raise the wage differential in the North and, when the
endowment differences are big enough, also in the South. In essence, MNEs change the
trade flows from final goods to intermediates and services. This change breaks the factor
price and final goods price linkage central to the Stolper-Samuelson results. Accordingly,
multinationals export firm-specific knowledge-capital and their production is fragmented
between skilled and unskilled-labor-intensive activities in national and foreign plants.
Besides the wage differential result, they also find that MNEs may export low skilled jobs
to the South and that trade barriers do not protect unskilled labor in the high-income
countries.
Although the exact effect of outsourcing is open to debate in the North18, it is still
regarded as an important factor that can explain wage differentials.
To summarize this section, we found important theoretical arguments to take into con-
sideration when analyzing the effect of trade on income inequality. The Stolper-Samuelson
remains the best analytical tool available to examine the links. However, there are impor-
tant theoretical reasons that can invalidate the Stolper-Samuelson results. In particular,
18We discuss this further in the wage inequality debate section.
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technological change and outsourcing have received special attention in the literature.
Additionally, caution must be used when shifting from the functional to the personal
distribution of income. In particular, the importance of country-specific and political
variables to determine household inequality must be controlled when conducting empiri-
cal tests.
In the following sections we turn our attention to the empirical studies that test the
link between trade and inequality. First, we give a review of the trade and wage inequality
debate, which is focused on the functional distribution of income. Later, we present the
empirical results that directly test trade liberalization against the personal distribution
of income.
2.3.2 The trade and wage inequality debate
There is a vast literature analyzing the effects of trade on wage inequality. In this context,
some of the studies have been used to test the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the effect
of trade on the functional distribution of income. The surge of studies was encouraged by
the sharp wage inequality increase in the United States that began in the 1980s (Bound
and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992).
As exposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1995b) while there is a general agreement that
the wage inequality increase was caused by a shift in the relative demand for skilled labor,
the sources of this shift were controversial. On one hand, some argued that skilled-biased
technological change had increased the demand and the returns to skilled labor.19 Alter-
natively, some authors claim that trade liberalization and increased North-South trade
have been responsible.20 This trade argument relied, in general terms, on the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem: the unskilled workers in the North will have a relative wage decrease
with respect to the relatively abundant skilled workers. With respect to our theoreti-
19Leamer (1994) argues that it is sector-biased technological change which raises the relative produc-
tivity of skilled labor. However, Krugman (1995a) forcefully demonstrates that when the small-country
assumption is dropped and technological change affects international prices, then it is factor-biased tech-
nological change that matters.
20It is important to remind that trade per se is an endogenous variable in a general equilibrium trade
model. Thus, the trade explanation is based on the change of an exogenous variable that induces more
North-South trade. The possibilities include tariff reductions and other trade policy instruments, drops
in transport costs, shifts in foreign tastes and technology (Deardorff and Haikura, 1994; Slaughter, 1998).
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cal framework, the skill-biased technological change will be represented by a change in
the vector φ and the trade argument is represented by shifts in tariffs and the initial
endowment vectors (T,E,Ew).
2.3.2.1 OECD countries
As mentioned before, the main debate has focused almost entirely on the experience of
the United States. However some studies have included other OECD countries which also
present an increase in the wage differential or were unemployment has risen. We analyze
first the methodological debate and afterwards, the empirical evidence.
Theoretical and methodological issues
Besides the technology change and trade arguments, there were some alternative ex-
planations to the wage inequality rise. Immigration was mentioned to have increased the
supply of unskilled labor and decreased the wage of these workers. Thus, immigration was
complementing the trade effect (Borjas 1994; Borjas, Freeman and Katz 1992; Williamson
1998).
Others blamed the labor market institutions. The OECD wage data showed that
those countries with more flexible labor markets had greater wage inequality. One of
these issues was the decentralization of wage determination and the power and coverage
of unions (Freeman 1991).21 While the United States and the United Kingdom had greater
wage inequality, continental Europe had greater unemployment. This suggests that the
labor market institutions affected the final outcome of the labor market shocks, but did
not generate these shocks (Wood, 1995; Neary, 2001).
At the end, labor supply issues and labor market institutions were left out of the
main debate, which was centered on the skilled-biased technological change and trade
liberalization arguments. Both were regarded as key influences, but the magnitude of
each became a critical part of the debate. In particular, the concern was on how to
21He acknowledges, however, that deunionization was not the critical factor explaining the surge in
wage inequality. In addition, Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) and Bound and Johnson (1992) do not find
a significant role for deunionization.
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estimate the impact of both phenomena. This has created an analytical dispute that has
been implicit in most of the literature.
In general terms, one can observe a confrontation of the labor economists (using
mainly partial equilibrium analysis and econometric methods) with trade economists (us-
ing mainly general equilibrium analysis and the HOS trade model). Several authors con-
vincingly point out that a general equilibrium approach is the appropriate tool to tackle
the problem.22 Nevertheless, this may complicate the empirically testing and hence, par-
tial equilibrium and an econometric approach can also yield useful insights (Richardson,
1995).
The starting point of the debate has been the correlation of trade volumes, trade
deficits and wage inequality. Labor economists have used the factor content of trade
analysis to link the wage dispersion with trade. This analysis looks at the factor inten-
sities of exports and imports. In the case that the skill to unskilled labor intensity in
exports is higher than in imports, then increased trade volumes are associated with an
increased demand for skilled workers. Hence, increased trade widens the wage differential.
Complementing this insights with the increased trade volumes and trade deficits in the
United States since the 1980s, has lead some authors to state that the wage differential
had been caused by trade liberalization.23
However, this approach has been criticized on several grounds. First, it lacks a clear
theoretical framework to link the mentioned variables and this qualifies any conclusion
drawn from these simple relationships. In fact, there is an implicit flaw in the analysis,
which is easily observed using the HOS trade model. For the Stolper-Samuelson effects to
be in play, the relative price of skilled and unskilled labor intensive goods must change.
Trade volumes are in this case an endogenous variable and can be affected by several
factors and thus, the behavior of such an endogenous variable does not establish causality.
Therefore, the factor content of trade analysis, while looking at trade volumes and
not at relative prices, has been regarded as an invalid method to explain wage inequality
caused by trade.24 Nonetheless, Krugman (1995) argues that the approach is valid when
22Richardson (1995), Bhagwati (1998) and Francois and Nelson (1998).
23Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992), Murphy and Welch (1992), and Wood (1994, 1995).
24Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994), and Bhagwati (1998).
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dealing with small trade shares, as is the case in North-South trade. In this context,
using the factor content of trade can answer the question on how the increased volumes
of imports from the South changed the wages in the North, compared to the case where
trade had not occurred.
Further criticism to the labor economists come from two additional results of the
HOS model (Leamer, 1993; Robbins, 1996b). Labor economists often net out relative
supply shifts. However, labor supply changes do not affect relative wages and demand
shifts induced by trade are directly observable in wage changes. Secondly, exchange rate
variations also leave relative wages unchanged. This observation invalidates those studies
that focused on the dollar revaluation (i.e. Murphy and Welch, 1992; Revenga, 1992).
Empirical evidence
In this section we turn our attention away from the methodological issues and deal with
the empirical evidence. The relevant empirical facts can be summarized as follows:
• the relative price of unskilled-intensive goods has not declined significantly25
• the ratio of skilled to unskilled employment has increased in all sectors (not only in
the skill-intensive sector)
• the wage differential has risen in both North and South
Using the first fact in combination with the HOS model, several authors conclude
that trade does not have much influence on the wage gap.26 Moreover, if trade was the
cause of the wage dispersion episode, then the unskilled to skilled employment ratio must
decrease. Given the second empirical fact, this is not the case.27 Lastly, the Stolper-
Samuelson effect should reduce the wage dispersion in developing countries, not increase
it.28
The first fact was initially presented by Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). They claim
that the relative price of investment goods, which are taken to be skill-intensive goods,
25As we illustrate below, this is still disputed by some authors, but is generally accepted.
26Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994), and Bhagwati (1998).
27Krugman and Lawrence (1994).
28We analyze further this empirical fact in the following section.
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was falling instead of increasing. However, Sachs and Schatz (1994) refute this conclusion
and claim that the price of skill-intensive goods was driven by computer prices.29 Once
these are removed, the relative price is increasing.30 Yet, they do not find that the fall in
the relative price of unskilled-intensive goods is large enough to account for the significant
wage dispersion.
This last point can be explained by another argument of labor economists, i.e., that the
smooth transition of labor from one sector to the other, implicit in the general equilibrium
approach, is not reasonable. They remark that there are adjustment costs and that these
costs can cause wage differentials. For instance, skilled labor can shift more smoothly to
another productive sector and obtain earnings similar to those he enjoyed before. This
may not be the case for unskilled workers. Therefore, a small change in relative prices can
cause a significant change in the wage differential in the short run (Richardson, 1995).
For instance, Slaughter (1998) acknowledges this problem and suggests that such labor-
market frictions can create a lag in the price-wage relationship that can seriously affect
the empirical testing.
On the other hand, the biased technology explanation is consistent with both an in-
crease in the wage gap and constant final goods prices. Leamer (1994) and Richardson
(1995) demonstrate how in a general equilibrium setting, trade prices and biased techno-
logical change are the causes of factor price changes in the long run. Empirically, Lawrence
and Slaughter (1993) find a significant and positive relation between the growth of total
factor productivity (TFP) and the intensive use of skilled labor, which further supports
the biased technological change hypothesis.31
However, there is also an important shortcoming with the technological change expla-
nation. As the second empirical fact shows, the skill intensity in both sectors has increased
and this is incompatible with the skilled biased-technological change argument.32 In an
29The price of computers fell sharply due to extraordinary productivity increases, which are hard to
measure and thus, it is hard to obtain the “effective price”, i.e., the net effect of price changes and
total factor productivity changes. Nonetheless, since the introduction of personal computers has been
mentioned as a critical part in the recent technological spell, it is a crucial decision to exclude them.
30This last result depends on the price definition used and in some cases the changes are not statistically
significant.
31Although this is again challenged by Sachs and Shatz (1994), which find they TFP changes actually
favored low-skill labor.
32See Neary (2001) for a thorough exposition.
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attempt to account for this fact, Francois and Nelson (1998) use a combination of tech-
nological change that is both sector and factor biased. They show that in this case, the
skilled-intensive sector becomes more skilled intensive while the other sector is more un-
skilled intensive. Yet, the empirical evidence suggests that both sectors became more
skill-intensive and their explanation is not satisfactory. Moreover, Leamer (1994) argues
that technological change has in fact decreased the wage differential. In general, there are
several limitations on the empirical testing of the nature and magnitude of technological
changes. These limitations make it very difficult to check if technological change has in
fact been the culprit (Deardorff, 1998).
Alternatively, some authors combine both effects to explain the wage gap increase and
the changing ratio of skilled to unskilled labor.33 On the other hand, Neary (2001) disre-
gards both the trade and technical change arguments as the causes of the wage dispersion.
He argues that none of the explanations comply with the three stylized facts and he uses
his oligopolistic competition model (discussed above) as an alternative explanation.
To qualify the impact of trade, Krugman (1995a, 1995b) focuses on the relative im-
portance of North-South trade. Using the fact that manufactured imports from newly
industrialized economies (NIEs) to OECD countries has only increased from almost zero
to 2%, he assess a significant but rather small impact of trade on factor prices.
Finally, the introduction of outsourcing and MNEs has also played an important role in
the debate. As explained above, Feenstra and Hanson (1995a, 1995b) have argued in favor
of outsourcing as an additional trade induced mechanism and an important determinant
in the wage episode. Nonetheless, outsourcing has been downgraded as an explanation
of the wage differential in the United States (Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993; Berman,
Bound and Griliches, 1994; Slaughter, 1995). One of the reasons is that the magnitude of
outsourcing is too small to account for the wage differential increase. Other reason is that
South unskilled labor is apparently a weak price substitute for American unskilled workers
(Slaughter, 1995). However, Feenstra and Hanson (1995a, 1996 and 2004) observe that
33Sachs and Schatz (1994), Leamer (1993).
40
when a broader definition of outsourcing is taken34, it can explain an important share of
the wage changes.
Going one step further, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) use a regression linking indus-
try prices and wages to disaggregate the effects of trade and skill-biased technological
change.35 Trade is taken as the broad outsourcing definition introduced before and the
respective technical change as expenditures in high-technology capital.36 Their estima-
tions predict correctly the wage changes and they find that trade has a significant effect,
but technological change is the most important factor to account for the increase in the
wage differential.37 However, Slaughter (1998), surveying this and other studies that
used the same technique, concludes that the results are sensitive to the exact estimating
strategy.
We conclude this section with Table 2-1. Here we use an arrangement from Cline
(1997) to summarize and frame each position in the debate.
The general perception is that the debate and empirical evidence has been favorable
for the skilled-biased technological change explanation (Richardson 1995; Cline 1997).
Trade liberalization is accepted to have had a significant influence on the wage inequality
increase, although the magnitude seems to be relatively small compared to the effect of
the skill-biased technological change (Slaughter, 1998). However, when complemented
with the outsourcing argument, trade does seem to have a stronger effect.
For our purposes, the debate is corroborating the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Al-
though the weight attributed to trade in the increase in the wage differential is relatively
small, it is a significant influence and it has the expected direction.
2.3.2.2 Developing countries
Most of the empirical evidence for this group of countries, especially from Latin America
in the 1980s, reports different results from those expected using the Stolper-Samuelson
34One that includes all imported intermediates or final goods, which are used to produce or are sold
under an American brand.
35They regress the change in the industry price on the level of factor shares, where the estimated
coefficients are interpreted as the expected wage changes.
36Of which computers is the only significant component.
37They reach this result when they adjust industry prices to obtain the “effective price”.
41
Table 2-1: Overview of the trade and wage inequality debate
Labor Economists Trade Economists
Borjas, Freeman & Katz (1992) Leamer (1993, 1994, 1996)
Murphy & Welch (1992) Sachs & Shatz (1994, 1996)
Trade Revenga (1992) Wood (1994, 1995, 1998) /1
Borjas & Ramey (1995) Feenstra & Hanson (1995a/b, 1997) /2
Burtless (1995) Deardorff (1998)
Francois & Nelson (1998)
Mincer (1991) Lawrence & Slaughter (1993)
Davis & Haltiwanger (1991) Bhagwati & Dehejia (1994)
Bound & Johnson (1992) Deardoff & Hakura (1994)
Berman, Bound & Griliches (1994) Krugman & Lawrence (1994)
Technology Krugman (1995a/b)
(no trade) Baldwin & Cain (1997)
Bhagwati (1998)
Desjonqueres et al.  (1999)
Notes: The 'trade' row includes papers giving a moderate and high importance to trade, while the 'technology'
           row includes papers favoring skilled-biased technological change and give a low trade effect.
           1/ Wood is a development economist
           2/ These authors refer to trade as outsourcing by MNEs and FDI.
theorem. This has prompted Davis (1996) to call the case an anomaly. Nevertheless,
it is important to keep in mind that developing countries are more difficult to study, as
exposed by Robbins (1996b):
“Less developed country studies often face greater data limitations, less
perfect understanding of non-trade influences on their labor markets, and the
difficulty of controlling for important non-trade changes.”
A first attempt to analyze economies outside the OECD was made by the World Bank
(1987). They analyzed the cases of Singapore, Hong Kong and Korea and reported that
the theorem was corroborated. With this evidence they encouraged trade policy reforms
in developing countries during the 1980s.
However, the most studied developing country case has been Mexico (Feenstra and
Hanson 1995b; Hanson and Harrison, 1995, 1999; Feliciano 2001). These studies found
evidence that trade liberalization has in fact increased instead of declined wage inequal-
ity, as was expected from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, Hanson and Harrison
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(1999) argue that the decline in tariffs was highest in the unskilled labor intensive sec-
tors.38 Under these conditions, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem holds, since the price of
unskilled labor intensive goods is reduced and this diminishes the wage of these workers.
In particular, these sectors were highly protected before the reforms and had significant
profit margins in the domestic markets. The tariff reductions increased exports and re-
duced the profit margins. Outsourcing from MNEs was another explanation common to
all these papers related to the Mexican experience. As explained above, the capital in-
flow that FDI brings, has been described as skilled-biased and thus, can also explain the
increase in the wage dispersion.
Robbins (1996a, 1996b) studies nine Latin American and East Asian countries39 and
reports that wage inequality rose after trade reforms. In addition, he finds that labor
supply shifts and real exchange rates do affect relative wages, in contradiction to the HOS
model. Therefore, he nets out these supply changes on wages to identify the demand shifts.
To explain the apparent Stolper-Samuelson anomaly, he employs his skill-enhancing-trade
hypothesis. He supports this claim by finding a positive and significant relationship
between his estimated labor demand variable and the imported capital stock.
Wood (1997) separates both regions and claims that in Latin America the theorem
fails empirical evidence, but is supported by the East Asian experience. He introduces
land (also associated with natural resources) as a third production factor and employs it
to explain the different inequality outcomes of the trade liberalization episodes in Latin
America and Southeast Asia. He notices that Latin American countries are relatively
land-abundant, while Southeast Asian countries are relatively labor-abundant and the
developed North is capital-abundant. However, he does not find any strong empirical
evidence to support that this endowment differences can explain the inequality results.
Instead, he suggests another plausible reason of the different outcomes in both regions.
The 1960-70s, when Southeast Asian countries began to liberalize trade, was different
from the 1980-1990s, when Latin America began to liberalize. In the second time period,
there was an increase in the world supply of unskilled labor after the rise of trade volumes
experimented by China and other low-income Asian countries. As a result, one can use
38They also claim that this was the case in Morocco.
39Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan and Uruguay.
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an argument related to the diversification cones hypothesis. Thus, this event changed the
cone in which some middle-income countries were and their comparative advantages were
shifted from products intensive in unskilled labor to products of medium-skill intensity.
Subsequent trade liberalization in these countries reduced the relative wages for unskilled
workers. Secondly, technical progress between the 1970s and the 1990s was biased against
unskilled workers, in accordance with the skill-enhancing-trade hypothesis.
Unfortunately, Robbins and Wood do not analyze changes in the relative price of final
goods, nor do they check for the sectoral composition of the tariff reductions. Thus, it is
not clear whether the Stolper-Samuelson results are an important influence or if the effect
is going in the right direction.
Williamson (1998) introduces economic history into the debate and argues that the
previous globalization process in the late XIX century was as big or bigger that the on
in late XX century. He finds evidence to support the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in the
previous case. He also says that immigration, together with trade liberalization, plays a
central role in the wage convergence process.
In a recent report, the World Bank (2001) cites a number of case studies that suggest
that openness over the last decade is partially responsible for increasing relative wage
dispersion. They argue that relative endowments, previous trade protectionism patterns
and technological change can be influencing these results.
With respect to the influence of labor market institutions in developing countries, ini-
tial studies did not find a significant influence on the wage inequality results. Harrison
and Revenga (1995) claimed that the empirical evidence for Mexico and Morocco sug-
gested that labor market restrictions were not responsible for the labor market response
to trade reforms. However, more recent papers have stressed the importance that these
institutions exert in developing countries through changes in labor demand elasticities
(Rodrik, 1997; Turrini, 2002).
Thus, besides the three effects already identified (e.g. trade liberalization under a
diversification cones context, FDI and technology inflows),.labor market institutions be-
comes an additional factor to explain the increased wage inequality in the South.
Summarizing the studies presented here, there are mix results regarding the evidence
on the Stolper-Samuelson results for developing countries. Most studies that disregard
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the theorem lack a robust specification in the analysis. Those that support it, are few
and case specific. In general, there is a lack of representativeness of other developing
countries regions (Africa and South Asia) and further research is necessary to obtain a
better understanding of the effects of trade on wage inequality in the South.
2.3.3 Trade and the household distribution of income
Contrasting the trade and wages debate, the empirical tests on the effect of trade on
the personal distribution are based on cross-country and panel data analysis. In these
studies it can no longer be taken as granted that inequality has increased, as was the
case in the wage dispersion debate. Now, we must associate trade openness with possible
distributional changes and this introduces an additional and important problem: how to
measure trade liberalization. Thus, we first deal with this issue and afterwards present the
empirical literature that links trade openness with the household distribution of income.
2.3.3.1 Trade openness measurement
There are a number of important analytical and practical problems involved when mea-
suring trade openness. As explained by Berg and Krueger (2003), the main concern is
about policies that distort market allocation and there can be many instruments that can
achieve this; among others, tariffs and non-tariffs barriers (NTBs), and discriminatory
exchange rates. However, one must also keep in mind that there are possible trade policy
substitutions that cannot be monitored by a single variable indicator.
Direct policy measures
This approach directly uses some policy measures that restricts trade, such as average
tariffs and NTBs. The problem here is how to aggregate meaningfully across goods.
Simple averages can overestimate the weight of goods that are relatively unimportant for
a country, but have high tariffs (Dollar and Kraay, 2004). Since tariffs affect trade flows,
weighting the tariffs by trade volume can also be inappropriate because tariff levels have
different effects on goods and moreover, different welfare effects. In addition, there is no
necessary relationship between official and collected tariff rates.
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On the other hand, NTBs are extremely hard to quantify. Thus, most of the indicators
focus on easily quantifiable barriers, but usually exclude the most difficult ones to measure.
Additionally, non-tariff coverage ratios do not discriminate adequately between highly and
less restrictive barriers (Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2001).
Moreover, tariffs and NTBs can be substituted in a way that low average tariffs can be
compatible with high protectionist overall policies. Finally, it is not clear if these direct
measures explain changes in trade volumes. For example, some studies have found that
both measures have little correlation with trade volumes (Dollar and Kraay, 2004), while
Rodrik (2000) does find a significant and negative relationship between average tariffs and
import/GDP ratios.
These are important critics and limitations, but there is no ideal openness indicator.
Therefore, these direct measures can be informative of trade policy and in contrast with
other indicators, provide non-binary values.
Policy-based measures
Another approach is to take into account the possible substitution between measures.
Sachs and Warner (1995) try to capture any substitution policies by looking at five differ-
ent trade policies. They construct a dummy variable for openness based on those countries
that pass each of the following policy tests:
• An average tariff rate below 40 percent
• NTBs covering less than 40 percent of trade
• A black market exchange rate premium below 20 percent on average during the
1970s and 1980s
• The absence of a socialist economic system
• The absence of an extractive state monopoly on major exports
If any of the previous criteria is not met, the economy is considered to be closed and
the index is assigned a value of zero.
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This approach has several drawbacks. First, being a dummy variable one cannot
differentiate degrees of openness.40 Second, some of the index components do not relate
directly to trade liberalization. For instance, Hanson and Harrison (1999) remark that
the black market premium measures factors other than trade policy. There has also been
criticism in the use of the marketing board component and the independence of the tariff
and quota measures with regard to the aggregated measure. Finally, Berg and Krueger
(2003) claim that the measure can be seen as a product of its time, since there are new
policies that restrict trade (e.g. sanitary and technical standards, contingent protection).
To sum up, the Sachs and Warner index is suitable to assess broader economic reforms
and the degree of liberalization of the economy, but it does not seem to properly isolate
trade policy.
Outcome-based measures
Finally, openness can be measured using trade volumes. The common indicator is the
ratio of exports plus imports with respect to Gross Domestic Product, i.e. (X+M)GDP . This
is a useful indicator of trade outcomes, but not necessarily of trade policy (Dollar and
Kraay, 2004). In fact, this particular measure can be influenced by a number of country
characteristics that are not related to trade policy at all. E.g. level of development,
country size, geographic factors and resource endowment. An alternative is to regress
(X+M)
GDP against these non-policy determinants of trade and take the residual as a measure
of openness. However, Berg and Krueger argue that the empirical models used in these
regressions are still not sufficiently accurate to identify the residual with policy.
An interesting approach is to use changes in the volume of trade over time (Dollar
and Kraay, 2004). In this way, the geographical and country specific variables, which
are assumed to be constant, drop out of the indicator. Of course, other economic policy
variables can also be changing with time, but at least the geographical ones are not.
However, Rodrik (2000) has criticized this indicator for its indirect relationship with
trade policy. He argues that policy makers cannot control the levels of trade, only the
tariffs and NTBs.
40Yet, some authors use the average of the indicator for a given period to obtain a value between zero
and one.
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Another refinement is to take into consideration the effects of openness on relative
prices. An expected increase of manufacturing productivity from trade increases the
relative price and relative importance of the non-tradable sectors. This effect can bias
the outcome index towards lower “real openness”. Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) suggest
correcting this bias using variables adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP).
Summarizing, there is no ideal openness indicator and each group of measures has its
own problems and limitations (Edwards, 1998). A strategy to overcome this problem has
been to test the robustness of the results using different openness indicators.41 Never-
theless, the measurement error induced by the openness indicators can be significant and
most be considered when conducting empirical research.
2.3.3.2 Empirical studies analyzing the effects of trade on the personal dis-
tribution of income
The trade and wages debate was centered exclusively on labor wages and excluded capital
and land rents. Thus, a generalization from this partial functional distribution to the
personal income distribution may be misleading.
Early studies that focused on the household distribution from the 1960s and 1970s
(Bhagwati, 1978; Krueger, 1978) produced mixed results that did not state a clear rela-
tionship between both variables. More recently, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1990) and
Spilimbergo et al. (1999), used the general equilibrium theoretical approach outlined in
Section 2.3.1 to test if trade has a significant impact on income inequality. Bourguignon
and Morrisson prove the importance of initial endowments on the personal distribution of
income. They find that there is higher inequality in land and natural resource abundant
countries. This finding is corroborated in most of the following studies. In addition, they
conclude that trade protection increases inequality. However, their sample is restricted
to small and medium-sized developing countries, it only covers one year (1970) and the
quality of the variables they use is dubious.42 Hence, their results can only be considered
as tentative (Fischer, 2001).
41Among others, Levine and Renelt (1992); Edwards (1997, 1998); and Greenaway et al. (1998).
42In particular, the ILO inequality dataset lacks many of the quality criteria implemented later by
Deininger and Squire (1996).
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Spilimbergo et al. significantly improve the empirical settings by using more countries,
a 28 year period and better constructed variables. They also find that factor endowments
can significantly account for income inequality. Land and capital abundant countries
are more unequal, while countries with relative high average skill levels are less unequal.
Additionally, when trade is introduced in the equation, factor endowments are still a sig-
nificant explanatory variable for income inequality. Overall, openness increases inequality,
but the effects depend on the initial factor endowments. Trade decreases inequality in
capital-abundant countries and increases inequality in skill-abundant countries. These
last results directly contradict the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and are rather puzzling,
but are later refuted by the other studies. As with the rest of studies that follow, they use
the DS inequality dataset, which allows panel data regressions. In addition, these authors
construct their own openness indicator, based on an adjustment of the volumes of trade
for geographical variables and factor endowments.
Edwards (1997) finds no evidence linking openness to increases in inequality. He pays
special attention to the methodological problems of measuring openness. Thus, he uses
six alternative openness indexes to test the robustness of his results. Inequality is defined
as the average Gini change from the 1970s to the 1980s and it is regressed against the
openness indexes and other control variables. Yet, he does not include initial endowments
in his regressions and his study is not directly comparable with the previous. Dollar
and Kraay (2002) use a similar approach, include endowment variables and do not find a
systematic relation between different openness indicators and the income of the poorest
20%. Although they claim that the income share of the first quintile is highly correlated
with the Gini coefficient, this introduces additional measurement errors to the already
highly problematic data on inequality. This problem is acknowledged by these authors
and thus, we do not consider it very informative on inequality, but on poverty.
In a related study, Litwin (1998) uses a sample of developing countries and finds a
negative relation between trade openness and inequality. She includes endowment vari-
ables and trade composition in the regressions. The endowment of human capital is an
important determinant of income inequality and can even reverse the positive openness
effects. Trade composition is also important and those countries with relatively more
manufactured exports than primary goods exports, experience better income distribu-
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tions. Thus, she concludes that trade openness can reduce inequality when human capital
accumulation is increased. This directly improves the income distribution and indirectly,
by changing the composition of trade towards manufactured goods.
Some studies use the Kuznets curve tradition to check for openness effects and hence,
include a quadratic GDP specification. Higgins and Williamson (1999) find limited sup-
port for the positive impact of trade openness on income inequality. Nevertheless, even
when they acknowledge and find empirical significance for factor endowments, they do not
jointly regress them with their openness variables. Besides including GDP per worker to
check for the Kuznets hypothesis, they also use cohort size as an inequality determinant.
They find both relationships significant and robust to the inclusion of other control vari-
ables. For instance, they conclude that the demographic factors proxied by their cohort
size variable is extremely important to explain inequality differences between countries.
Besides the GDP quadratic specification Barro (2000) includes schooling variables,
and dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America as important inequality deter-
minants. He finds a significant and positive influence of openness on inequality. Openness
is measured by the relative volume of trade filtered by country size, but the results are
robust to the inclusion of other indicators. To analyze the impact of endowments, he
uses the fact that rich countries are characterized by a relative abundance of physical
and human capital and developing countries are relatively abundant in labor or unskilled
labor. When openness interacts with GDP, the relationship is negative and thus, this
result conflicts with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, the results are not robust
to the econometric specification and are valid only when excluding fixed country effects.43
Fischer (2001) finds that after trade liberalization income inequality increases. The ef-
fect is relatively small and is moderated by factor abundance: in land-abundant countries
the increase is higher than in labor-abundant countries. Hence, he can explain the dis-
similar income inequality results of trade liberalization in Latin America and East Asian
countries. Nevertheless, there are several limitations in his empirical approach: he does
not include additional control variables, uses only the Sachs and Warner openness index,
and the Gini coefficient data does not comply with the quality standards of the Deininger
43He uses seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in this case. Fixed-effects estimations do not show
significant coefficients for the openness and interactive openness-GDP variables.
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and Squire dataset. Additionally, he finds that labor-abundant countries are less unequal,
a result that is not supported by other empirical studies.
In a related study, Lundberg and Squire (2003) also find a significant and positive
relation between the Gini coefficient and the Sachs and Warner openness index. They use
a three-stage least squares (3LS) technique, arguing that the use of fixed effects estimation
does not exploit the significant between-country inequality differences. However, they are
not directly concerned with the effects of openness and state that the Sachs and Warner
index is not appropriate when exclusively focusing on trade liberalization. In addition,
they use a large set of control variables, which are chosen to reflect determinants of growth
and inequality.
Finally, we survey a group of studies done by World Bank researchers. These set
of papers, however, where not intended to assess directly the effect of trade openness
on inequality, but anyway, present interesting results. Dollar and Kraay (2004) regress
changes in the volume of trade with respect to GDP, against changes in the Gini coefficient.
They control for changes in average incomes and some macroeconomic indicators.44 They
do not find any significant relationship between changes in trade and inequality, but
they do not include any endowment or demographic variables.45 Analyzing country case
studies, the World Bank (2001, 2002) finds mixed results in inequality experiences in
countries that have performed significant outward oriented reforms. In particular, they
find decreasing inequality in the Philippines and Malaysia and increasing inequality in
most Latin American countries and China. Nevertheless, they refer to countries which
have integrated sharply into the world economy and they do not explicitly separate trade
liberalization from other outward oriented and domestic market liberalization reforms.
The limitations in both the regression and case study analysis from this group of papers
obscure the role of trade liberalization in any inequality episode.
Surveying the literature on sectoral and micro studies, Berg and Krueger (2003) con-
clude that there is no systematic relationship between openness and income inequality,
when growth is not included.
44Government consumption, inflation, financial development and the rule of law.
45They use the DS data set and check the robustness of the results using different income and openness
definitions.
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Table 2-2: Survey of empirical studies on trade and income inequality
Autho rs ID Data S ample De p. var. Trade  var. Co ntro l var. Re s ults
Bourguignon small & Dummy for efective GDP per capita Endowments are important
 & Morrisson ILO medium LDCs Income shares protec. in manuf. factor endowments Openness decreases inequality
(1990) only 1970  sector > 30% ownership var.
Edwards 43 countries Gini coefficient: Seven indexes & Schooling Schooling reduces inequality
(1997) DS Two decades: Decadal average Reform dummy Macro var. No openness effect
70s and 80s difference No trade reform effect
Litwin Gini coefficient (X+M)/GDP Endowments Endowments are important
(1998) DS only LDCs Income shares Sachs & Warner Kuznets Openness increases inequality, 
Trade composition conditional on endowments.
Spilimbergo 34 countries Gini coefficient Own constructed GDP per capita Endowments are important
 et al. (1999) DS  a/ 320 obs Income shares index factor endowments Openness increases inequality, 
1965-1992 Alternative indexes ownership var. conditional on endowments.
Higgins  & 73 countries Gini coefficient: GDP per worker Demographic factors important
Williamson DS  b/ 219 obs Decadal average Sachs & Warner Rich/Poor dummy Support for cond. Kuznets-cuve
(1999) Four decades: Quintile ratio gap Alternative indexes Cohort size Openness reduces inequality,
1960-1990s but the effect is weak
Barro Var. sample Gini coefficient: Own constructed GDP per capita Openness increase inequality
(2000) DS  b/ Three decades: Decadal average volume index Schooling and inverserly with GDP size
1965-1985 Income shares Alternative indexes Regional dummies Support for cond. Kuznets-curve
Fischer Barro Five year Gini coefficient Sachs & Warner Factor Openness increases
(2001) & Lee averages endowments inequality, but it is
1965-1995 dependent on endowments
Notes: a/ They drop 10 observations, so within country is either expenditure or income-based.
           b/ They use dummy variables to correct for differences in income and reference unit definitions
A summary of the results is presented in Table 2− 2. Although the results are mixed,
more studies conclude that trade increases inequality. However, the relationship is condi-
tional on factor endowments and other economic variables (e.g. GDP per capita, schooling
and cohort size). This outcome conditions the results of those studies that do not control
for these variables and makes it a necessary step in future empirical tests. In any case, the
major setback of the previous studies relies on the inequality dataset used. Some stud-
ies use inequality data that does not comply with the DS quality criteria. Furthermore,
the DS dataset has been recently criticized by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) and this
qualifies the results based on this dataset.
Therefore, there is a major scope for improving the empirical testing. The introduction
of a new income inequality dataset seems necessary to check the results drawn from the
DS dataset. Additionally, the specification of the empirical tests can also be improved.
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2.4 Summary
This survey has documented the main debates and findings of the literature that studies
the effects of trade liberalization on income distribution. This research field is charac-
terized by the presence of controversial topics, some of which are still part of ongoing
academic debates. In addition, much of the empirical research is characterized by impor-
tant methodological problems and data limitations. However, from the large amount of
studies that have been published, we can highlight some important observations.
The main theoretical results linking trade openness and income inequality are derived
from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. This extension of the HOS trade model predicts
that trade liberalization in rich capital-abundant countries deteriorates the real income
of workers and benefits capital-owners. In poor labor-abundant countries these results
are inverted. These predictions are used to determine the possible influence of import
tariff changes on the functional distribution of income. Moreover, these basic results
are usually generalized to encompass broader trade liberalization policies. Furthermore,
assuming that labor is equally distributed and more abundant in developing countries, the
Stolper-Samuelson results can also be used to predict the influence of trade liberalization
on household inequality.
However, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is based on simple and strong assumptions.
When some of these assumptions are relaxed or changed, the main results no longer hold.
Therefore, many studies have focused on testing the theorem’s predictions. Given the
large amount of empirical studies, we divided the discussion between those analyses that
dealt with the functional or the household distribution of income.
In the first case, the OECD experience documented in the trade and wages debate
seems to support the Stolper-Samuelson results, although other important factors are at
play, i.e. technological change and outsourcing activities. In developing countries the
experiences are driven by country specific characteristics, which are crucial to understand
particular results. The intrinsic heterogeneity between developing countries makes it
difficult to discern a clear general relationship. When subdivisions are used, some distinct
patterns emerge. For instance, the South East-Asian experience tends to confirm the
Stolper-Samuelson results. On the contrary, trade and inequality experiences in Latin
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American countries do not follow the theorem’s predictions. A common explanation to
this apparent anomaly is that these economies are not labor-abundant in a global sense,
but rather belong to an intermediate specialization cone.
Concerning the influence of trade liberalization on the personal distribution of income,
the empirical results are mixed. Most of the countries in the world do not possess adequate
inequality time-series and income data is associated with intrinsic measurement error
problems. In addition to these important data limitations, some studies do not control for
country endowments or income inequality determinants. Therefore, the various outcomes
are not conclusive and there is scope for improved empirical tests.
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Chapter 3
The Construction and Interpretation
of Combined Cross-Section and
Time-Series Income Inequality
Datasets1
3.1 Overview
There is a sizeable literature regarding the interaction between income distribution and
other economic variables, such as growth, poverty, trade and economic policy. Beginning
with Kuznets (1955), the theoretical work has steadily grown, and recently there has been
a surge in the topic, reflected in a new wave of publications (Atkinson, 1997). Comple-
menting this recent literature, the introduction and easy availability of a cross-country
inequality data set by the World Bank (Deininger and Squire, 1996) has launched a series
of influential econometric studies.
While at the core of most recent work in the area, the inequality dataset compiled
by Deininger and Squire, henceforth DS, has been recently criticized by Atkinson and
Brandolini (2001). They forcefully argue for the need to assess the use of such “secondary”
1This chapter is based on “The Construction and Interpretation of Combined Cross-
Section and Time-Series Income Inequality Datasets” by Francois and Rojas-Romagosa
(2004c).
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datasets mechanically and to deal more systematically with the measurement problems
involved. This paper focuses on the empirical and theoretical difficulties related to income
inequality measurement, analyzes the characteristics of “secondary” datasets and presents
a new methodological approach to reduce the measurement error problems common to
inequality information.
Substantial difficulties arise in the empirical measurement of inequality. The most
notorious is the lack of an institution and agreed procedures that can assure data quality
and consistency over time and across countries. In other words, an equivalent to the
United Nations System of National Accounts, which provides macroeconomic statistics
that are constructed by national agencies and are reasonably consistent over time and
countries. In the absence of such an institution, some organizations have constructed
“secondary” datasets, of which the best known are DS, the World Income Inequality
Database (UNU/WIDER-UNDP, 2000) and the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). These
datasets compile available national inequality statistics and perform quality assessments
of all the data observations. This has been an important first step towards the creation
of internationally comparable inequality time series.
Deininger and Squire (1996) compiled a large amount of inequality observations for the
entire world and classified each observation following three quality criteria. More recently,
the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) has extended and updated the DS dataset,
using similar quality criteria. Throughout the paper, we use this larger compilation of
data provided by the WIID as our main inequality data source.
Beyond quality criteria issues, there are additional problems that increase the mea-
surement error present in national series and in international inequality comparisons. In
particular, national inequality statistics generally include observations that differ on con-
cepts measured (i.e. expenditure, gross and net income), reference units (e.g. household,
person, family) and/or sources. Subsequently we refer to these three distinctive char-
acteristics as the inequality data definitions and we consider an inequality series to be
consistent when these definitions are identical for all observations. Although some coun-
tries have relatively extensive and consistent time series, the general rule is that inequality
observations are sparse and differ on definitions over time. Hence, to create relatively ex-
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tensive inequality time series that can be used in econometric studies, it is often necessary
to assume the comparability of some of the definitions.
Deininger and Squire assumed that all definitions are broadly comparable and used
their “high quality” observations to construct the most consistent inequality time series for
each country. However, they cautioned about the potential problems of the comparability
assumption and as an alternative they advised the use of dummy variables to adjust and
account for different definitions. Using this approach, they provide a single inequality
series for a wide number of countries, which can conveniently be used in empirical research.
While convenient, we argue that these simplifying assumptions (i.e. the complete
comparability of definitions and sources), introduce serious distortions and noise into
the data. Furthermore, we agree with Atkinson and Brandolini and consider that the
use of dummy variables is not an acceptable solution to this problem. Thus, a main
contribution of this paper is the testing of the comparability of different concepts. We
use the results of this comparability analysis to generate consistent inequality series, for
which the measurement error is reduced.
Our goal is to diminish the measurement error implicit in currently available datasets
(DS, WIID, LIS) and to provide an augmented version of these data that we hope is
more reliable. However, we do not address all measurement issues. Most of the problems
embedded in inequality data, including the comparability assumptions, have been exten-
sively addressed by Atkinson and Brandolini for a sample of OECD countries2 and this
paper does not attempt to correct all of the limitations at hand.
We also explore conceptual issues of measurement. There are important theoretical
considerations with regard to inequality measurement. While there are several indicators
that measure inequality, there is no consensus in favor of any particular index.3 Although
the Gini coefficient is the most commonly used indicator, there are many more inequal-
ity indexes that can be used. Alternatively, distribution share analysis (i.e. quintiles
and deciles information) can also be employed. The main difficulty involved is that an
2Throughout this paper we refer to OECD countries as: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Before
1990, Germany refers to the Federal Republic of Germany.
3A comprehensive survey of the topic can be found in Cowell (2000).
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inequality index reduces the information provided by a whole distribution function to a
single value. This simplification is helpful, but necessarily disregards information. There
are several inequality indexes suggested in the literature, but an appropriate choice is to
select an index that complements the information provided by the widely used Gini coef-
ficient. In particular, since this coefficient is more sensitive to transfers in the middle of
the income distribution and less sensitive to transfers at the extremes, it is convenient to
include an index that can solve for this limitation. Such an index is provided by Atkinson
(1970), which has an inequality aversion measurement parameter that controls for the
sensitivity of transfers at the extremes.
However, there is an important practical difficulty involved. In order to estimate al-
ternative indexes, we need the whole income distribution. Yet, most sources of inequality
data only report Gini coefficients and grouped income shares. This means that we must
first estimate the income distribution from grouped data and then estimate the inequal-
ity indexes. Specifically, we use parametric estimation of Lorenz curves to approximate
the entire income distribution, and then use these estimates to calculate four different
Atkinson indexes and poverty rates. These alternative inequality indexes complement the
information provided by the Gini coefficient.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the difficulties involved in dealing
with inequality data. In the following section we assess the comparability assumptions
and discuss the resulting assumptions needed in order to group different definitions and
sources. In Section 4 we explain how we estimate the Lorenz curves and Atkinson indexes
from grouped data, and in addition, we discuss how we have calculated poverty ratios.
Once we have obtained the new inequality dataset, we compare it with the DS series and
also compare the results provided by the Gini and the Atkinson indexes. Likewise, we
analyze how international and intertemporal inequality has changed over time. This set
of results and comparisons is presented in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
3.2 Problems when dealing with inequality data
We divide the tasks involved in building a cross-country inequality dataset into two main
groups. The first group includes data compilation and quality control. These issues are
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relatively well addressed by existing datasets. The second group includes those issues that
are not yet convincingly tackled: the intertemporal and international comparability and
consistency of inequality data.
3.2.1 Secondary datasets
A “secondary” dataset is a summary of national information that is drawn from household
income studies and micro-datasets produced by national surveys. The two most used
datasets are the Deininger and Squire (DS) and the World Income Inequality Database
(WIID). The WIID was constructed itself based on the DS dataset and has expanded
this dataset and aggregated new available information. Thus, this is the largest and
most exhaustive compilation of inequality data available. It provides up to 5067 data
observations, for different definitions, coverage and quality ratings. Therefore, we take it
as our starting point and main source of information.
The secondary datasets provide two important advantages. They compile most of
the available inequality data into one source, and they check for the quality of each
observation. The quality controls used to filter information from the primary to the
secondary datasets eliminate unreliable data and inequality observations that are not
representative of the whole country. Deininger and Squire (1996) used three quality
controls:
“The statistics were selected by requiring that they be from national house-
hold surveys for expenditure or income, that they be representative of the na-
tional population, and that all sources of income or expenditure be accounted
for.”
The WIID quality ratings are very similar to those of DS. However, there are some
important differences.4 In particular, WIID considers as reliable data some of the ob-
servations that did not have a clear reference to the primary source, while DS did not
4These quality criteria differences introduce some divergences between our dataset and DS, which are
not accounted for by the comparability assumptions we use later.
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consider these observations in their “high quality” dataset.5 The second important differ-
ence is the inclusion of observations based on monetary income, which is not used in DS
because it does not account for all sources of income.6 Finally, missing income concepts
are not accepted by WIID and this implies that we do not consider some of the DS ob-
servations. The reliable data ratings of the WIID are labeled as OKIN and from a total
world population of 150 countries, we have OKIN data for 141 countries.
The main difference between DS and WIID, however, is that the last does not identify
a single time series for each country. Instead, the researcher has the full available infor-
mation and has a wide range of series to choose from. The disadvantage is that there is
no clear indication on how to use or join inequality observations with different definitions
and/or sources.
Finally, it is important to mention that another source of inequality data, which we do
not use, is from the micro data-sets provided by the Luxembourg Inequality Study (LIS)
and the Living Standards Measurement Study of the World Bank. We do not consider
their use here because their coverage, in terms of time and countries, is very limited. In
addition, they are usually difficult to access and obtaining summary statistics is very time
consuming in an already burdensome process.7
3.2.2 Definition inconsistency
We follow the WIID and classify each data observation into six characteristics: concept
measured, reference units, area coverage, population coverage, data sources and quality
ratings. Technically there are other distinctive characteristics that may significantly al-
ter the inequality values, such as: survey methods, sample characteristics, income issues
included (imputed rents for own-occupied houses, insurance premia, interests and divi-
dends) and the time period considered.8 Nevertheless, since our main interest is to obtain
5As explained later, the inclusion of these observations significantly increases the number of inequality
data points in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the measurement accuracy may be reduced, it provides a
valuable extension in the time series (Barro, 2000).
6We justify the inclusion of these observations in the following section. Mainly, the data included are
from rich or middle-income countries, for which non-monetary income is not expected to be significant.
7Nonetheless, these data sets may be a preferable source of information for single country inequality
analysis or limited cross-country analysis.
8Some of these issues can induce substantial measurement errors of their own. For example, imputed
rents can represent a significant share of household income in some countries and if it is included in the
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a reliable cross-country dataset, we do not deal with these measurement issues, which
are generally country-specific, and we focus instead on the broad characteristics of the
inequality observations. Thus, our resulting dataset diminishes the measurement error
embedded in inequality data, but does not entirely eliminate this problem.
From the main six characteristics, we follow DS and select only data that considers
the entire population and has a national coverage. Moreover, we use the quality criteria
provided by the WIID and select only the observations labeled as OKIN. After this first
filtering of the information, we remain with three characteristics: concept measured, ref-
erence unit and source. Since there are multiple combinations of concepts and recipients,
and usually more than one source per country, we have what Atkinson and Brandolini
(2001) refer to as a “bewildering variety of estimates”. That is, a number of generally
discontinuous series, with differences in one or two definitions and usually from different
sources. The problem can be better understood by looking at Table 3-1.
For this particular country we have seven different series, two income concepts (gross
income and gross monetary income), two recipients or reference units (person and house-
hold) and six sources. However, the number of series and definitions involved can be larger
in other countries. In total, there are five different concepts and as many as nine differ-
ent income recipients.9 Additionally each data point provides the Gini coefficient and
sometimes distribution shares in quintiles or deciles of population. In Table 3-1 the ob-
servations with distribution shares are indicated by the data in boxes. Moreover, the Gini
coefficient can be given by the primary source or directly estimated from the distribution
shares when available.
These characteristics of the inequality data leave several questions to be answered.
Can we mix different definitions of income concepts and income recipients? Can we mix
different sources? If yes, how do we mix them? Which data observation should we choose
when there is more than one available for a given year? How many series should we
analyze per country? In order to have an inequality dataset that can be readily used for
household survey it can create an important source of distortion in the comparability of different inequality
observations. Ravallion and Chen (1997), and Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000) discuss further on these
points.
9The concepts are gross income, gross monetary income, net income, net monetary income and ex-
penditure. The most common reference units are person, household, household per capita, household
equivalent, family and family equivalent.
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Table 3-1: Chile, Gini series with different definitions, 1968-1996.
Income Monetary
concept: Inc. Gross
Recipient: Household
Source: UN Fields SH Mideplan Paukert IADB SH DS accept
Series: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1968 45.64 44.00 45.64
1969
1970
1971 46.00 46.00
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980 53.21 53.21
1981 53.46
1982 56.98
1983 54.49
1984 55.85
1985 54.91
1986 55.69
1987 56.72
1988 54.50
1989 57.88 57.88
1990 54.70 53.18 55.65
1991 55.38
1992 52.19 50.70 52.00 53.08
1993 50.00
1994 55.58 57.42 56.49
1995
1996 56.37 57.24
Note: Observations in boxes represent data with distribution share information
Source: WIID, version 1, Sept. 2000
Income Gross
Household Person
empirical research we must answer these questions. The questions are relevant if we want
to analyze country time series, as well as cross-country analysis. Given that especially
in developing countries there are not many inequality observations, there also has to be
some assumptions regarding the combination of the different definitions in order to obtain
at least one series per country.
3.2.3 Deininger and Squire approach
DS assume that all definitions are broadly comparable and instead, focus on the quality
of the observations. Thus, they freely mix the different definitions, regardless of income
concept or reference unit. However, they acknowledge the potential measurement errors
that this approach may cause and recommend the use of dummy variables to deal with
the problem.
This strategy allows them to present a single time series for each country, which is
very convenient for empirical studies. Moreover, when there is more than one observation
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per year that satisfies their three quality criteria, they choose the observation which is
consistent with the rest of the series. In other words, they try to maintain the same
income concept, recipient unit and source when possible. Their final inclusion criterion is
that the observation originates from an official publication. In the last column of Table
3-1, we present their “high-quality” data observations, which are labeled as DS-accept.
In this particular case, they mix household and person reference units and three different
sources. The 1994 observation they use is not included in our series because it does not
properly define the type of income it uses. This lack of information accounts for the WIID
considering the observation not reliable (NOOK) and we do not use it.10
Nevertheless, this grouping procedure has been strongly criticized by AB (Atkinson
and Brandolini, 2001). Using a sample of OECD countries, they show how inconsistent it is
to create such series. In many cases the constructed DS-accept series significantly modifies
the level and even the trend of some inequality series, in comparison with series that use
only consistent income concepts. Furthermore, AB demonstrate for OECD countries,
that the use of dummy variables is not enough to render some definitions comparable.
In particular this is the case for net and gross income, as well as for income based and
expenditure based observations.11
DS defend the grouping of net and gross income by assuming that in developing
countries, where there is not enough data to compare both definitions, redistribution
is not important and thus, gross and net income are comparable. Yet, AB stress the
inconsistencies this mixing yields for many OECD countries for which both types of income
are available. Compared with the Luxembourg Inequality Study (LIS), which adjusts
inequality data to make it international comparable within the OECD countries, AB find
that the rankings provided by DS are very different from those of the LIS.
Similarly, for the case of expenditure-based and income-based observations, DS ac-
knowledge that both concepts are significantly different. To correct for this problem,
they suggest the use of a fixed adjustment to render both concepts comparable. In their
dataset they find that expenditure-based observations are on average 6.6 points below
10For the rest of the MIDEPLAN observations, they are not DS-accept because there was not a clear
reference to the primary source. However, WIID consider this data to be reliable and it provides more
observations to be used.
11In the next section, we use a bigger sample and reach the same conclusions.
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income-based Gini coefficients. However, this particular value is conditional on the sam-
ple they analyze. We use the same procedure and compare the inequality levels of both
concepts only for those countries where both are available, but in our sample we find that
the average difference is three points.12 Therefore, using the fixed value proposed by DS
increases in average, around 3.6 points the levels of inequality for the countries in our
sample. We conclude that the estimate of the true difference can be unreliable and the
use of fixed adjustments introduces arbitrary noise in an already problematic dataset. In
short, we agree with AB and conclude that the use of fixed adjustments is not enough to
reconcile both definitions.
The treatment of different reference units by DS is also problematic. DS collapse the
numerous definitions into two categories: person-based and household-based observations
After this rough grouping, they compare both definitions and conclude that they are not
significantly different. However, not all the person-based definitions are comparable, nor
are all the household-based ones. This also raises questions about their comparability
assumptions.
Figure 3-1: Spain, Gini coefficient series
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We use two examples to highlight in detail the main problems involved when grouping
heterogeneous series. In Figure 3-1 we plot two inequality series for Spain, each differs in
12The sample difference is given by the larger compilation provided by the WIID and by the differences
in some of the quality criteria we explained before. In our case, we can directly compare 19 countries
that have both income and expenditure information, of which 58% belong to the OECD.
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the concept measured (e.g. gross income and expenditure). Each series has different levels
and no significant trend. However, DS use two gross income observations to expand the
expenditure series and this alters significantly the inequality conclusions. First, the DS
has a time trend, with a considerable decrease in inequality from the 1970s to the 1980s.
Secondly, the combination of both concepts significantly changes the inequality levels.
In particular, using the gross income series for the 1980s yields inequality observations
of around 8 points higher than the DS-accept values. Such a dramatic level variation
substantially changes the country’s international inequality ranking, as we show in Section
5.
In Figure 3-2 we plot two series for Mexico that differ in their reference unit (household
and person), but have the same gross income concept. Both series have distinctive time
trends and significantly different levels in the last years. DS combine both reference units
and again, freely mixing different definitions changes the inequality results. In particular,
for the 1980s, the levels of both series are quite different —around 8 points— and this
introduces an important modification in the inequality results. Furthermore, DS report
an increase in inequality from 1977 to 1989, while the consistent gross-household series
shows the opposite result. Finally, the DS dataset fails to indicate any time trend at all
for the entire period, while the gross-household series has, at least, a decreasing trend.
Figure 3-2: Mexico, Gini coefficient series
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Although such examples are not widespread, they certainly introduce noise in the data
that increases the measurement error and may affect the overall empirical results. While
the corrections proposed by DS may sometimes work, on other occasions they may distort
the data further or leave the discrepancies unaltered. In our last example fromMexico, DS
do not recommend any correction for reference unit differences and the problem shown
above persists. For the case of Spain, the use of the particular 6.6 adjustment value
reduces the inconsistencies, but in other cases it does not help.
In summary, although the DS dataset was a very important step forward in the study
of inequality data, it has significant limitations that increase the measurement error and
may seriously alter the empirical results of those studies that use this inequality dataset.
In particular, though it is quite reasonable to use the kind of quality control considerations
they introduced, the evidence suggests that grouping different definitions to create single
country time series is unreliable and the use of fixed adjustments does not correct this
problem.
3.3 Controlling for definition comparability and se-
ries grouping
Since there are several concepts and reference units, we still need to have a methodology
to collapse the various series available for each country. This is necessary to obtain
consistent and comparable series that can be used in cross-country and time series studies.
To collapse further the existing series provided by the WIID, we take three steps. First,
we group those series which have the same definitions (concept and reference unit). The
second step is to make a comparability analysis and judge which definitions and conflicting
sources can be mixed and how. The final step is to construct the national series, using
consistent groupings and standard procedures based on these results.
3.3.1 Grouping series with the same definitions
It is straightforward to group those series with identical definitions. The main difficulty in
this first step is to deal with different sources. In some cases, we can have a year where two
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sources report observations with the same definitions. This is the case for Chile in 1992,
shown in series 4 and 6 of Table 3-1. If both sources have series that can be analyzed13 we
run the same comparability tests as below. If this is not possible, we choose observations
following this preference ordering:
• Observations with income share information
• LIS data
• DS accept data
• The source with the longest time coverage.
Since one of our main purposes is to compare the Gini coefficient with alternative in-
dexes, we need the income share information to construct such indexes. The Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS) is a project that has created a micro-data of social and economic
information. It has been used to explicitly compare cross-country inequality information
and thus presents adjusted data for such purposes (Atkinson, et al., 1995). Finally, the last
two ordering preferences ensure consistency in the series and the previous considerations
contemplated by DS.
In our example for Chile, we have two conflicting sources: MIDEPLAN and IADB.
Using the four decision criteria stated before we prefer the MIDEPLAN observation, since
it provides income share information. After doing this first grouping, we have collapsed
seven series into three (see Table 3-2).
We use the same standard procedure with all the countries to collapse series with
the same definitions. However, this first step is insufficient given that many countries
remain with several series (i.e. Sweden has up to 14) and further grouping procedures are
necessary.
3.3.2 Comparability analysis
Li et al. (1998) have compared values of the Gini coefficient with different definitions
for countries and years where estimates are available. However, this procedure is biased
13As explained below, this requires that both series have a common sample of at least three observations
in a time span of five or more years.
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Table 3-2: Chile, grouped Gini series, 1968-1996.
I n c o m e M o n e t r a y
c o n c e p t : In c .  G r o s s
R e c ip ie n t : H o u s e h o ld P e r s o n H o u s e h o ld
S o u r c e : 3 s 3 s S H D S  a c c e p t
S e r ie s (1 ) (2 ) ( 3 ) (4 )
1 9 6 8 4 5 . 6 4 4 4 .0 0 4 5 .6 4
1 9 6 9
1 9 7 0
1 9 7 1 4 6 . 0 0 4 6 .0 0
1 9 7 2
1 9 7 3
1 9 7 4
1 9 7 5
1 9 7 6
1 9 7 7
1 9 7 8
1 9 7 9
1 9 8 0 5 3 .2 1 5 3 .2 1
1 9 8 1 5 3 .4 6
1 9 8 2 5 6 .9 8
1 9 8 3 5 4 .4 9
1 9 8 4 5 5 .8 5
1 9 8 5 5 4 .9 1
1 9 8 6 5 5 .6 9
1 9 8 7 5 6 .7 2
1 9 8 8 5 4 .5 0
1 9 8 9 5 7 .8 8 5 7 .8 8
1 9 9 0 5 4 . 7 0 5 3 .1 8 5 5 .6 5
1 9 9 1 5 5 .3 8
1 9 9 2 5 2 . 1 9 5 0 .7 0 5 3 .0 8
1 9 9 3 5 0 .0 0
1 9 9 4 5 5 . 5 8 5 7 .4 2 5 6 .4 9
1 9 9 5
1 9 9 6 5 6 . 3 7 5 7 .2 4
N o te :  " 3 s "  r e f e r s  t o  t h re e  d if f e re n t  p r im a ry  s o u rc e s
S o u rc e :  W IID ,  v e r s io n  1 ,  S e p t .  2 0 0 0
I n c o m e  G r o s s
towards the sample of countries with available data. A more satisfactory procedure is to
compare observations available for the same country and the same year, as was done by
DS.
The existing literature does not offer a consistent and standard comparison procedure.
DS limit themselves to comparing the average difference between different definitions. In
the case of income and expenditure, they try to check the correlation of the differences with
some explanatory variables. In our view, this procedure is not satisfactory. For two series
to be comparable, and thus, interchangeable if one data observation is missing, we need
much more than average differences. We need two series which have a very similar trend
and level. In the case the level is not comparable, we need that the difference between
both series is relatively constant over time and only in such cases does it makes sense to
freely mix different series. In other cases, grouping definitions that are not comparable
can seriously alter the level and/or trend of the series. Adjusted data in this way at best
increases the measurement error and at worst can invalidate the empirical results.
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In addition, to clearly single out what we are comparing, the series should differ in only
one of the definitions. For example, if a Gini coefficient series for net income and household
seems comparable with a series of gross income and person; it could be because indeed
gross and net are comparable or because net and gross are different but a combination of
income concepts and reference units produce the similarities.
3.3.2.1 Comparability procedure
To analyze different definitions and sources, we use the following procedure:
• We use only Gini data for the same country and the same year when they differ in
only one of the definitions (concept or reference unit) and have a common sample
of at least three observations in a time span of at least five years.
• We estimate the simple correlation between both series. If the correlation is negative
we conclude that the series are not comparable.
• We check if both series are normally distributed and run hypothesis tests for equal
mean and equal variance (i.e. a t-test and an F-test). If the variance is significantly
different (at a 5% significance level) then we conclude that the series are not compa-
rable. If the mean is significantly different, we test if there is a constant difference
between them.14
• When the series are positively correlated and have the same variance, they move in
the same direction over time. If instead, the mean is not equal we use the average
difference between series.15 Furthermore, we check for one, three and five points
differences in the means (which are some values reported as the average difference
between series with different concepts).
• To complement the hypothesis of equal mean and variance, we take OLS regressions
on the equation: S1 = β (S2 + c) + ε, where S are the series and ε the error term.
14For the few cases where the series are not normally distributed, we use the ANOVA F-statistic to
test for equality of means and the Levene and the Brown-Forsythe methods to test for the equality of the
variances. Again, if the variance is significantly different we conclude that the series are not comparable.
15We round the values to the closest integer to simplify the procedure. In some cases we need to use
half points in order for the series to be comparable.
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We run a Wald coefficient test to check the null hypothesis that β = 1. When
the means of S1 and S2 are not the same c is the average difference of the series,
otherwise c = 0. To check how sensitive the series are to absolute differences in the
mean, we also test the null hypothesis when c is ±1, 3 and 5. Note that in this
case the inclusion of c is equivalent to the use of a fixed adjustment or the use of a
dummy variable.
• In summary, we consider two series to be comparable when they have a positive
correlation, not a significantly different variance and we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that β = 1, when −1 ≤ c ≤ 1. For other values of c we consider the series
to be comparable, but with a constant absolute difference between them. In this
last case, we must add c to make the series compatible.
Through this comparison procedure we attempt to assure that both series have sta-
tistically the same time trend and the same level (or an absolute constant difference).
This ensures that when freely mixing two series we do not alter the trend or level of the
resulting series. This procedure was also employed to compare some series that differed
only in the source.
3.3.2.2 Comparability assumptions
Once we have pared comparable series and followed the above procedure, we can study
which definitions can be mixed. The results of this analysis provide the basis for establish-
ing the comparability assumptions we use later. This allows us to consolidate series and
reduce the number of definition combinations available for each country. In total we have
179 possible comparable pairs for 38 countries, 14 of which are OECD countries with 107
pairs and 24 are developing countries with 72 pairs. The results for all the comparable
definitions are summarized in Table 3-3.
In this table, the first column shows which variables are being compared. The next
two columns indicate the number of pairs compared and the percentage that belongs to
OECD countries. The next column is very important, since it shows the percentage of
series that are not comparable, either because there is a negative correlation between the
series or because they fail the equal variance test. The columns labeled c±1 and c±2 show
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Table 3-3: Comparability results for all definitions
Obs OECD Not  c ±1  c ± 2 average c percentage DECISION
Comparable comparable
Income vs Monetary Income 7 43% 0% 43% 71% -2 29% uncertain
Income vs Expenditure 19 58% 42% 16% 32% 3 26% no
Gross vs Net 36 78% 31% 19% 28% 3 39% no
Person vs HH per capita 8 0% 0% 88% 88% 0 88% yes
Household vs HH equivalent 36 100% 25% 19% 28% 4 36% no
Household vs Person/HHpc 23 26% 9% 61% 61% 0 61% uncertain
Household vs Family 8 75% 0% 50% 63% 2 38% uncertain
Household vs Family eq. 18 100% 6% 28% 44% 5 17% no
Household eq. vs Family eq. 16 100% 13% 81% 88% 0 81% yes
Family vs Person 2 50% 0% 100% 100% 1 100% uncertain
HHe/Fe vs Person/HHpc 6 83% 17% 67% 83% 0 67% uncertain
Notes: The OECD column corresponds to the percentage of observations from these countries.
      The Not Comparable column presents the percentage of observations with a negative correlation and/or different variance.
      The c±1 column shows the percentage of comparable pairs with a fixed adjustment (c) of +1 or -1.
      The next column is the equivalent when the ±2 range is used.
      The Average c column reports the mean difference between definitions for all observations.
      The following column shows the percentage of comparable pairs when this average c is used. 
      The last column reports the comparability result for each pair of definitions.
Sample Comparability Results
the percentage of comparable series when the absolute average difference is less than one
and two, respectively. The following column shows the sample average difference and the
following column reports the percentage of series that are comparable when this average
difference is applied. The final column indicates the decision regarding the comparison of
definitions.
In Table 3-3 we show all the 11 possible comparisons. We analyze the six most rel-
evant pairs and we use them to illustrate how we reach the final decision regarding the
comparability assumptions. The remaining five couples follow the same procedure and
we just mention the final decision.
Three main considerations were taken into account when deciding which series could
be comparable. The first criterion was the percentage of non-comparable couples. A high
percentage indicates that the considered series had different trends and hence, provide
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a very bad substitute for a missing series. The second criterion is the percentage of
comparable series when no fixed adjustment is applied and when the average difference is
applied. These percentages show how good it can be to mix series with or without a fixed
adjustment. Finally, we prefer combinations with large samples and, for some cases, the
percentage of OECD observations is also relevant for the analysis.
Income and Monetary Income. In this case, we have four developing countries and
the USA, which offer seven comparable pairs. Of these 43% are comparable series with
an average difference (c) smaller than ±1 and 71% are in the range of c < |2| . Almost one
third of the pairs are comparable when using the average difference of −2. Moreover, all
the pairs are positively correlated, have equal variance and an average difference of −2.
This result is theoretically consistent, since monetary income excludes own-produced
consumption and it should report a higher level of inequality. Since all the series are in
principle comparable it seems reasonable to freely mix both definitions. Nonetheless, we
are uncertain of which fix adjustment (average difference) to apply. If we use the average
difference of −2 only 29% of the series are comparable. Another inconvenience is the
small sample of only seven observations. Thus, we are uncertain about this comparison
couple.
It is important to note that DS did not take into consideration data observations
defined for monetary income. They argue that the consumption of own produced goods
is an important source of revenue for poorer households and not taking into account this
kind of consumption can skew the indicator towards more inequality. However, our results
suggest that for some cases, a fix adjustment can render both definitions comparable. In
particular, we mix both definitions only in rich and middle-income countries16, for which
one does not expect this kind of consumption to be important. Therefore, we find it
reasonable to include data based on monetary income for these countries and by doing so
we can expand the available number of observations.
On the other hand, the example provided by DS to exclude monetary income is not
compelling. Although later they conclude, as we do, that income and expenditure-based
are not readily comparable, in their paper they actually compare the monetary income
16Australia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Panama, Russia, United States and Venezuela.
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and expenditure observations for Greece in 1974, as a way to associate income and mone-
tary income. Since for this year the difference in both series is of roughly six points they
conclude that both definitions cannot be mixed. However, when applying our comparabil-
ity analysis to Greece, we conclude that both series are indeed comparable when adding
three points to the expenditure series.
Income and Expenditure. In this case 42% of the observation couples are not com-
parable at all, i.e., they have a negative correlation or significantly different variance.
Moreover, if we were to use a fixed adjustment to compare series, only 26% are compara-
ble for the average difference of 3 points. If we were to use the average difference found in
DS of 6.6, then only 11% of the series are comparable. In other words, in almost one out
of ten cases the fixed adjustment significantly alters the level and/or trend of the series,
overwriting information contained in the original data.
Since expenditure does not take into account income that is saved, we expect it to give
less unequal values. On the other hand, expenditure information can take into account
income smoothing by borrowing or lending. Thus, we also expect lower inequality values
from expenditure surveys. However, in developing countries the main limitation is that
many households do not know their actual income or their knowledge is incomplete. This
limitation can be explained by the presence of significant own-produced consumption,
temporal and/or irregular monetary income sources. Therefore, it is easier to survey their
consumption (expenditure) and this has become a common practice in poor countries.
Nevertheless, given the very high percentage of non-comparable cases, the most likely
possibility is that both series are providing different inequality information. Therefore,
we conclude that it is not reasonable to mix income and expenditure definitions, not even
when using fixed adjustments.
Gross and Net Income. For this case, almost a third of all the series couples are
not comparable. The average difference is of three points, but only 39% of the series are
comparable when such a fixed effect is applied. Although this is not such a clear case as
the previous, we also reject comparing gross and net income.
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One argument used in DS to compare both definitions is that in developing countries
the difference should not be big, assuming that their redistribution systems have a small
impact on incomes. However, of the eight comparisons that come from non-OECD coun-
tries, 25% are not comparable, 50% are comparable with c < |1| and 38% are comparable
when the average difference of three points is applied. Therefore, even when the sample
is still small and all the non-OECD countries involved are middle-income countries, there
is not much evidence that gross and net income are equivalent.
On the other hand, grouping series with net and gross income does make a significant
impact in OECD series. In particular, AB show in detail how damaging the combination
of both definitions is to the information on levels and trends contained in the original
series for these rich countries.
Mixing different reference units. Grouping person and household per capita is prob-
ably the clearest case in favor of mixing definitions. In 88% of the cases we can freely
mix both series. In addition, we do not need to adjust for any fixed effects. Although the
sample of eight is small, the evidence is strong. Therefore, we assume that both series are
comparable and we evaluate this grouped definition (person-household per capita) with
other income recipient definitions.
On the other extreme, comparing household and household equivalent does not seem
reasonable. A quarter of the observations are not comparable and when the average
difference of four points is applied only 36% of the series are comparable.
The comparability of household with person/household per capita is an uncertain one.
The non-comparable percentage is relatively small, but only in 61% of the cases are the
definitions comparable. In fact, household and person are the most common reference
units and this particular comparability assumption is very important and we deal with it
latter.
Finally the remaining five comparability results are the following: household and fam-
ily (uncertain), household and family equivalent (no), household equivalent and family
equivalent (yes), family and person (uncertain), household equivalent/family equivalent
and person/household per capita (uncertain).
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In summary, for the eight couple of reference unit definitions that were tested, only
one was clearly non-comparable. These results suggest that one may mix reference units
in many cases, but not in all.
3.3.3 Grouping the data
Using the results of the previous section we can directly group those series with compa-
rable definitions and reduce the number of series per country. However, since the three
main concepts (e.g. net income, gross income and expenditure) cannot be mixed, then
inevitably we have more than one inequality series for some countries. Moreover, we asso-
ciate each concept with the most common reference unit and this union creates our three
main resulting series: Gross Income-Household, Net Income-Household and Expenditure-
Person.
The presence of three series may seem inconvenient when conducting empirical re-
search, but different income concepts may offer different information about inequality
behavior and using more than one concept can increase the available information that
we can use. For example, evaluating both gross and net income inequality measures
provides important information concerning the redistribution policies of some national
governments. In addition, trade theory makes direct predictions about gross, not net
factor incomes.
On the other hand, separating series because of different reference units is not very
compelling. Any difference provided by dissimilar reference units are mostly explained by
demographic factors. When the size of the household changes according to the income
classes, one can expect different inequality results from household and individual informa-
tion. In addition, the number of adults in different income classes can provide divergences
in the inequality results. However, these demographic factors vary across countries.
An additional advantage of our comparability analysis is that it offers country-specific
information. For those countries were we conducted the tests, we have and indication of
whether specific national series with different definitions may be comparable or not. This
information is used to group series in that particular country, even if the overall analysis
resulted in a verdict of non-comparable definitions. For instance, in a country were gross
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and net income are comparable with a fixed adjustment, we can use this information to
expand one or both series.
Finally, we have to take a decision concerning those definitions that yield an uncertain
result. The approach we take is to have two broad types of series. First, we construct
“basic” series in which we are confident of the definition groupings used. Hence, we only
mix definitions for which we have strong evidence that they may be comparable and/or
definitions that are comparable for that particular country.
We then construct “extended” series. These series have more observations, but we
use definition groupings that are less reliable and we combine definitions for which we are
somewhat uncertain about their comparability. For example, the most common “basic”
series is the data based on gross income and household units, and this series is mostly
complemented with observations based on monetary income and person units to create
the “extended” series.
In summary, to finally collapse the remaining series, we perform the following standard
procedure:
• We group those reference units for which we are certain about their comparability
• We use the country specific information to further group series. In particular, to
expand the most common series: Gross Income-Household, Net Income-Household
and Expenditure-Person. This includes grouping series with a fixed adjustment,
when the evidence supports this type of comparability assumption.17
• We also take advantage of the LIS data (only available for OECD countries) to
adjust the series in those cases in which they are comparable. E.g., if we have a
net income-household series from both the LIS and another source, and both series
are comparable with a fixed adjustment, then we adjust the series to have the levels
reported by the LIS data.
17When some observations are adjusted to make them consistent with the rest of the series, we have
a problem with the Atkinson indexes (that we calculate later). Generally, the difference between Gini
coefficients with different definitions is not the same for the Atkinson indexes. To solve this problem
we use two standard approaches. A direct approach is applied when we have three or more comparable
Atkinson observations and then, we directly apply the average difference. The indirect approach is to
estimate the average difference between Gini and the particular Atkinson index for both series and then
adjust the Atkinson by the difference between both averages.
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• Finally, we use definitions for which we are uncertain about their comparability to
create the “extended” series.
In brief, for each country we can have one or more basic series relating to gross income,
net income or expenditure and in some cases, extended series, which expand the series by
including uncertain definition comparisons.
Even though we apply this same procedure for each country and in every case we try
to be as objective as possible, we face the same dilemma expressed by DS and “decisions
concerning the inclusion or exclusion of certain observations are always based on some
judgment and arbitrariness”.
In our case, our results can be replicated using the WIID database. This allows other
researches to review our procedure and make their own changes if necessary.
Table 3-4: Chile, final Gini series, 1968-1996
In c o m e
c o n c e p t:
R e c ip ie n t : H o u s e h o ld /P e rs o n P e rs o n
S o u rc e : 3 s 3 s D S  a c c e p t
S e r ie s (1 ) (2 ) (3 )
1 9 6 8 4 5 .6 4 4 4 .0 0 4 5 .6 4
1 9 6 9
1 9 7 0
1 9 7 1 4 6 .0 0 4 6 .0 0
1 9 7 2
1 9 7 3
1 9 7 4
1 9 7 5
1 9 7 6
1 9 7 7
1 9 7 8
1 9 7 9
1 9 8 0 5 4 .7 1 5 3 .2 1 5 3 .2 1
1 9 8 1 5 4 .9 6 5 3 .4 6
1 9 8 2 5 8 .4 8 5 6 .9 8
1 9 8 3 5 5 .9 9 5 4 .4 9
1 9 8 4 5 7 .3 5 5 5 .8 5
1 9 8 5 5 6 .4 1 5 4 .9 1
1 9 8 6 5 7 .1 9 5 5 .6 9
1 9 8 7 5 8 .2 2 5 6 .7 2
1 9 8 8 5 6 .0 0 5 4 .5 0
1 9 8 9 5 9 .3 8 5 7 .8 8 5 7 .8 8
1 9 9 0 5 4 .7 0 5 3 .1 8
1 9 9 1 5 6 .8 8 5 5 .3 8
1 9 9 2 5 2 .2 0 5 0 .7 0
1 9 9 3 5 1 .5 0 5 0 .0 0
1 9 9 4 5 5 .5 8 5 6 .4 9
1 9 9 5
1 9 9 6 5 6 .3 7
S o u rc e :  W IID ,  v e rs io n  1 ,  S e p t .  2 0 0 0
In c o m e  G ro s s
In our previous example for Chile, from an initial number of seven series, we can
collapse the inequality information into two “basic” series (see Table 3-4). Here we used
the fact that for Chile the household and person series are comparable with an adjustment
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of 1.5 points. This allows us to expand the Gross income-Household series from 6 to 15
observations.18
When compared with the DS accept series the levels are not significantly different,
but in this example, we find different time trends. In section 4 we compare in detail the
inequality trends reflected in our dataset against those present in the DS dataset.
3.3.3.1 Characteristics of the three main series
When our grouping methodology is applied to all the countries, we still have several series,
especially in OECD countries. However, the three main series have comprehensive world
coverage and can be readily used for empirical analysis. The main statistics of these series
are presented in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5: Characteristics of the three main inequality series
D S - a c c e p t
G i n i S h a r e  
d a t a
G i n i S h a r e  
d a t a
G i n i S h a r e  
d a t a
G i n i S h a r e  
d a t a
B A S I C  s e r i e s
     C o unt r ies 4 9 3 8 2 7 2 5 6 9 6 3 14 5 12 6 115
     Ob servat io ns 4 2 7 3 2 6 2 8 8 2 4 1 18 9 159 9 0 4 72 6 6 9 3
     A verag e o b s. 8 .71 8 .58 10 .6 7 9 .6 4 2 .74 2 .52 6 .2 3 5.76 6 .0 3
     OEC D  co unt r ies 2 9 % 3 9 % 70 % 72 % 1% 2 % 2 3 % 2 7% 17%
E X T E N D E D  s e r i e s
     C o unt r ies 9 5 70 4 7 4 3 8 5 75 2 2 7 18 8 115
     Ob servat io ns 6 3 4 4 4 5 4 3 3 3 76 2 54 2 0 5 13 2 1 10 2 6 6 9 3
     A verag e o b s. 6 .6 7 6 .3 6 9 .2 1 8 .74 2 .9 9 2 .73 5.8 2 5.4 6 6 .0 3
     OEC D  co unt r ies 17% 2 3 % 4 3 % 4 4 % 1% 1% 16 % 19 % 17%
T o t a l  f o r  t h e
t h r e e  s e r i e s
G r o s s  I n c o m e N e t  I n c o m e E x p e nd i t u r e
H o u s e h o l d H o u s e h o l d P e r s o n
Although all the series have a smaller sample and coverage than the DS-accept series,
we still have a satisfactory representation. Moreover, the extended gross-household series
is fairly comparable in number of observations and OECD representation to the DS-accept
series.
The net-household series seems to be better suited to analyze OECD countries, while
the expenditure-person series consists of a majority of developing countries. The gross
18Note that for international comparisons we only use the first series. The second series is only used
when analyzing inequality in Chile.
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income series is better balanced between rich and poor countries. These sample differences
between concepts can also be observed in the average series length. OECD countries have
longer series and this is reflected in the average number of observations in the net income
series. In contrast, developing countries and the expenditure-person series have shorter
series, and in many cases just one or two observations.
Additionally, we have at least one of the three main series for 141 countries. This is
an improvement with respect to the 115 country coverage of the DS dataset. The share
data is also sparser than the Gini coefficient observations and again, only the net income
series has almost the same number of share data and Gini observations, due to the better
quality of the OECD inequality data.
3.3.3.2 Series length and panel data analysis
Another important decision regards the length of the series we choose to analyze. Given
the sparse amount of inequality information in many countries, once we have created the
basic and extended series, some countries end up with only one or two data points per
series.
Subsequently, when we analyze inequality trends and when we compare our dataset
with DS, we use only countries with at least one series with three or more observations, in
a time span of at least five years. This allows us to study cross-country inequality trends
and use panel data analysis. This set of countries with long series includes 80 countries
and the main characteristics are reported in Table 3-6. In the Appendix we present the
summary statistics of this subset of countries with longer series
Our full dataset, which includes countries with only one or two observations, can be
used to conduct cross-country analysis for specific years of our three main series. It also
allows for decade or five year averages that can be used as a panel database. Since there
is a majority of expenditure-person series for developing countries in the full dataset, this
can give a better representation than the longer series.
In summary, we have six main series: three basic series, with consistent definition
comparability and three extended series with less reliable comparability assumptions.
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Table 3-6: Characteristics of the three main inequality series, countries with three or more
observations
D S - a c c e p t
G i n i S h a r e  
d a t a
G i n i S h a r e  
d a t a
G i n i S h a r e  
d a t a
G i n i S h a r e  
d a t a
B A S I C  s e r i e s
     C o unt r ies 3 8 3 4 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 1 8 0 75 6 6
     Ob servat io ns 4 13 3 2 2 2 79 2 3 5 12 7 10 6 8 19 6 6 3 6 3 4
     A verag e o b s. 10 .8 7 9 .4 7 13 .9 5 11.75 5.77 5.0 5 10 .2 4 8 .8 4 9 .6 1
     OEC D  co unt r ies 3 7% 4 7% 75% 75% 5% 5% 3 8 % 4 3 % 2 9 %
E X T E N D E D  s e r i e s
     C o unt r ies 57 4 7 3 2 3 1 3 0 2 8 119 10 6 6 6
     Ob servat io ns 58 0 4 2 0 4 0 7 3 54 18 2 14 6 116 9 9 2 0 6 3 4
     A verag e o b s. 10 .18 8 .9 4 12 .72 11.4 2 6 .0 7 5.2 1 9 .8 2 8 .6 8 9 .6 1
     OEC D  co unt r ies 2 6 % 3 2 % 50 % 52 % 13 % 11% 2 9 % 3 2 % 2 9 %
T o t a l  f o r  t h e
t h r e e  s e r i e s
G r o s s  I n c o m e N e t  I n c o m e E x p e nd i t u r e
H o u s e h o l d H o u s e h o l d P e r s o n
In constructing these series, we have used the recommendations made by Atkinson and
Brandolini (2001):
“The use of simple dummy variable adjustments for data differences is not
appropriate. Over time, the net and gross income distributions may behave
differently, as may the distributions for households and for families. It is
necessary to piece together information from different sources, informed by an
awareness of their relative strengths and weaknesses. All of this points to the
need for a blend of quantitative and qualitative analysis, and the avoidance of
mechanical use of the (secondary) datasets.”
3.4 Alternative inequality indexes
Given our inequality series, we now turn our attention to a completely different topic.
In this section we estimate Lorenz curves from distribution share or grouped data. This
allows us to construct the Atkinson indexes and estimate headcount poverty ratios.
Thereafter, we can use these estimates to conduct some tests. First, we can compare
our Gini estimates, which are drawn from the Lorenz curve, with the Gini coefficients
reported by the primary sources. Secondly, we can test if the inequality information
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provided by the Gini coefficient is similar to the one offered by the Atkinson indexes. The
later can be considered a test of the robustness of the Gini coefficient as an inequality
indicator.
3.4.1 Inequality measurement
Most of the inequality observations provided by the secondary datasets are given by Gini
coefficients. Formally, this inequality measure is given by:19
G = 1 +
1
n
− 2
n2y
¡
y1 + 2y2 + ...+ nyn
¢
= 1 +
1
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−
"Ã
2
n2
X
h
hyh
y
!#
where income is arranged so y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ... ≥ yn. This inequality index is widely accepted
and used. However, there are many other inequality indexes and there is no theoretical
prerogative to prefer any.
Inequality is associated with the variance of the income distribution and this creates
two basic measurement complications. First, as with any distribution, it is not a single-
valued variable. Second, even when the concepts of Lorenz-dominance and Generalized
Lorenz-dominance (Shorrocks, 1983) are widely accepted as ways to impartially rank two
different distributions, in many cases the Lorenz-curve intersects at least once, and this
method yields an incomplete ranking of distributions.
To solve both problems, inequality indexes are used to rank distributions in these
indeterminate cases and to provide a single-valued variable that can be used in empirical
models. However, since all inequality indexes have a specific method to weight and rank
incomes from different levels, there is no objective inequality index and any inequality in-
dicator has built-in social preferences. Moreover, many inequality measures are implicitly
based on a social welfare function.20
In particular, when the Lorenz curves intersect, different indexes can provide different
inequality information and this makes the choice of the index important for the results.
For instance, the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to changes in the middle of the income
distribution and it is less sensitive to movements at the extremes. On contrary, the family
19A summary with definition of the variables is presented in the Appendix to Chapter 4.
20Dalton (1920), Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970).
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of Atkinson indexes is precisely more sensitive to changes at the extremes and thus, this
index is a very convenient complement to the Gini coefficient.
Formally, the Atkinson index (A) is defined as:
A =



1−
·
1
n
P
h
³
yh
y
´1−θ¸ 11−θ
if θ 6= 1
1−
Q
h
³
yh
y
´ 1n
if θ = 1
where yh is the income of household h, y is the average income, and the level of
sensitivity is conveniently provided by the inequality aversion parameter (θ), which defines
each Atkinson index.
To illustrate the differences between both inequality measures, in Figure 3-3 we plot
the Lorenz curves for Bulgaria in 1978 and 1996.21 Both curves intersect once and this
points to an important change in the distribution of income. For instance, in 1996 both
the lowest and highest deciles increased their income share22, while intermediate deciles
experienced a relative decrease. The Gini coefficient, however, did not change (26.5).
In contrast, the Atkinson index with an inequality aversion parameter of one, decreased
more than a point (from 11.5 to 10.4), reflecting the gain of the lowest income quintile
against medium income households.
Therefore, by using both the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson indexes we can be more
certain about variations in the whole income distribution. If both inequality measures
move in the same direction our conclusions are more robust. If both measures behave
differently this is an indication that the choice of a particular inequality index is important,
since the weighting assigned to different parts of the distribution is relevant. Thus, the
information given by both indexes is complementary and gives us a better understanding
on how the income distribution is behaving.
We use four different values of θ to obtain more information on the inequality trends
(0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2). It is known that for values above one, the Atkinson index is very
sensitive to abnormally low incomes (Cowell, 1995). With this in mind, we estimate the
four values to have a broader picture of how θ affects the levels and trends of inequality.
21The curves are estimated using the technique we describe below.
22This can be observed by a steeper curve in these population segments.
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Figure 3-3: Bulgaria, Gross-Household series, Lorenz curves for two different years
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The most common used values of θ is 0.5 and 1 (Atkinson, et al., 1995; Burniaux, et
al., 1998). In the macro literature, the conceptually equivalent risk aversion parameter is
estimated to be less than one.
Finally, some studies do not rely entirely on indexes and use share data directly to
asses inequality behavior. Indeed, one can compare the ratio of the first and fifth quintile
or the extreme deciles to obtain inequality information. These ratios provide information
on the gap between the richest and poorest households of the population and can be used
to assess inequality dispersion.
However, this method has some drawbacks. The most relevant is that it does not
consider the distribution within income shares. The lowest quintile income share can
remain unchanged, even if the poorest individuals are worst off. On the other extreme,
the highest quintile share can also remain constant even when the richest individuals are
much better off. Such intra-share changes in inequality are not measured by this kind of
ratios, but are taken into account in an indicator like the Atkinson index. Moreover, there
is no clear indication of which ratios are to be used and employing the extreme shares
does not assure that we are comparing poor and rich individuals, since many poor people
can be represented by middle shares in countries with widespread poverty. Finally, the
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ratios completely ignore the behavior of the middle income households. It can be the case
that the ratio of the extreme quintiles is unchanged while the middle income shares are
diminishing and thus, the distribution of income is being polarized.
For the reasons listed above, we do not use such ratio measurements in this paper
and instead focus on inequality indexes that provide information for the whole income
distribution. To obtain information about poverty and how poor individuals are faring
with respect to the rest of society, we can directly estimate the extent of poverty from the
Lorenz curve. This estimation is more useful than just assuming that a particular share
is representative of the poor and provides us with better information in order to assess
poverty.
Additionally, it is also of practical importance to know the actual shape of the Lorenz
curve, which can be directly used to asses and compare inequality. Although this informa-
tion cannot be directly employed in econometric models, it provides useful information for
country-specific inequality analysis and greater detail on the actual inequality experience
of each country.
Finally, we could use our country results to estimate the world’s Lorenz curve. How-
ever, this task has additional limitations (i.e. lack of inequality data in many countries)
that require further assumptions, which exceed the scope of this paper. On the other
hand, this estimation has already been done by Sala-i-Martin (2000a,b) and we do not
expect our estimations to alter the results found in these papers.23
3.4.2 Parametric estimation of the Lorenz Curve from grouped
data
To construct inequality measures from grouped data we must first obtain the Lorenz
curve. There are two approaches to obtain the Lorenz curve from grouped data: simple
interpolation and methods based on parameterized Lorenz curves. As explained by Datt
(1998) the second method is preferred for its relative accuracy.
23Although our country-specific Lorenz curve may be better estimated, in general the trend of re-
duced global inequality driven by high growth rates in China, can hardly be offset by such estimation
improvements.
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3.4.2.1 Valid Lorenz curves
Parametric estimation implies choosing a specific functional form and then estimating
the underlying parameters. After the parameters are obtained, the Lorenz curve can be
easily calculated. Nevertheless, in order to be considered as a legitimate Lorenz curve a
functional form must comply with certain conditions.
If p is the cumulative proportion of population and L (p) is the cumulative income
share of group p. L (p) is a valid Lorenz curve if and only if:
L (p) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ (0, 1) (3.1)
L (0) = 0 (3.2)
L (1) = 1 (3.3)
L0
¡
0+
¢
≥ 0 for p ∈ (0, 1) (3.4)
L00 (p) ≥ 0 (3.5)
3.4.2.2 Functional forms
There is a large literature concerning Lorenz curves estimation and there are many pro-
posed functional forms. Some models are better suited for specific distributions and others
perform better on typical distributions. However, given that income distributions can dif-
fer widely across countries and time, not one functional form is always preferable. To deal
with this fact, we use the most popular functional forms and for each case, we choose the
one that gives a better estimation.
We describe next each functional forms and the parameter constraints that assure a
valid Lorenz curve.
The General Quadratic Lorenz curve.24 In this model the Lorenz curve is given by:
LGQ (p) = −
1
2
h
bp+ e+
¡
mp2 + np+ e2
¢ 1
2
i
(3.6)
24Villaseñor and Arnold (1989).
85
where e = − (a+ b+ c+ 1) ; m = b2 − 4a and n = 2be − 4c. The parameters to be
estimated are then: a, b and c. In order for (3.6) to represent a valid Lorenz curve we
must have: m < 0, e < 0, c ≥ 0 and a+ c ≥ 1
Pareto Family of Lorenz Curves. A group of functional forms has been derived from
the well-known classical Pareto Lorenz curve. The main difference between these models
is the number of parameters employed.
• P0: Classical Pareto. This functional form is given by:
LP0 (p) = 1− (1− p)π (3.7)
A valid Lorenz curve is obtained when: 0 < π ≤ 1.
• P1: Ortega et al. (1991):
LP1 (p) = pα [1− (1− p)π] (3.8)
where the necessary conditions for a valid Lorenz curve are: 0 < π ≤ 1 and α ≥ 0. If
α = 0 then P1 reduces to P0.
• P2: Rasche et al. (1980). Here we have:
LP2 (p) = [1− (1− p)π]β (3.9)
where the necessary conditions are: 0 < π ≤ 1 and β ≥ 1.
• P3: Sarabia et al. (1999). Combining P1 and P2 they propose:
LP3 (p) = pα [1− (1− p)π]β (3.10)
where 0 < π ≤ 1, α ≥ 0 and β > 0 assure a valid Lorenz curve.
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Kakwani and Podder (1973). They suggest the following functional form to estimate
the Lorenz curve:
L (p) = pα expβ(p−1) (3.11)
A valid Lorenz curve is obtained when 1 < α < 2 and β > 0
The Beta model.25 The is Lorenz curve is given by:
LB (p) = p− θpγ (1− p)δ (3.12)
where θ, γ and δ are the parameters of the model to be estimated and we need for
a valid curve that: θ > 0, 0 < γ ≤ 1 and 0 < δ ≤ 1. However, in many cases LB (p)
fails condition (3.1) even when the parameters have the right values. This is an important
shortcoming of the Beta model, but we consider it here since it is one of the best performers
(Datt, 1998) and the negative values it produces in the lower tail of the distribution can
be easily detected.
Sarabia et al. (1999). They propose a four-parameter functional form to correct for
the Beta model problem. We name their equation the BS model:
LBS (p) = pλ+γ
h
1− θ (1− p)δ
iγ
(3.13)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, γ ≥ 1, 0 < δ ≤ 1 and λ ≥ 0 assure that LBS (p) is a valid Lorenz
curve.
3.4.2.3 Estimation and selection of the Lorenz curve model
In total we can use seven different models to estimate the Lorenz curve. Some of these
can be linearized to use ordinary least square estimations, but others cannot. Therefore,
we have employed a non-linear estimation program in the General Algebraic Modeling
System (GAMS) software to test the seven parametric models. We also check if each
model complies with the conditions to be taken as a valid Lorenz curve. When more
25Kakwani and Podder (1976) and Kakwani (1980).
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than one model yields a valid Lorenz curve we use the standard procedure adopted in the
literature and choose the model that yields a lower sum of squared residuals.
In our view, this non-linear estimation of parametric models is an improvement with
respect to existing software. The POVCAL software (Chen et al., 1998) only estimates
linearized models of the General Quadratic and Beta models. In some cases both models
fail to provide a valid Lorenz curve and in addition, this software does not correct for
Beta models that generate negative values at the bottom of the distribution.26
Furthermore, our GAMS program calculates the underlying income distribution as-
sociated with the estimated Lorenz curve. Using this information it directly estimates
the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index for the four different θ values and the poverty
ratios. Nonetheless, not all the series present in the WIID database have grouped data
information. Therefore, the number of Gini and Atkinson indexes estimations we obtain
is lower than the number of Gini coefficients provided by primary sources. This limits the
analysis but provides additional information not present in the source Gini coefficients.
3.4.3 Poverty estimation
It is straightforward to conduct poverty analysis once the entire income distribution is
estimated and this procedure has the advantage of not relying on the strong assumption
that the poor people are well represented by the lowest quintile or decile.
To estimate poverty ratios, we use the official World Bank absolute poverty lines of
one and two dollars a day (Ravallion et al., 1991). The income levels are taken from the
PPP-adjusted GDP values of the Penn World Tables version 6.1.27
However, the use of GDP data as an income indicator is problematic. First, inequality
data is drawn from household surveys and there is a substantial discrepancy between the
national income reported from these household surveys and that from national accounts
data. The difference is mainly explained because GDP not only includes private consump-
tion, but also private investment and government spending. Secondly, the poverty lines
26Nevertheless, we use POVCAL to estimate the cumulative income shares L (p) when these are not
provided directly by the source and instead, the grouped data is presented by income classes or the income
data is associated with mean income and/or upper limit values.
27The poverty lines were reported in 1985 values and the PWT data is in 1996 dollars. Thus, the
equivalent annual income of $1/day is $532 and for $2/day is $1064 (Sala-i-Martin, 2000a,b).
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were calculated using mean consumption levels in poor countries and therefore, include
only the most basic consumption needs and it does not take into account public services
or investment.
Following these considerations, there are two main approaches to estimate absolute
poverty. TheWorld Bank (Chen and Ravallion 2001, 2004) uses consumption and inequal-
ity data both drawn from household surveys. On the other hand, we follow Sala-i-Martin
(2000a,b) and estimate poverty using inequality data from household surveys, but per
capita income from national accounts data. This later approach allows us to have larger
series. In addition, it indirectly accounts for governmental expenditure and other non-
private consumption sources of goods and services for the poor.
The two methods can yield significantly different poverty estimates for a given poverty
line. Yet, in recent articles (Chen and Ravallion, 2004; and Ravallion, 2004) it is shown
that both methods produce very similar results when the World Bank method uses the
$1/day poverty line and the other method uses $2/day. Moreover, Ravallion (2001) finds
that, with the exception of the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union, growth rates of national accounts measures are not systematically different
from growth rates of household survey measures.
To sum up, using a $2/day poverty line we obtain poverty estimates roughly equivalent
to the $1/day absolute poverty based on consumption and we expect that this equivalence
does not change over time.
Formally, the headcount poverty ratio is defined as the number of individuals with an
income below the poverty line in relation to the total population:
PRz =
zU
0
I(y)dy
∞U
0
I(y)dy
(3.14)
where z is the poverty line and I (y) is the distribution function of income y.
We estimate the poverty ratio using a GAMS program similar to the one used in our
previous section. Nonetheless, since we are now primarily interested in the lower tail of
the income distribution, we select the model that provides a valid Lorenz curve that fits
best the lower quintile of the distribution.
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Moreover, we use a discrete version of the previous formula. For instance, we divide
the population in a thousand q units and estimate the income of each unit using the
formula:28
I(q) = GDPpc ∗ IS(q) ∗ 1000 (3.15)
where GDPpc is gross domestic product per capita, IS (q) is the income share of unit q.
The poverty ratios are given by the sum of the number of units with an income below the
two poverty lines ($1/day and $2/day), divided by the total population. The total number
of poor can easily be obtained by multiplying the poverty ratio by the total population.
With a similar procedure, it is also straightforward to estimate other poverty indexes,
such as the poverty gap and the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke index.
3.5 Evaluating the data
On the basis of the previous two sections we can construct a whole new inequality dataset.
Unlike the DS series, we have several inequality series for each country (gross-household,
net-household and expenditure-person), five inequality measures (Gini coefficient and four
Atkinson indexes) and two types of series based on their reliability (basic and extended).29
To assess the implementation of our comparability assumptions, we begin by compar-
ing our dataset with that of DS. We also check how our estimated Gini coefficients fare
with respect to the source information provided in the WIID. Finally, we analyze if the
Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index yield similar results.
3.5.1 Differences between our series and Deininger and Squire
In general, we want to know if inequality levels and time trends are significantly different
when moving from one dataset to the other. Inequality levels are important for cross-
28The formulas to integrate the poverty ratios are complicated by the non-linearity of most of the
Lorenz curve models. However, with a thousand units we have a three digit approximation of the real
value.
29The summary statistics for the Atkinson indexes and our own Gini estimates are given in Figure 3-5,
under the column: share data.
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country comparisons. Time trends provide information on specific country inequality
behavior and are relevant when analyzing pooled data.
3.5.1.1 Level differences
AB find serious level differences when comparing the DS dataset with the LIS information.
Since the LIS was conducted explicitly to render OECD inequality data comparable, it is
a reliable indicator on which to compare the inequality levels for OECD countries. Thus,
we follow AB and compare our dataset with the LIS information for a single year (1991
or the closest available). The results are shown in Table 3-7.
Table 3-7: OECD country rankings, Gini Gross-Household series for one year
Ye a r
1991 1 Finland 29.61 Finland 29.61 Finland 26.11
1991 2 Netherlands 30.59 Netherlands 30.59 B elgium 26.92
1992 3 S weden 31.11 S weden 31.11 Canada 27.65
1983 4 Germ any 31.37 Germ any 31.37 Great B ritain 27.80
1991 5 Norway 31.81 Norway 31.81 Netherlands 29.38
1992 6 B elgium 31.95 B elgium 31.95 Germ any 31.37
1992 7 Denm ark 33.20 Denm ark 33.20 S weden 32.44
1984 8 France 34.91 France 34.91 Denm ark 33.20
1991 9 Canada 35.08 Canada 35.08 Norway 33.31
1986 10 Great B ritain 36.18 Great B ritain 36.18 France 34.91
1991 11 US A 39.15 US A 39.15 USA 37.94
LIS Ba sic se rie s DS -a cce pt
For this specific year our observations are exactly the same as the LIS and thus we
have the same country ranking. However, the ranking provided by the DS series is very
different. This is evident in the low inequality reported for Canada and Great Britain,
and the higher inequality in Sweden and Norway.
The results are similar when evaluating net income rankings. In Table 3-8 our basic
series is almost identical to that of LIS, the only difference being the observation for Italy,
which is very low in the LIS series. On the other hand, the DS accept series once more
provides a completely different ranking. Spain has a very low inequality (e.g. DS use
expenditure information for this country). Once more, Great Britain and Canada have
unexpected low positions and Sweden and Norway very high ones.
One can argue that a one-year ranking is not adequate, since a single uncharacteristic
observation can alter the ranking. Thus, we also rank the OECD countries by the average
Gini coefficient for a five year period: 1983-1987. We choose this period since it provides
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Table 3-8: OECD country rankings, Gini Net-Household series for one year
Year
1991 1 Finland 26.11 Finland 26.11 Spain 25.91
1992 2 Belgium 26.92 Belgium 26.92 Finland 26.11
1991 3 Italy 27.12 Norway 28.80 Belgium 26.92
1991 4 Norway 28.80 Sweden 29.16 Canada 27.65
1992 5 Sweden 29.16 Germany 29.36 Great Britain 27.80
1983 6 Germany 29.36 Netherlands 29.38 Netherlands 29.38
1991 7 Netherlands 29.38 Denmark 29.96 Germany 31.37
1992 8 Denmark 29.96 Spain 30.60 Italy 32.19
1990 9 Spain 30.60 Canada 31.47 Sweden 32.44
1991 10 Canada 31.47 France 31.94 Denmark 33.20
1984 11 France 31.94 Italy 32.19 Norway 33.31
1989 12 Australia 32.85 Australia 32.85 France 34.91
1986 13 Great Britain 33.29 Great Britain 33.29 Australia 37.32
1991 14 USA 35.24 USA 35.24 USA 37.94
Note: For Spain the LIS observation refers  to fam ily equivalent and we only have an extended series .
LIS Basic series DS-accept
the most LIS observations possible. The results for the Gross-Household series are given
in Table 3-9 and those for Net-Household in Table 3-10.
Table 3-9: OECD Country rankings, Gini Gross-Household average for 1983-1987
1 B elg ium 26.22 B e lg ium 26.22 B e lg ium 26.22
2 F in land 30 .10 N orw ay 29 .44 G rea t  B rita in 27.14
3 N orw ay 30 .36 F in land 30.30 N etherlands 28.94
4 S w eden 30 .77 S w eden 30 .77 F in land 29.34
5 G erm any 31 .78 N etherlands 31 .69 S w eden 31.30
6 N etherlands 32 .94 G erm any 31 .78 N orw ay 31.69
7 D enm ark 33 .15 D enm ark 33 .15 G erm any 31.78
8 C anada 34 .28 C anada 34 .67 C anada 32.67
9 F ranc e 34 .91 F ranc e 34 .91 D enm ark 33.15
10 N ew  Zea land 35 .00 N ew  Zea land 35 .48 F ranc e 34.91
11 G reat  B rita in 36 .18 G reat  B rita in 36 .18 N ew  Zea land 35.48
12 A us tra lia 36 .50 U S A 38.93 U S A 37.20
13 U S A 39.23 A us tra lia 39 .09 A us t ra lia 39.09
N otes :  The  N ew  Zea land L IS  obs erva t ion  re fe rs  to  fam ily .  
   W e on ly  have an  ex tended s e ries  fo r F in land.
L IS B a sic  se rie s D S -a cce p t
Again our basic series for gross income ranks the OECD in a very similar way as the
LIS. Nevertheless, the DS series once more yields an unsuitable ranking. Great Britain is
again very highly positioned and Norway too low. When turning to Net income, some dif-
ferences appear between our data and the LIS with respect to Finland, Great Britain and
Australia. The difference is justified in these cases by the existence of more observations
in our basic series than those in the LIS dataset.
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Table 3-10: OECD Country rankings, Gini Net-Household, average for 1983-1987
1 Finland 26.19 Belgium 26.22 Belgium 26.22
2 Belgium 26.22 Norway 26.87 Great Britain 27.14
3 Netherlands 28.35 Sweden 28.64 Netherlands 28.94
4 Norway 28.35 Netherlands 28.94 Finland 29.34
5 Sweden 28.64 Finland 29.34 Sweden 31.30
6 Germany 29.36 Germany 29.36 Norway 31.69
7 Canada 31.21 Canada 29.87 Germany 31.78
8 Denmark 31.30 Denmark 31.30 Canada 32.67
9 Australia 31.49 Great Britain 31.84 Denmark 33.15
10 France 31.94 France 31.94 Italy 33.80
11 Italy 32.78 Italy 33.80 France 34.91
12 Great Britain 33.29 USA 34.93 USA 37.20
13 USA 35.24 Australia 36.24 Australia 39.09
LIS Basic series DS-accept
We can draw two conclusions from this example of OECD countries. First, our series
are compatible with the LIS and the few divergences are justified by more observations
present in our series. The second conclusion is that the DS accept series yields some
rankings that are very hard to justify and can only be explained by the inconsistent use
of different income concepts.
In the case of developing countries, there is no equivalent to the LIS that we can use
as a benchmark to compare datasets. However, the differences in levels between our basic
series and the DS accept series persist. When ranking OECD countries some differences
were produced by the loose interchange of net and gross income data present in the DS
series. For developing countries the source of divergence in levels is produced by mixing
expenditure and gross income data. Since expenditure data is significantly lower than
gross income data, this alters the inequality levels between countries.
Thus, these results support the idea that mixing different income concepts can lead to
misguiding conclusions and is an important limitation for inequality cross-country studies.
3.5.1.2 Time trend differences
The use of fixed adjustments can help to render the DS series comparable to the LIS. If
provisions are made to adjust for income differences some of the divergences shown before
disappear. However, there is still an element of arbitrariness in the procedure. How much
should we adjust the series? The countries average difference or the overall average? The
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decision of which fixed adjustment to apply affects the outcome and the resulting country
ranking.
Nevertheless, the fixed adjustment of series can mainly solve for level-differences. For
instance, when the time trend of series with different definitions is not the same, mixing
the series creates a whole new trend. In many cases, the use of a fixed adjustment does
not correct for this problem
Therefore, we proceed to compare the time-trend differences between our basic and
extended series, with the DS accept series. To do so, we regress the Gini coefficient against
time for those series that have five or more observations. We use two equations:30
Gi = α1 + α2ti + εi (3.16)
Gi = β1 + β2ti + β3t
2
i + εi (3.17)
The first regression tests for any linear time trends and the second for quadratic
trends. To do a valid comparison of our series with the DS-accept series we do not take
into consideration information that was not available to DS (data after 1996 and studies
published after this year). We limit the analysis to the three main series: gross-household,
net-household and expenditure person. In total we study 44 basic series, 39 extended series
and 43 DS-accept series with five or more observations, where 45% of the series come from
OECD countries.
To have a statistically significant trend, we must find that α2 is significantly different
from zero and/or that β1 and β2 are jointly different from zero. In total, 27% of the basic
series have a different time trend than the DS-accept series. The figure is over 66% in the
case of the extended series.
We can also analyze only those series with ten or more observations. Although the
number of series decreases, the results remain the same. Now we have 30 basic and 16
extended series. 23% of the basic series and 73% of the extended series have a different
time trend than the DS-accept series. The OECD proportion of observations remains
close to half (47%). These comparisons show significant time trend differences between
both datasets, which suggest dissimilar conclusions regarding inequality variation.
30Given the small number of observation per country, we do not pursue a time series analysis.
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As an example we can analyze the case of Sweden. There are two main sources:
LIS and SAS for the net and gross household series. However, when conducting our
comparability analysis both sources are rendered not comparable and thus, we do not
mix them. Instead, we choose the LIS series, which has fewer observations than the
SAS series, but has a larger time span and provides better cross-country comparisons, as
explained above. In Figure 3-4 we plot our two basic series and the DS-accept series. The
first two DS observations are taken from the LIS series but the remaining are from the
SAS series.
Figure 3-4: Sweden, Gini coefficient, basic and DS-accept series
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The first conclusion is that the levels are different. This was already analyzed in the
previous section. More interesting, the DS-accept series fails to show any time trend at
all.31 From our basic series it is clear that there is a trend, in particular an U-shape
pattern. This also is corroborated by significant coefficients in the quadratic regression.
Another compelling example is Canada. In Figure 3-5 we present two of our basic series
and the DS-accept. The gross-household series has been adjusted by the LIS data and
thus, has a different level from the DS-accept series until the 1988 observation. After this
year the series diverge, DS take some observations which fail the WIID quality criteria.
Instead, we use the LIS observation for 1991. Although the last part of the two series
31This could be corrected by a fixed adjustment of the Net series. However, DS do not find any
significant difference between Net and Gross, and thus, do not apply any adjustment.
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show different time trends, there is no overall time trend in both series. However, when
using our basic net-household series, we have significant coefficients for the quadratic
form regression, i.e., we spot again the U-shape pattern. This is a clear example of the
limitations of the dummy variable solution, since a fixed adjustment does not solve the
inconsistency and the time trend does not change.
Figure 3-5: Canada, Gini coefficient, basic and DS-accept series
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There are many other cases that show different levels and time trends between our
series and the DS-accept. Most of the differences are given by the grouping approach used;
not only by the income concepts and reference units, but also by incompatible sources.
On the other hand, there are some differences that are provided by the quality labels
used. In the example of Canada we rejected some observations used in DS. Sometimes it
is the other way around and we include observations not labeled as high quality by DS,
but accepted as reliable data by the WIID.32
Yet, the differences are significant and it is clear that the decision regarding how to
group different definitions is essential when analyzing inequality data. Furthermore, the
use of dummy variables or fixed adjustments does not solve the problem satisfactorily.
32A noteworthy example is the data presented by Paukert (1973). Most of his data is not accepted
by DS because it lacks a clear reference to the primary source. However, the WIID accepts all his
observations. Since this sources provide information from the 1960s it expands many country series and
thus, may alter the time trends for some countries. For instance, Barro (2000) also uses observations that
do not pass this “primary source” quality test.
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However, in a recent paper Deininger and Squire (2002) continue to justify this practice.
In our view, the empirical work they cite to back their claims is not compelling and does
not tackle the main limitations pointed in this paper. Therefore, we agree with Atkinson
and Brandolini and conclude that researches employing inequality data should avoid the
use of the DS-accept series.
On the other hand, our dataset does comply with the recommendations of AB:
“A secondary dataset should be a consolidation of earlier work, with mul-
tiple observations for the same country and the same date being justified by
differences in source, in definition, or in methods of calculation.”
3.5.2 Compatibility of the source and our estimated Gini coef-
ficients
We turn our attention to our own estimated Lorenz curves. It is a straightforward exercise
to obtain Gini coefficients and Atkinson indexes once the Lorenz curve is estimated.33
With this information we first test how our estimated Gini coefficients compare to the
source information. Afterwards, we analyze if the Atkinson indexes provide different
information on inequality than the Gini coefficient.
In order to compare our Gini estimates and the source coefficients we conduct the same
comparability tests done in section 3.2.1. Again we limit our analysis to the three main
series: gross-household, net-household and expenditure-person. We obtain 87 comparable
series. 85% are fully comparable with c (an average difference) of zero; 92% are fully
comparable with c ≤ |1| and 95% with c ≤ |2| . The average difference between series is of
−0.15 and the average difference weighted by the number of observations is −0.17. These
results show a very good estimation of the Gini coefficients from our constructed Lorenz
curves.
Moreover, of the three non-comparable estimations, two of them can be explained by
inconsistent source information for one particular year. For example, the expenditure-
33Using the chosen parametric equation we can construct the whole income distribution and the Lorenz
curve. In our case, we use centuples to do so. The resulting inequality indexes do not change significantly
if a lower unit is used.
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person series of Estonia has a Gini estimate of 39.47 for 1993 while the source value is of
31.52 (see Table 3-11). This single observation renders the series incompatible.
Table 3-11: Estonia, Expenditure-person series, accumulated share data and Gini coeffi-
cients
Year Gini (source) Gini est. Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4
1992 35.82 35.79 0.0702 0.1879 0.3490 0.5691
1993 31.52 39.47 0.0624 0.1717 0.3245 0.5386
1995 36.63 36.60 0.0691 0.1835 0.3423 0.5623
Source: WIID and DS datasets.
Yet, a closer inspection of the accumulated share data reveals a source inconsistency.
All the quintile accumulated income shares are higher for 1992 and 1995, but the Gini
coefficients are higher in both years. This result is very contradictory and can be a typo
in the source data.34 On the other hand, our Gini estimate is consistent with the share
information.
In general, our estimates are very close to the source information and we can be assured
of the quality of our estimated Gini coefficients. This also provides confidence in the values
of the Atkinson indexes that also use the constructed Lorenz curves. Li et al. (1998) state
that the estimation methods vary across different sources and therefore, the use of one
standard technique can minimize this problem. Consequently, our main series include
our own estimations when there is income share information, and the source data when
there is no way to estimate the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson indexes. Nevertheless,
we retain both observations: the source and our estimations and hence, we can test the
robustness of our results.
34From equations 4 and 5 we know that the Lorenz curve for 1992 and 1995 dominates that of 1993 for
the whole middle section of the distribution. Thus, the lower Gini value given by the source could only
be justified by significant differences at the extremes of the distribution in 1993. However, given that the
Gini attaches more weight to the middle of the distribution this possibility seems very unlikely.
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3.5.3 Comparing inequality measured by the Gini coefficient
and the Atkinson indexes
We analyze now the inequality results provided by the two measures we have. First, we
check the behavior of the Atkinson index for each value of θ. Afterwards we compare the
Atkinson and the Gini data. Throughout the section, we only use our estimated Gini
coefficient. In this way we have the same sample as the Atkinson index and both indexes
are derived from the same estimation technique.
3.5.3.1 Atkinson index results
As expected, the level and variance of the Atkinson index increases with θ. The higher the
inequality aversion, the index gives higher values and also is more sensitive to changes in
the distribution (see Table 3-12). The overall values of the Net series are lower than those
of the Expenditure series because the first series has more OECD countries in its sample
and the later more developing countries. In fact, from the Gini coefficient values we know
that the level of inequality and the variance between OECD countries is smaller than for
developing countries. The gross-household series has intermediate values, reflecting the
more balanced sample.
Table 3-12: Basic series, averages for different indexes
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3.5.3.2 Differences between the Atkinson and the Gini
In the following sections we analyze only the two middle Atkinson indexes. Further-
more, we only consider series with five or more observations. First we explore how the
two inequality indexes rank a sample of countries and then we analyze the time-trend
information that both indexes provide.
Level differences. In Table 3-13 we rank a sample of 13 countries by the three inequal-
ity indexes. We use the average for the whole 1980s decade. In general, the Atkinson
ranking is very similar to that given by the Gini coefficient. The only significant differ-
ence is in the ranking of Canada and Bangladesh for the last index. Thus, although the
Atkinson provides lower levels, this does not change much the relative position of each
country.
Table 3-13: Basic Gross-Household series, 1980s average ranking
However, it does provide more information about the income distribution. In Table
3-14 we rank the 12 countries that have a Basic Net-Household series with more than
five observations. The general ranking does not change much from index to index, but it
does have some interesting cases. For example, Sweden has a relatively high inequality
for the Atkinson indexes and Italy a relatively low one. A closer inspection of the share
information shows that the difference is provided by the lowest quintile, where Italy has an
average share income of 8.2% and Sweden of 7.4%. Therefore, Italy has a lower Atkinson
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level when θ = 1.5. Yet, the middle quintiles are very similar and Sweden’s highest quintile
has around four points less. This explains the lower inequality when θ = 1 or when we
use the Gini coefficient.
Table 3-14: Basic Net-Houshold series, 1980s average ranking
Time trend differences. To analyze the time trend information provided by both
inequality measures, again we only use the three main series for those countries with five
or more observations, and we regress once more equations (3.16) and (3.17).
We have a sample of 60 observations, 23 of those representing OECD countries. For
θ = 1 the Atkinson index yields a different time trend in 27% of the cases from that of
the Gini coefficient. When θ = 1.5 the difference increases to 31%. If we expand the
series length to ten or more observations the results are similar: 31% for θ = 1 and 28%
for θ = 1.5. Therefore, we can conclude that the Atkinson index gives a different time
trend in roughly a third of all cases. This is a significant divergence and confirms that the
changes in different parts of the income distribution can be responsible for both indexes
reporting different inequality results.
In summary, although there is not much variation in the ranking given by both inequal-
ity indexes, there are important differences when we analyze the time trend information.
Thus, the Atkinson index does provide additional information about the extremes of the
distribution and as such, it is a useful resource when analyzing inequality data.
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3.5.4 International and intertemporal patterns of inequality
As before, in this section we use our three main series and in addition, we use our own
Gini estimates when share data was available. First we summarize the characteristics of
the basic and extended series and we end the section by analyzing how inequality varies
across and within countries.
3.5.4.1 Descriptive information
In the Appendix we present the summary statistics for our six series: three basic and
three extended. It is important to remember that the Net series are more representative
of OECD countries, the Expenditure series of developing countries and the Gross series
has a balanced sampled between both groups. The disparities in the sampled countries
of each series makes it difficult to compare the results when different income concepts are
used. Nonetheless, a simple examination of the tables shows that the Gross series has a
higher mean and standard deviation in average. The standard deviation is very similar
for the Net and Expenditure series, while the last has a higher mean in average.
We also present for each series the results of a simple ANOVA analysis, which shows the
percentage of variation represented by between and within country changes. The results
are homogeneous and for each series between-country variation represents between 80%
and 90% of total variation. This suggests that inequality levels are more important than
inequality trends, a conclusion also reached by Li, et al. (1998). However, in our case
the within-country variation is also significant and thus, we find evidence for the weaker
hypothesis they test, i.e., that intertemporal shifts in inequality are modest compared
with international differences.
3.5.4.2 International patterns
Using again the two time trend equations, we run random-effect regressions on the six
series. Here we want to find if there are any inequality patterns that are common to
countries and groups. The results are presented in Table 3-15.
First there is no linear pattern in the Gross and Net series. The Expenditure series has
a significantly decreasing trend. However, all six series do present significant quadratic
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Table 3-15: Random-effect regressions of Gini series
trends. In particular, all the series reveal a U-shape pattern with a significantly negative
β2 and a positive β3. These results support the idea of what Atkinson (2003) labeled the
“U-turn” pattern. This is represented by a decrease of inequality after the Second World
War and a turning point around the 1980s when inequality began to increase again.35 In
particular, for the gross and net series the turning point is around the late 1970s and early
1980s. Although Atkinson finds this pattern for OECD countries, our results suggest that
it can represent a broader phenomenon.36
Additionally, the values of the quadratic coefficients produce a different U-pattern for
the extended expenditure series. It has a prominent decrease in inequality and the turning
point is in the mid-1990s. These divergent results suggest that the sample of countries may
be behaving differently, since expenditure series represent mainly developing countries.
Therefore, to analyze this point further we divide the series by OECD and developing
countries (see Table 3-16).37
For the case of OECD countries the results are very robust. For the four analyzed
series there is no linear trend but a quadratic U-pattern. On the other hand, the series
for developing countries present different results. The gross-household basic series does
35Li, et al. (1998) fail to find any significant time trend. However, they only use the linear approach.
36He explains this inequality behavior by a decrease in governmental intervention and the increase of
more liberal economic policies.
37In the following tables and figures, LDCs refers to developing countries.
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Table 3-16: Random effects regressions of Gini series for OECD and developing countries
separated
not have any significant trend, while the extended series presents the familiar U-pattern.
Moreover, both expenditure series have decreasing linear trends and the expenditure basic
series has a significant U-pattern. When the estimated regression curves are plotted38
(Figure 3-6), we observe that the series for the developing countries are mainly decreasing
in the period. The two series with a significant quadratic trend have their turning point
late in the period: for the Gross extended series it is 1987 and for the Expenditure basic
series, 1991. This generates a trend that is decreasing trough the period and increases
slightly at the end.
Therefore, we can conclude that the OECD countries present a clear U-pattern time
trend, with a turning point around the late 1970s. In addition, for developing countries
inequality has been mainly decreasing in the period, with a slight increase in the 1990s.
Subsequently, although inter-country inequality is more variable, within-country trends
are also significant.
38We only plot the OECD Gross-extended series, since the other series are very similar. The linear
trend of the developing countries Expenditure-extended series is very similar to that of the basic series
and thus, it is not plotted either.
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Figure 3-6: Estimated random-effects regression curves
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3.5.4.3 Country-specific intertemporal patterns
Inequality changes over time have important policy implications. For instance, if inequal-
ity is stable over time, then economic growth has a direct impact on poverty reduction.
Moreover, the particular level of inequality determines how much poor households benefit
from countrywide growth. Conversely, significant shifts in inequality can offset pro-poor
growth, signal important socioeconomic changes and strengthen the importance of redis-
tributive policies.
We focus now in country specific inequality trends. Again we use a linear and a
quadratic time trend to test for intertemporal variations in inequality, but now we use
fixed-effects estimations to capture the individual coefficients for each country. More-
over, as some countries have more series with different reference units (i.e. household
equivalent), then we incorporate these series into the pooling to obtain more country
observations.39
In the Appendix (Tables 3-23 and 3-24) we present the fixed-effects regressions for
the basic and extended gross-household series. For the basic series 24% had a significant
linear trend, 24% a quadratic trend and 13% both. In total, 61% of the countries had
some kind of time trend. For the extended series the numbers increase to 32%, 29% and
39Note that we are not mixing different reference units in a same series, but using distinctive series,
each with a different reference unit.
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26%, leaving the total to 87%. The differences between both series can be accounted by
the increase in the individual country observations provided by the extended series.
Using panel data provides more observations per country and thus, a better approx-
imation of the inequality trend. For each country we perform pool regressions using all
its basic series and then asses if there is any significant trend at a 5% confidence level.
Together with the results of the basic gross-household series, the results of the panel data
estimations for all the series are presented in the appendix (Table 3-25). In some cases
the panel data regressions confirm the results of the gross-household series, in others it
provides other trends or produces a trend that was not present in the gross-household
series. Additionally, 71% of the countries of the countries for which we regressed the
pooled data have some kind of significant time trend.
The different results can be a consequence of several factors: the number of series in
each country, the increased number of observations provided by the panel data analysis
and the difference in definitions (income concept and/or recipient unit). Thus, with our
inequality dataset there are many ways to analyze an individual country. The presence of
series with different definitions, the basic series and the extended series and the Atkinson
indexes provide a richer source of information from where to draw inequality conclusions.
What seems to be evident is that many countries present inequality time series with some
significant trends and thus, within-country inequality variations are important.
3.5.5 Poverty results
We estimate poverty ratios for the three basic extended series.40 In general, poverty has
been declining in most of the countries and as expected, there is no poverty in OECD
countries. In many Asian and Latin American countries the ratios have been declining
(i.e. China and India) and have become zero for some (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand). The
exception is the African continent, were the ratios continue to remain high. These results
40Since some of the observations in these series have been adjusted for comparability reasons, we
have some share data that does not correspond with the associated Gini values. Thus, we have some
observations that present a lower or higher inequality than the non-adjusted data. There is no easy way
to correct for this problem. However, since most of the adjustments were performed in OECD countries,
the poverty results are mainly not affected, since there is usually no poverty in these countries. The three
exemptions are the G-hh series for Brazil, Chile and Mexico. For Brazil we did not use the adjusted data.
In the later two cases Chile has a higher poverty and Mexico a lower poverty for the adjusted data.
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are consistent with Sala-i-Martin (2002a,b), who used a similar estimation technique. In
Figure 3-7 we show the poverty ratios for the $2/day poverty line for China, Mexico and
Thailand.
Figure 3-7: $2/day Poverty Ratios: Selected Countries
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These poverty results may seen surprising, especially the lack of poverty in some
Southeast Asian countries. However, one must keep in mind that the poverty lines are
analytical constructs that show minimum living standards in poor countries and do not
reflect any relative poverty. For some countries there can be poverty as defined in national
standards, but it disappears when an international absolute poverty line is used.
Furthermore, the interrelation between growth and inequality is crucial to understand
poverty reduction. To clarify this point, we have done some poverty numerics that show
the relationship between income shares, GDP per capita and poverty ratios. Using equa-
tion (3.15) , for any given income share we can establish the minimum GDP per capita
needed to cross the poverty line. The income shares are determined by the underlying
income distribution of each data point.
For illustration purposes we obtain the average income shares for the three extended
series and estimate the minimum GDP per capita that assures that the poverty line is
crossed.41 Figure 3-8 shows that the required GDP per capita is higher for the gross-
41We are implicitly assuming that growth does not change income inequality, although this is a con-
troversial point (Dollar and Kraay, 2002).
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Figure 3-8: Minimum GDPpc to cross $2/day poverty line
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household series. This is consistent with the fact that this series has higher inequality
than the net and expenditure series. Moreover, the figure shows the percentage of the
population that lives below the poverty line of $2/day. For example, with a GDP per
capita of at least $3000, the poverty line is below 20% when inequality is measured by
expenditure or net income. Equivalently, with a GDP per capita of at least $5000 there
is less than 1% of poverty. However, these minimum total income requirements can vary
when the country has extreme income distributions. Additionally, for a poverty line of
$1/day, the minimum GDP per capita is exactly half of the values shown in the figure.
Figure 3-9: Thailand: Poverty ratios, Gini coefficient and GDP per capita
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Finally, we present the specific case of Thailand. In Figure 3-9 we plot the poverty
ratio for $2/day, the GDP per capita levels and the Gini coefficient for the gross-household
series. The Gini coefficient has been relatively stable over the period, with an increase
in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, there have been high rates of
GDP per capita growth in the same period and this has allowed a sharp decrease in the
poverty ratio. For 1996 the poverty ratio is zero, when the GDP per capita was above
$7000. The data is consistent with our poverty numerics: with a GDP of around $3000
the poverty ratio was above 20% and in 1996 the poverty ratio is zero, when the GDP
per capita was above $6000.
3.6 Conclusions
The empirical study of cross-country inequality is limited by the heterogeneity and vast
amount of available data. Some of these limitations can be overtaken by filtering the
data with quality criteria. A complementary step is to make comparability assumptions
and group data with different definitions. However, we have convincingly shown that it
is not a sound practice to collapse the whole available information of a particular country
into a single income inequality time series. We have proven that using different income
concepts in a same series may seriously affect inequality levels and time trends. Likewise,
mixing some recipient units may also alter significantly the series. There are already
important measurement errors implicit in most of the inequality data and freely mixing
different concepts and reference units only adds more noise to the data. Furthermore,
using dummy variable adjustments does not always correct for this problem and in some
cases, increases the data distortions. Thus, the single time series approach followed by
Deininger and Squire (1996) must not be continued and those inequality studies that used
their dataset must be reassessed.
As an alternative, we propose the use of more than one series per country, where each
series is characterized by a different income concept and/or reference unit. Although an
individual country may have several series, there are three series for which there is a con-
siderable world-wide coverage: gross-household, net-household and expenditure-person.
Moreover, we created two main set of series, based on the reliability of the comparability
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assumptions used. The “basic” series uses only strong comparability assumptions, while
the “extended” series allows for less reliable assumptions, but has longer time series. In
sum, our approach yields six main inequality series that can readily be used in empirical
tests and within these series we have reduced the measurement error implicit in inequality
data.
In any case, if the researcher is only interested in a single series to analyze world
inequality, then we recommend the use of our gross-household extended series. This series
offers significant country coverage and has a balanced sample of OECD and developing
countries. Alternatively, if the interest is centered on OECD countries, then the net-
household extended series is preferable. For developing countries the expenditure-person
extended series presents a better coverage for these countries.
Additionally, we improve existing methods to estimate Lorenz curves from grouped
data. Our approach is more reliable and extensive than the often used POVCAL soft-
ware. The Gini estimations obtained from the income share data are highly satisfactory
and statistically comparable to the coefficients reported by the primary sources. Further-
more, using our estimated Lorenz curves we can estimate Atkinson indexes, which are a
conveniently complement to the information provided by the Gini coefficient. We have
proven that in roughly a third of the cases both indexes report different inequality trends
and thus, the use of both indexes is advisable in order to obtain robust conclusions about
income inequality.
Finally, we used our dataset to test for international patterns of inequality and poverty.
A first conclusion is that between-country inequality variation is more significant than
within-country. This suggests that country specific characteristics have a bigger role in
explaining inequality levels than time trends. However, we also find that within-country
inequality is still important and there are significant time trends in our series. Therefore,
we reject the “glacial change” hypothesis (Li, et al., 1998) that inequality does not vary
significantly over time. For the specific case of OECD countries, we clearly detect a U-
shape pattern that confirms the “U-turn” hypothesis of Atkinson (2003). For developing
countries the cross-country pattern is less clear, but it suggests a decrease in inequality
for most of the analyzed period, with a slight increase in the 1990s. Country-specific
time trends are diverse and it is difficult to spot precise trends. The choice of income
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concept, basic or extended series and the use of pool data may produce different results.
Nevertheless, this variety of choice emphasizes the richness of our inequality dataset,
which is not limited by a single series and provides wider information from where to draw
conclusions. With respect to poverty, we can observe a decline in the poverty ratios in
most of the countries covered by our sample. The only exception is the poverty experience
in the African continent.
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3.7 Appendix to Chapter 3
Table 3-17: Summary statistics, Gross-Household Basic series
C o untry O b s. M ea n St. d e v . M a x M in M a x -M in C o v era g e
A US 12 37.88 3.75 44.11 31.82 12.29 68 ~  96
B EL 3 28.22 3.13 31.81 26.11 5.71 85 ~  92
B GD 10 35.20 2.77 38.50 29.00 9.50 63 ~  86
B GR 29 23.18 3.67 34.41 17.83 16.58 63 ~  96
B HS 11 44.34 4.71 53.61 38.74 14.88 70 ~  93
B R A 17 57.85 2.68 65.05 53.46 11.59 60 ~  87
C A N 18 33.60 1.09 35.04 31.39 3.66 65 ~  91
C HL 18 55.01 3.55 59.63 46.40 13.23 68 ~  96
C HN 4 35.20 13.83 55.80 26.60 29.20 53 ~  75
C O L 7 51.69 1.90 54.52 49.24 5.28 70 ~  92
C R I 5 47.52 3.02 51.40 44.69 6.72 61 ~  83
D EW 8 32.07 2.16 35.56 29.40 6.16 73 ~  84
D N K 6 36.46 4.69 41.27 30.98 10.30 78 ~  92
ES P 5 33.19 3.24 36.30 27.77 8.53 65 ~  91
FR A 7 43.10 6.08 49.00 34.72 14.28 56 ~  84
GB R 4 33.87 5.44 40.38 28.40 11.97 69 ~  95
HKG 8 44.24 3.61 52.00 39.68 12.32 71 ~  96 
IN D 4 41.17 5.51 47.75 34.34 13.41 56 ~  75
J P N 23 36.38 1.90 41.49 33.27 8.22 62 ~  90
KO R 9 35.94 2.14 39.85 33.98 5.87 65 ~  88
LKA 8 42.70 4.96 47.95 35.65 12.30 53 ~  87
MEX 11 52.29 6.42 62.28 42.90 19.38 50 ~  96
MYS 6 50.63 1.87 52.83 48.30 4.53 67 ~  84
N LD 10 31.16 1.61 33.37 28.40 4.97 77 ~  97
N O R 10 31.80 3.20 37.50 27.22 10.29 62 ~  96
N ZL 13 34.12 3.19 40.11 29.23 10.88 73 ~  97
P A K 10 34.54 1.96 38.65 32.38 6.27 63 ~  88
P ER 4 50.08 3.69 55.00 46.43 8.57 71 ~  97
P HL 11 47.61 2.64 51.45 43.61 7.83 56 ~  97
P O L 5 30.96 0.90 32.20 30.07 2.13 86 ~  92
P R I 3 50.30 1.50 51.98 49.12 2.86 69 ~  89
S GP 7 40.76 1.88 43.23 37.88 5.35 73 ~  93
S W E 5 31.76 3.03 36.96 29.02 7.93 67 ~  92
THA 11 46.88 3.57 53.53 42.90 10.63 62 ~  96
TTO 4 46.04 4.22 51.64 41.49 10.15 58 ~  81
TUR 3 50.81 6.12 56.26 44.20 12.06 68 ~  87
TW N 31 31.15 1.71 34.60 28.82 5.78 64 ~  97
US A 53 38.21 1.79 42.72 35.34 7.38 44 ~  97
Aver ag e 10.87 40.21 3.50 45.52 35.81 9.71
O ve ral l 413 38.94 9.39 65.05 17.83 47.22 44 ~  97
B etw e en  C o u n try  va ria t io n 8 9 % C o u n trie s 3 8
With in  C o u n try  v a ria t io n 1 1 % O E C D 1 4 3 7 %
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Table 3-18: Summary statistics, Net-Household Basic series
Country Obs. Mean St. dev. Max Min Max-Min Coverage
AUS 8 37.23 6.01 44.00 31.04 12.96 68 ~ 96
BEL 4 27.08 0.96 28.39 26.11 2.29 79 ~ 92
CAN 12 30.03 1.97 34.30 26.60 7.70 71 ~ 94
DEW 7 29.98 2.35 33.56 27.40 6.16 63 ~ 83
DNK 3 30.79 1.01 31.48 29.63 1.85 76 ~ 92
FIN 10 30.43 2.35 33.93 26.37 7.55 77 ~ 91
FRA 3 30.42 2.23 31.85 27.85 4.00 79 ~ 84
GBR 32 32.79 2.57 38.38 26.23 12.15 61 ~ 95
IRL 3 38.70 1.28 39.86 37.32 2.54 73 ~ 87
ITA 25 35.19 4.58 42.00 28.78 13.22 48 ~ 95
MEX 13 50.94 5.95 58.06 40.90 17.16 50 ~ 96
NLD 16 29.17 2.14 32.40 24.66 7.74 75 ~ 94
NOR 15 28.39 2.75 34.50 24.22 10.29 62 ~ 96
POL 16 26.97 4.40 34.19 18.85 15.34 76 ~ 97
POR 4 37.09 2.51 40.36 34.25 6.11 73 ~ 91
ROM 9 26.76 3.21 31.26 22.88 8.38 89 ~ 97
SVK 11 20.96 3.91 30.60 17.73 12.87 58 ~ 97
SWE 5 28.73 2.41 32.61 26.44 6.17 67 ~ 92
TWN 30 30.11 1.66 33.60 27.82 5.78 64 ~ 97
USA 53 34.22 1.78 38.72 31.34 7.38 44 ~ 97
Average 13.95 31.80 2.80 36.20 27.82 8.38
Overall 279 32.17 6.25 58.06 17.73 40.33 44 ~ 97
Between  Country  variation 77% Countries 20
Within  Country  variation 23% OECD 15 75%
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Table 3-19: Summary Statistics, Expenditure-Person Basic series
Country Obs. Mean St. dev. Max Min Max-Min Coverage
BGD 3 30.22 2.98 33.64 28.23 5.41 89 ~ 96
CIV 5 38.67 1.97 41.20 36.64 4.56 85 ~ 95
ESP 3 33.41 1.37 34.90 32.18 2.71 74 ~ 91
EST 5 36.72 1.82 39.47 34.57 4.90 92 ~ 98
GHA 5 34.64 1.63 36.73 32.73 4.00 88 ~ 97
GIN 3 42.54 3.73 46.84 40.36 6.48 91 ~ 95
HUN 3 21.86 4.41 26.96 19.24 7.71 93 ~ 97
IDN 13 34.37 1.72 37.71 31.68 6.03 64 ~ 96
IND 33 32.56 2.17 37.48 29.10 8.38 51 ~ 97
IRN 5 43.23 1.41 45.45 41.88 3.57 69 ~ 84
JAM 9 41.07 2.96 45.58 36.47 9.11 71 ~ 96
JOR 4 39.38 3.80 44.21 36.33 7.87 80 ~ 97
LKA 3 34.46 4.32 38.80 30.15 8.65 87 ~ 95
MRC 3 39.27 0.24 39.53 39.09 0.44 84 ~ 99
NGA 5 43.71 5.07 50.60 36.93 13.67 86 ~ 97
PER 3 43.70 1.22 45.11 43.00 2.11 86 ~ 94
POL 3 30.10 2.75 32.66 27.20 5.47 92 ~ 96
PHL 4 42.66 2.46 46.06 40.68 5.38 85 ~ 97
THA 3 30.10 2.75 32.66 27.20 5.47 89 ~ 98
TUN 3 43.77 2.45 46.20 41.31 4.90 65 ~ 90
TZA 5 42.61 1.45 44.00 40.15 3.85 69 ~ 93
ZMB 4 45.04 9.66 59.01 38.15 20.86 91 ~ 96
Average 5.77 37.46 2.83 41.13 34.69 6.43
Overall 127 36.97 6.00 59.01 19.24 39.77 51 ~ 99
Between Country variation 79% Countries 22
Within Country variation 21% OECD 1 5%
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Table 3-20: Summary statistics, Gross-Household Extended series
C o u n t r y O b s . M e a n S t .  d e v . M a x M i n M a x - M i n C o v e r a g e
A U S 1 5 3 9 . 1 4 4 . 2 2 4 4 . 2 2 3 1 . 8 2 1 2 . 4 0 6 8  ~  9 8
B E L 3 2 8 . 2 2 3 . 1 3 3 1 . 8 1 2 6 . 1 1 5 . 7 1 8 5  ~  9 2
B G D 1 0 3 5 . 2 0 2 . 7 7 3 8 . 5 0 2 9 . 0 0 9 . 5 0 6 3  ~  8 6
B G R 2 9 2 3 . 1 8 3 . 6 7 3 4 . 4 1 1 7 . 8 3 1 6 . 5 8 6 3  ~  9 6
B H S 1 1 4 4 . 3 4 4 . 7 1 5 3 . 6 1 3 8 . 7 4 1 4 . 8 8 7 0  ~  9 3
B R A 2 1 5 8 . 0 2 2 . 4 6 6 5 . 0 5 5 3 . 4 6 1 1 . 5 9 6 0  ~  9 6
B R B 3 4 7 . 7 6 0 . 7 9 4 8 . 2 7 4 6 . 8 5 1 . 4 2 5 1  ~  7 9
C A N 1 8 3 3 . 6 0 1 . 0 9 3 5 . 0 4 3 1 . 3 9 3 . 6 6 6 5  ~  9 1
C H L 1 8 5 5 . 0 1 3 . 5 5 5 9 . 6 3 4 6 . 4 0 1 3 . 2 3 6 8  ~  9 6
C H N 1 6 3 2 . 4 2 7 . 1 2 5 5 . 8 0 2 4 . 3 6 3 1 . 4 4 5 3  ~  9 2
C O L 1 1 5 3 . 9 5 5 . 2 0 6 4 . 5 3 4 7 . 8 3 1 6 . 7 0 6 4  ~  9 4
C R I 1 2 4 7 . 1 7 2 . 9 5 5 3 . 5 4 4 3 . 9 0 9 . 6 4 6 1  ~  9 5
D E W 8 3 2 . 0 7 2 . 1 6 3 5 . 5 6 2 9 . 4 0 6 . 1 6 7 3  ~  8 4
D N K 1 5 3 3 . 7 1 3 . 9 6 4 1 . 2 7 2 8 . 2 9 1 2 . 9 8 6 3  ~  9 5
D O M 4 4 7 . 0 7 3 . 5 5 5 1 . 0 0 4 3 . 2 9 7 . 7 1 7 6  ~  9 2
E C U 3 4 7 . 0 0 7 . 9 4 5 3 . 0 0 3 8 . 0 0 1 5 . 0 0 6 8  ~  9 4
E S P 5 3 3 . 1 9 3 . 2 4 3 6 . 3 0 2 7 . 7 7 8 . 5 3 6 5  ~  9 1
E S T 6 3 1 . 9 7 7 . 2 3 3 7 . 7 5 2 1 . 0 0 1 6 . 7 5 8 8  ~  9 6
F I N 3 3 5 . 6 1 1 0 . 1 7 4 7 . 3 5 2 9 . 4 7 1 7 . 8 8 6 2  ~  9 8
F R A 7 4 2 . 9 8 6 . 9 7 5 2 . 0 9 3 4 . 7 2 1 7 . 3 6 5 6  ~  8 4
G B R 1 5 3 0 . 2 2 3 . 6 3 4 0 . 3 8 2 7 . 2 0 1 3 . 1 8 6 4  ~  9 5
G T M 4 5 6 . 1 0 5 . 1 8 5 9 . 5 6 4 8 . 4 0 1 1 . 1 6 7 9  ~  8 9
H K G 9 4 4 . 7 4 3 . 6 9 5 2 . 0 0 3 9 . 6 8 1 2 . 3 2 6 5  ~  9 6
H N D 7 5 5 . 0 4 3 . 9 8 6 1 . 8 8 5 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 8 8 6 8  ~  9 3
I N D 5 3 9 . 5 4 6 . 0 1 4 7 . 7 5 3 3 . 0 0 1 4 . 7 5 5 6  ~  7 5
J P N 2 3 3 6 . 3 8 1 . 9 0 4 1 . 4 9 3 3 . 2 7 8 . 2 2 6 2  ~  9 0
K O R 9 3 5 . 9 4 2 . 1 4 3 9 . 8 5 3 3 . 9 8 5 . 8 7 6 5  ~  8 8
L K A 8 4 2 . 7 0 4 . 9 6 4 7 . 9 5 3 5 . 6 5 1 2 . 3 0 5 3  ~  8 7
M E X 1 1 5 2 . 2 9 6 . 4 2 6 2 . 2 8 4 2 . 9 0 1 9 . 3 8 5 0  ~  9 6
M Y S 7 5 0 . 3 3 1 . 8 9 5 2 . 8 3 4 8 . 3 0 4 . 5 3 6 7  ~  8 9
N G A 3 4 0 . 7 7 8 . 8 7 5 1 . 0 0 3 5 . 1 8 1 5 . 8 2 5 9  ~  8 2
N L D 1 1 3 2 . 4 1 4 . 4 1 4 4 . 8 9 2 8 . 4 0 1 6 . 4 9 6 2  ~  9 1
N O R 1 1 3 2 . 2 5 3 . 3 7 3 7 . 5 0 2 7 . 2 2 1 0 . 2 9 6 3  ~  9 1
N Z L 1 3 3 4 . 1 2 3 . 1 9 4 0 . 1 1 2 9 . 2 3 1 0 . 8 8 7 3  ~  9 7
P A K 1 1 3 4 . 7 7 2 . 0 0 3 8 . 6 5 3 2 . 3 8 6 . 2 7 6 3  ~  8 8
P A N 7 5 4 . 5 4 4 . 5 0 5 8 . 9 2 4 7 . 4 6 1 1 . 4 6 7 0  ~  9 7
P E R 6 5 2 . 7 7 6 . 2 5 6 3 . 9 5 4 6 . 4 3 1 7 . 5 2 6 1  ~  9 7
P H L 1 1 4 7 . 6 1 2 . 6 4 5 1 . 4 5 4 3 . 6 1 7 . 8 3 5 6  ~  9 7
P O L 5 3 0 . 9 6 0 . 9 0 3 2 . 2 0 3 0 . 0 7 2 . 1 3 8 6  ~  9 2
P R I 4 4 9 . 1 5 2 . 6 1 5 1 . 9 8 4 5 . 6 8 6 . 3 0 6 3  ~  8 9
R O M 4 2 8 . 5 2 1 . 9 4 3 1 . 2 0 2 7 . 1 0 4 . 1 0 8 9  ~  9 4
R U S 7 3 2 . 1 6 6 . 5 8 4 0 . 0 1 2 5 . 9 0 1 4 . 1 1 8 8  ~  9 8
S U N / R U S 1 0 3 0 . 2 7 6 . 2 1 4 0 . 0 1 2 4 . 5 2 1 5 . 4 9 8 0  ~  9 8
S G P 7 4 0 . 7 6 1 . 8 8 4 3 . 2 3 3 7 . 8 8 5 . 3 5 7 3  ~  9 3
S L V 4 5 1 . 1 0 2 . 2 9 5 3 . 0 0 4 8 . 4 0 4 . 6 0 6 5  ~  9 5
S U N 4 2 6 . 0 0 1 . 2 4 2 7 . 5 4 2 4 . 5 2 3 . 0 2 8 0  ~  8 9
S V K 5 2 2 . 6 0 1 . 2 8 2 4 . 5 0 2 1 . 5 0 3 . 0 0 8 9  ~  9 3
S W E 6 3 3 . 1 4 4 . 3 4 4 0 . 0 6 2 9 . 0 2 1 1 . 0 4 6 3  ~  9 2
T H A 1 1 4 6 . 8 8 3 . 5 7 5 3 . 5 3 4 2 . 9 0 1 0 . 6 3 6 2  ~  9 6
T T O 5 4 5 . 8 0 3 . 6 9 5 1 . 6 4 4 1 . 4 9 1 0 . 1 5 5 7  ~  8 1
T U R 3 5 0 . 8 1 6 . 1 2 5 6 . 2 6 4 4 . 2 0 1 2 . 0 6 6 8  ~  8 7
T W N 3 1 3 1 . 1 5 1 . 7 1 3 4 . 6 0 2 8 . 8 2 5 . 7 8 6 4  ~  9 7
U K R 8 2 7 . 9 6 5 . 0 8 3 4 . 4 3 2 1 . 8 2 1 2 . 6 1 8 0  ~  9 7
U S A 5 3 3 8 . 2 1 1 . 7 9 4 2 . 7 2 3 5 . 3 4 7 . 3 8 4 4  ~  9 7
V E N 1 2 4 3 . 8 8 3 . 2 6 4 9 . 6 3 3 7 . 6 8 1 1 . 9 5 6 2  ~  9 7
Y U F 9 3 3 . 4 0 1 . 8 2 3 7 . 6 8 3 1 . 8 4 5 . 8 4 6 3  ~  9 0
Z A F 3 6 1 . 3 4 2 . 0 9 6 3 . 0 0 5 9 . 0 0 4 . 0 0 9 0  ~  9 5
A v e r a g e 1 0 . 0 9 4 0 . 3 4 3 . 8 6 4 6 . 0 2 3 5 . 2 5 1 0 . 7 7
O v e r a l l 5 8 0 3 8 . 9 7 9 . 9 6 6 5 . 0 5 1 7 . 8 3 4 7 . 2 2 4 4  ~  9 8
B e t w e e n  C o u n t r y  v a r i a t i o n 8 7 % C o u n t r i e s 5 7
W i t h i n  C o u n t r y  v a r i a t i o n 1 3 % O E C D 1 5 2 6 %
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Table 3-21: Summary statistics, Net-Household Extended series
Country Obs. M ean St. dev. M ax M in M ax-M in Coverage
AUS 8 37.23 6.01 44.00 31.04 12.96 68 ~ 96
BEL 4 27.08 0.96 28.39 26.11 2.29 79 ~ 92
BGR 6 34.10 2.34 37.10 30.98 6.13 92 ~ 97
CAN 12 30.03 1.97 34.30 26.60 7.70 71 ~ 94
CHN 4 35.33 6.54 43.00 28.40 14.60 78 ~ 95
CSK 10 21.73 2.46 26.99 18.49 8.51 58 ~ 88
CZE 11 22.03 3.15 27.93 18.84 9.09 58 ~ 97
CSK/CZE 19 21.89 2.85 27.93 18.49 9.45 58 ~ 97
DEW 7 29.98 2.35 33.56 27.40 6.16 63 ~ 83
DNK 6 32.07 1.59 33.79 29.63 4.16 76 ~ 95
EST 7 37.94 2.31 41.02 33.80 7.21 92 ~ 98
FIN 10 30.43 2.35 33.93 26.37 7.55 77 ~ 91
FRA 3 30.42 2.23 31.85 27.85 4.00 79 ~ 84
GBR 32 32.79 2.57 38.38 26.23 12.15 61 ~ 95
GRC 3 35.89 4.82 41.30 32.06 9.24 74 ~ 88
HUN 14 23.31 1.52 25.79 20.36 5.43 62 ~ 98
IRL 3 38.70 1.28 39.86 37.32 2.54 73 ~ 87
ITA 25 35.19 4.58 42.00 28.78 13.22 48 ~ 95
MEX 13 50.94 5.95 58.06 40.90 17.16 50 ~ 96
NLD 16 29.17 2.14 32.40 24.66 7.74 75 ~ 94
NOR 15 28.39 2.75 34.50 24.22 10.29 62 ~ 96
POL 16 26.97 4.40 34.19 18.85 15.34 76 ~ 97
POR 4 37.09 2.51 40.36 34.25 6.11 73 ~ 91
ROM 9 26.76 3.21 31.26 22.88 8.38 89 ~ 97
SVK 11 20.96 3.91 30.60 17.73 12.87 58 ~ 97
CSK/SVK 19 20.71 2.15 24.81 17.73 7.08 58 ~ 97
SWE 12 29.41 1.92 32.70 26.44 6.26 67 ~ 96
TWN 30 30.11 1.66 33.60 27.82 5.78 64 ~ 97
UKR 8 27.46 5.08 33.93 21.32 12.61 80 ~ 97
USA 53 34.22 1.78 38.72 31.34 7.38 44 ~ 97
YUG 8 33.48 6.54 45.57 27.32 18.24 90 ~ 97
YUG/YUF 9 32.21 7.22 45.57 22.00 23.57 78 ~ 97
Average 12.72 30.75 3.22 35.86 26.44 9.41
Overall 407 30.41 6.94 58.06 17.73 40.33 44 ~ 98
Between Country variation 79% Countries 32
Within Country variation 21% OECD 16 50%
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Table 3-22: Summary statistics, Expenditure-Person Extended series
Country Obs. Mean St. dev. Max Min Max-Min Coverage
BGD 6 33.46 4.37 39.19 28.23 10.96 73 ~ 96
BGR 6 25.10 2.34 28.10 21.98 6.13 92 ~ 97
CAN 6 22.10 1.15 23.60 20.70 2.90 78 ~ 92
CIV 5 38.67 1.97 41.20 36.64 4.56 85 ~ 95
DEW 3 23.25 0.41 23.68 22.88 0.80 73 ~ 83
EGY 5 36.18 5.52 42.00 28.94 13.06 59 ~ 95
ESP 10 25.34 1.41 26.98 22.59 4.39 74 ~ 96
EST 5 36.72 1.82 39.47 34.57 4.90 92 ~ 98
GHA 5 34.64 1.63 36.73 32.73 4.00 88 ~ 97
GIN 3 42.54 3.73 46.84 40.36 6.48 91 ~ 95
GRC 3 34.60 1.15 35.35 33.28 2.07 74 ~ 88
HUN 3 21.86 4.41 26.96 19.24 7.71 93 ~ 97
IDN 13 34.37 1.72 37.71 31.68 6.03 64 ~ 96
IND 33 32.56 2.17 37.48 29.10 8.38 51 ~ 97
IRN 5 43.23 1.41 45.45 41.88 3.57 69 ~ 84
JAM 9 41.07 2.96 45.58 36.47 9.11 71 ~ 96
JOR 4 39.38 3.80 44.21 36.33 7.87 80 ~ 97
LKA 6 32.34 3.92 38.80 27.38 11.42 63 ~ 95
MRC 3 39.27 0.24 39.53 39.09 0.44 84 ~ 99
NGA 5 43.71 5.07 50.60 36.93 13.67 86 ~ 97
PAK 10 31.46 0.82 32.43 29.89 2.55 69 ~ 96
PER 3 43.70 1.22 45.11 43.00 2.11 86 ~ 94
PHL 4 42.66 2.46 46.06 40.68 5.38 85 ~ 97
POL 4 28.82 3.41 32.66 24.96 7.70 86 ~ 96
SGP 4 37.55 2.99 40.95 33.70 7.25 78 ~ 93
THA 4 42.97 2.57 46.20 40.56 5.65 89 ~ 98
TUN 5 42.61 1.45 44.00 40.15 3.85 65 ~ 90
TZA 4 45.04 9.66 59.01 38.15 20.86 69 ~ 93
UGA 3 37.67 4.14 40.87 33.00 7.87 89 ~ 93
ZMB 3 46.54 3.06 49.75 43.65 6.10 91 ~ 96
Average 6.07 35.98 2.77 39.55 32.96 6.59
Overall 182 34.78 6.89 59.01 19.24 39.77 51 ~ 99
Between Country variation 85% Countries 30
Within Country variation 15% OECD 4 13%
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Table 3-23: Fixed-effects regressions on Gini, Gross-Household Basic series
α1 α2 p-value β1 β2 p-value β3 p-value
AUS 23.97 0.356 0.000 21.89 0.470 0.518 -0.001 0.874
BEL -9.80 0.839 0.120 302.82 -12.933 0.548 0.151 0.522
BGD 30.44 0.152 0.180 56.32 -1.598 0.118 0.028 0.086
BGR 16.56 0.180 0.002 33.69 -0.817 0.042 0.014 0.013
BHS 58.22 -0.347 0.001 34.06 0.946 0.462 -0.017 0.314
BRA 57.75 0.003 0.976 53.40 0.283 0.580 -0.004 0.580
CAN 31.45 0.060 0.474 41.29 -0.533 0.465 0.009 0.414
CHL 43.58 0.269 0.002 -6.58 2.928 0.000 -0.034 0.000
CHN 65.73 -1.357 0.000 95.00 -4.761 0.000 0.083 0.000
COL 57.06 -0.144 0.196 16.03 2.147 0.219 -0.030 0.189
CRI 51.11 -0.115 0.462 58.71 -0.693 0.567 0.010 0.631
DEW 29.16 0.082 0.398 34.00 -0.202 0.698 0.004 0.580
DNK 58.77 -0.560 0.010 239.21 -9.306 0.051 0.104 0.066
ESP 28.53 0.138 0.314 -9.09 2.406 0.015 -0.032 0.021
FRA 58.77 -0.577 0.000 49.46 0.198 0.756 -0.014 0.218
GBR 16.28 0.463 0.001 17.21 0.411 0.761 0.001 0.969
HKG 35.70 0.220 0.057 90.89 -2.641 0.018 0.036 0.010
IND 33.01 0.363 0.066 -6.17 4.195 0.001 -0.085 0.001
JPN 38.45 -0.066 0.355 39.37 -0.126 0.791 0.001 0.899
KOR 34.70 0.038 0.740 5.96 1.878 0.079 -0.028 0.084
LKA 43.96 -0.043 0.644 63.58 -1.731 0.000 0.031 0.000
MEX 61.03 -0.258 0.000 51.09 0.575 0.015 -0.013 0.000
MYS 51.30 -0.021 0.914 -5.49 3.587 0.082 -0.056 0.080 a/
NLD 25.38 0.128 0.332 1.40 1.225 0.486 -0.012 0.532
NOR 38.90 -0.193 0.022 43.66 -0.482 0.338 0.004 0.561
NZL 18.86 0.379 0.001 3.63 1.136 0.286 -0.009 0.475
PAK 37.65 -0.099 0.299 46.45 -0.670 0.493 0.009 0.557
PER 61.09 -0.243 0.065 124.15 -3.663 0.062 0.043 0.081 a/
PHL 48.63 -0.031 0.580 50.18 -0.146 0.647 0.002 0.714
POL 28.64 0.050 0.932 -365.52 17.268 0.488 -0.188 0.489
PRI 54.22 -0.109 0.564 75.98 -1.383 0.497 0.018 0.530
SGP 37.59 0.078 0.616 44.82 -0.292 0.874 0.005 0.840
SWE 39.99 -0.220 0.106 74.55 -2.234 0.052 0.028 0.078 a/
THA 39.67 0.196 0.009 33.23 0.587 0.286 -0.005 0.474
TTO 48.93 -0.101 0.516 12.34 3.103 0.004 -0.062 0.003
TUR 71.20 -0.618 0.001 89.36 -1.715 0.559 0.016 0.708
TWN 30.19 0.025 0.635 49.33 -1.037 0.007 0.014 0.006
USA 36.84 0.049 0.041 40.29 -0.307 0.000 0.006 0.000
R-square 0.96
F-statistic 87.55
Note: a/ We reject the null hypothesis that both coefficients are zero at a 95% confidence level.
Linear trend Quadratic trend
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Table 3-24: Fixed-effects regressions on Gini, Gross-Household Extended series
α1 α2 SE p-value β1 β2 SE p-value β3 SE p-value
AUS 23.30 0.381 0.084 0.000 22.72 0.411 0.576 0.477 0.000 0.007 0.959
BEL -9.80 0.839 0.613 0.172 302.82 -12.933 21.865 0.555 0.151 0.240 0.529
BGD 30.44 0.152 0.129 0.239 56.32 -1.598 1.037 0.124 0.028 0.016 0.091
BGR 16.56 0.180 0.064 0.005 33.69 -0.817 0.408 0.046 0.014 0.006 0.014
BHS 58.22 -0.347 0.115 0.003 34.06 0.946 1.308 0.470 -0.017 0.017 0.322
BRA 56.87 0.029 0.077 0.710 57.52 -0.009 0.375 0.980 0.001 0.005 0.918
CAN 31.45 0.060 0.096 0.530 41.29 -0.533 0.741 0.472 0.009 0.011 0.422
CHL 43.58 0.269 0.099 0.007 -6.58 2.928 0.672 0.000 -0.034 0.008 0.000
CHN 42.93 -0.275 0.073 0.000 82.95 -3.378 0.312 0.000 0.050 0.005 0.000
COL 56.07 -0.056 0.087 0.517 122.65 -3.918 0.757 0.000 0.052 0.010 0.000
CRI 53.49 -0.165 0.088 0.061 55.89 -0.311 0.481 0.519 0.002 0.007 0.760
DEW 29.16 0.082 0.110 0.458 34.00 -0.202 0.529 0.703 0.004 0.007 0.587
DNK 44.44 -0.253 0.097 0.010 11.97 1.597 0.512 0.002 -0.025 0.007 0.000
DOM 32.21 0.352 0.251 0.162 94.29 -2.766 3.530 0.434 0.038 0.043 0.377
ECU 24.65 0.532 0.146 0.000 147.15 -6.789 9.820 0.490 0.097 0.130 0.456
ESP 28.53 0.138 0.156 0.377 -9.09 2.406 1.003 0.017 -0.032 0.014 0.023
EST -64.50 1.942 0.442 0.000 -478.19 18.907 15.869 0.234 -0.173 0.162 0.286
FIN 45.03 -0.281 0.068 0.000 83.28 -2.527 0.420 0.000 0.030 0.006 0.000
FRA 60.48 -0.621 0.126 0.000 49.34 0.307 0.646 0.635 -0.017 0.012 0.147
GBR 17.76 0.419 0.099 0.000 26.33 -0.100 0.571 0.861 0.007 0.008 0.359
HKG 42.31 0.066 0.109 0.545 86.00 -2.399 0.669 0.000 0.033 0.009 0.000
HND 71.37 -0.384 0.143 0.008 87.04 -1.326 2.404 0.582 0.013 0.033 0.695
IND 29.03 0.505 0.195 0.010 -10.87 4.523 1.158 0.000 -0.091 0.026 0.001
JPN 38.45 -0.066 0.082 0.417 39.37 -0.126 0.484 0.794 0.001 0.007 0.901
KOR 34.70 0.038 0.129 0.770 5.96 1.878 1.083 0.084 -0.028 0.016 0.089
LKA 43.96 -0.043 0.107 0.685 63.58 -1.731 0.405 0.000 0.031 0.007 0.000
MEX 61.03 -0.258 0.061 0.000 51.09 0.575 0.239 0.016 -0.013 0.004 0.000
MYS 53.10 -0.082 0.160 0.609 21.58 1.801 1.320 0.173 -0.027 0.019 0.153
NGA 61.83 -0.679 0.166 0.000 106.89 -4.661 8.039 0.562 0.073 0.147 0.621
NLD 43.75 -0.265 0.095 0.005 74.78 -2.073 0.459 0.000 0.024 0.006 0.000
NOR 39.76 -0.213 0.085 0.013 45.20 -0.557 0.466 0.233 0.005 0.007 0.456
NZL 18.86 0.379 0.130 0.004 3.63 1.136 1.083 0.295 -0.009 0.013 0.483
PAK 38.24 -0.114 0.102 0.264 48.40 -0.785 0.915 0.392 0.010 0.014 0.462
PAN 49.02 0.129 0.127 0.310 116.42 -3.341 1.046 0.002 0.042 0.013 0.001
PER 68.50 -0.398 0.096 0.000 87.21 -1.586 0.577 0.006 0.016 0.008 0.039
PHL 48.63 -0.031 0.063 0.627 50.18 -0.146 0.325 0.653 0.002 0.005 0.719
POL 28.64 0.050 0.661 0.940 -365.52 17.268 25.311 0.496 -0.188 0.276 0.497
PRI 46.40 0.086 0.154 0.577 29.63 1.200 1.092 0.273 -0.017 0.016 0.305
ROM 52.21 -0.488 0.844 0.563 1160.15 -46.240 37.861 0.223 0.472 0.390 0.228
SGP -0.31 0.612 0.174 0.001 100.66 -3.791 2.321 0.103 0.047 0.025 0.058 a/
SLV 37.59 0.078 0.178 0.659 44.82 -0.292 1.866 0.876 0.005 0.023 0.843
SVK 14.44 0.170 0.962 0.860 -889.92 37.884 60.082 0.529 -0.393 0.626 0.531
SWE 44.23 -0.321 0.120 0.008 71.53 -2.073 0.802 0.010 0.026 0.012 0.029
THA 39.67 0.196 0.085 0.021 33.23 0.587 0.559 0.294 -0.005 0.008 0.482
TTO 46.70 -0.035 0.142 0.804 14.78 2.940 0.985 0.003 -0.059 0.019 0.003
TUR 71.20 -0.618 0.218 0.005 89.36 -1.715 2.981 0.565 0.016 0.042 0.713
TWN 30.19 0.025 0.059 0.677 49.33 -1.037 0.391 0.008 0.014 0.005 0.007
UKR 45.79 -0.388 0.229 0.092 273.83 -10.567 2.579 0.000 0.112 0.028 0.000
USA 36.84 0.049 0.027 0.072 40.29 -0.307 0.087 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.000
VEN 38.15 0.147 0.090 0.103 59.10 -1.046 0.466 0.025 0.016 0.006 0.010
YUF 41.62 -0.207 0.132 0.118 45.51 -0.467 0.902 0.605 0.004 0.014 0.772
R-square 0.92 R-square 0.96
F-statistic 106.79 F-statistic 92.96
Note: a/ We reject the null hypothesis that both coefficients are zero at a 95% confidence level.
Linear trend Quadratic trend
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Table 3-25: Time trends, Basic series, Gross-Household and panel data of all definitions
Linear Quad. Linear Quad. Series Linear Quad. Linear Quad. Series
AUS 0.36 0.30 5 JPN U 1
BEL n.a. KOR 1
BGD 3 LKA U 3
BGR 0.18 U 0.21 2 MEX -0.26 inv U -0.19 3
BHS -0.35 -0.30 1 MYS inv U inv U 1
BRA 0.11 2 NGA n.a. n.a. 1.19 1
CAN 4 NLD 0.17 4
CHL 0.27 inv U 0.28 inv U 2 NOR -0.19 -0.22 4
CHN -1.36 U U 3 NZL 0.38 0.37 1
CIV n.a. n.a. 1 PAK 2
COL 2 PAN n.a. n.a. 1
CRI -0.18 2 PER U U 2
CSK n.a. n.a. -0.19 1 PHL 3
CZE n.a. n.a. U 1 POL 0.40 U 3
DEW U 7 PRI n.a.
DNK -0.56 inv U 6 ROM n.a. n.a. 1.86 1
EGY n.a. n.a. -0.42 1 RUS n.a. n.a. 1
ESP inv U -0.15 4 SGP 2
EST n.a. n.a. 3 SVK n.a. n.a. -0.24 U 1
FIN n.a. n.a. -0.18 U 3 SWE U U 4
FRA -0.58 -0.49 U 3 THA 0.20 0.19 3
GBR 0.46 0.23 U 4 TUN n.a. n.a. 1
GHA n.a. n.a. -0.41 1 TTO inv U n.a.
HKG U 0.40 1 TUR -0.62 n.a.
HND n.a. n.a. 1 TWN U U 2
HUN n.a. n.a. U 2 UKR n.a. n.a. U 2
IND inv U -0.68 2 USA 0.05 U 0.50 U 4
IRN n.a. n.a. 1 VEN n.a. n.a. 1
ITA n.a. n.a. -0.21 2 YUF n.a. n.a. 1
JAM n.a. n.a. inv U 1 YUG n.a. n.a. 1
Notes: n.a. stands for countries without a series with more than five observations. 
          "n.a." is for countries without a Gross-HH basic series.
          "U " refers to significant  negative and positive quadratic coefficients for β2 and β3 respectively.
          "inv U " is assigned when β2 and β3 are significant, while positive and negative respectively. 
Gross-Household Gross-HouseholdFixed-effects Fixed-effects
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Chapter 4
Household Inequality, Welfare, and
the Setting of Trade Policy1
4.1 Introduction
There has been widespread interest in the policy community in the distributional effects
of trade liberalization. Recent anti-globalization rhetoric has focused on the potential
negative impact of trade and outsourcing for unskilled wages in developed countries,
while arguing that it may also hurt workers in poor countries. On the other hand, many
economists regard trade liberalization as an instrument for increasing growth, but are less
certain about the distributional effects of increased openness.
Driven in large part by continued policy interest, the relationship between trade open-
ness and wages has also been an active topic of debate in the research community.2 How-
ever, this literature focuses on the functional distribution of income, with less emphasis
on household distribution issues.3 The current literature has stressed theoretical linkages
based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In this context, tariff reductions in poor labor-
abundant countries are expected to increase the real income of workers and hurt capital
1This chapter is based on “Household Inequality, Welfare, and the Setting of Trade
Policy” by Francois and Rojas-Romagosa (2004b).
2Comprehensive surveys are provided by Richardson (1995), Cline (1997) and Feenstra and Hanson
(2004).
3Recent papers include Edwards (1997), Higgins and Williamson (1999), Barro (2000) and Spilimbergo
et al. (2001).
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owners (or skilled labor). In developed countries the opposite effect is expected. The
empirical evidence remains mixed and somewhat contradictory.
In this paper, we follow Bourguignon andMorrisson (1989, 1990) and Spilimbergo et al.
(1999) and use an ownership matrix that allows us to move from functional to household
income. We then obtain a general function of the personal income distribution in terms
of endowments, tariffs and the ownership structure. Using this analytical framework, we
analyze the impact of trade and tariffs on the household distribution of income in general
equilibrium.
Treating equity issues as relevant, we work with Sen-type social welfare functions (Sen,
1974) and embed inequality indexes in social welfare indexes. In particular, we work
with the widely used Gini coefficient and with the Atkinson family of inequality indexes
(Atkinson, 1970), although other indexes may be employed. Using this framework we are
able to decompose the general equilibrium import protection effects into real income level
and dispersion changes.
The efficiency properties of tariffs are well developed in the literature. What we
highlight here is how distributional aspects of social welfare related to import protection
may be examined alongside efficiency aspects. For government, this is manifested not
only in special interest politics, but also through the direct impact of inequality on a
government’s objective function. We find that equity considerations may serve to counter
lobbying interests in both capital-rich and capital-poor countries, though with opposite
marginal impact on the final policy outcome. Although we focus our attention only on
import tariffs, the main message that follows from this approach can be applied in a more
general context of trade policy instruments. The precise distributional and efficiency
components may change, but in essence the trade-off and interrelation between both
economic outcomes is still present.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a formal representation of social
welfare inclusive of income inequality. In Section 3, we embed this social welfare function
into a general equilibrium trade model. We also develop the equilibrium representation of
inequality, based on the general equilibrium system fundamentals. Section 4 then explores
linkages between trade policy, inequality, and welfare. It also examines theoretical linkages
between country size, development, policy, and inequality. In Section 5, we explore the
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implications of the addition of inequality to the social welfare component of a government’s
objective function for political support function models of tariff formation. We conclude
in Section 6.
4.2 Defining social welfare with respect to inequality
Our goal in this section is to develop a functional linkage between inequality and aggregate
(social) welfare. This will then be integrated in the next section into a general equilibrium
trade model. A critical condition for inequality to have a meaningful link to aggregate
(social) welfare is that the utility function be strictly concave with respect to income.
Additionally, for tractability we prefer to work with a social welfare function that is
additively separable and symmetric in individual incomes.4
The existence of social welfare functions depends crucially on the possibility to compare
interpersonal utility levels. One such possibility is offered by the “veil of ignorance”
approach first proposed by Harsanyi (1953, 1955) and further developed by Rawls (1971),
where we rank different individual situations not knowing which would be the actual
situation. As stated by Sen (1997) this interpersonal comparison can be defined as those
situations where we make judgements of the type:
“I would prefer to be person A rather than person B in this situation” and
“while we do not really have the opportunity (or perhaps the misfortune, as
the case may be) of in fact becoming A or B, we can think quite systemat-
ically about such a choice, and indeed we seem to make such comparisons
frequently”.
Because GDP per capita is the most common indicator of social welfare, the “veil
of ignorance” approach supports the use of an inequality measure to complement GDP
per capita comparisons. If we do not know which individual household we are in a
specific country, then the expected utility becomes a function of mean income and the
4Note that the assumption of symmetric individual incomes implies that each individual is treated
anonymously. Thus, it is the individual’s income which provides the concavity of the function, not his
identity.
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personal distribution of income. How we evaluate the probability of receiving any given
income is then determined by the functional representation of the utility function and
more specifically by the degree of concavity of this function. In this context, a natural
extension of cross-country welfare comparisons is to complement GDP per capita levels
with some measure of inequality.5
Under the social welfare approach to income distribution measurement, inequality is
associated with variance in the distribution of income. This raises two measurement prob-
lems. The first is that we cannot generally rely on first moment-based indicators. The sec-
ond is that even though the concepts of Lorenz-dominance and General Lorenz-dominance
(Shorrocks, 1983) are accepted as ways to impartially rank two different distributions6,
in many cases the Lorenz-curves intersect at least once, so that we obtain incomplete
ranking of distributions. To solve both these problems, inequality indexes are usually
used to rank distributions in indeterminate cases and to provide a summary variable that
can be used in empirical models. While the most commonly used is the Gini coefficient,
most inequality measures are implicitly based on a social welfare function (Dalton, 1920;
Kolm, 1969; Atkinson,1970). As such, there is no perfect index, and any index has built
in social preferences.
In this paper, we employ two representations of household utility and social welfare.
Both reflect Sen’s (1974) preferred definition of social welfare as:7
SW = y (1− I) (4.1)
where SW is the social welfare, y is mean income, and I is an index of inequality.
Starting with CRRA preferences yields the well-known Atkinson inequality index di-
rectly as a natural metric for a mapping from income distribution to social welfare (see
Atkinson 1970). In this sense, Atkinson’s index fits naturally into Sen’s proposed social
welfare function.
Sen actually offered equation (4.1) as defined with respect to the Gini coefficient.
In this case, the social welfare function is axiomatic, in that we do not have an obvious
5This approach was formally treated by Sen (1976).
6See Lambert (1993) for details.
7A summary with the definition of the variables is presented in the Appendix.
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mapping —through aggregation— from individual preferences to an aggregate social welfare
function. This follows because the social welfare function is then rank sensitive. We work
with both the Atkinson index and Gini coefficient in this paper.
4.2.1 The Atkinson index-based social welfare function
Formally, we define a composite consumer good over the range of all consumption goods,
which follows from a linear homothetic aggregation function. As such, cost minimization
yields a composite consumer price index. This is defined over all consumer prices pc.
pc = f (p) (4.2)
Household utility uh is defined as a function of household consumption of the composite
consumer good ch:
uh = ψ
¡
ch
¢
(4.3)
We next map aggregate individual utility to aggregate welfare φ, which is defined as
the sum of household utility,
φ =
X
h
uh (4.4)
while aggregate consumption c is the sum of household consumption.
c =
X
h
ch (4.5)
We will assume that the function ψ is CRRA:8
ψ
¡
ch
¢
=



(ch)
1−θ
1−θ if θ 6= 1
ln ch if θ = 1
(4.6)
8In the present context, constant relative inequality aversion (CRIA) is a better label and acronym.
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In general, we assume that θ > 0, and in this paper we focus on the case where θ 6= 1.9
We employ a simple linear transformation, and are then able to define a social welfare
index in per-capita terms.
SWA =
φ
n (1− φ) =
1
n
X
h
¡
ch
¢1−θ
(4.7)
Simple manipulation then yields social welfare as a function of per-capita income y,
consumer prices, and income equality.
SWA =
µ
y
pc
¶1−θ
E1−θA (4.8)
With some further manipulation, our equality measure EA can be mapped directly
to the Atkinson index of income inequality, yielding a Sen-type social welfare function.
In particular, taking the definition of the Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970), we have the
following relationships between the Atkinson index IA, EA, and social welfare.
IA = 1−
Ã
1
n
X
h
µ
yh
y
¶1−θ! 11−θ
= 1−EA (4.9)
SWA =
·µ
y
pc
¶
(1− IA)
¸1−θ
(4.10)
Note that as θ → 0 only average income matters, rather than income inequality.
Alternatively, when θ → ∞, then SWA = min
¡
yh
¢
and we have the extreme Rawlsian
maximin social welfare function, were the income of the poorest individual is the only
relevant variable and average income is unimportant. Moreover, for a given distribution
(measured as shares of total income) we have declining marginal utility of income.
4.2.2 The Gini index-based social welfare function
The Gini coefficient is defined as twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-
degree line. As such, (1 − G) is then twice the area below the Lorenz curve. Formally,
9One gets the same basic results with log preferences. Estimates in the macro literature are that θ is
less than 1.
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this index is defined as follows:
IG = 1 +
1
n
− 2
n2y
¡
y1 + 2y2 + ...+ nyn
¢
= 1 +
1
n
−
"Ã
2
n2
X
h
hyh
y
!#
(4.11)
SWG =
·µ
y
pc
¶
(1− IG)
¸
(4.12)
where we have arranged households so that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ... ≥ yn. Unlike the Atkinson-
based social welfare function, the Gini-based social welfare function embodies asymmetry
not on specific individuals, but rather on relative income rankings. This ranking provides
the concavity of the utility function with respect to income. The higher the income in
the ranking, the less social weight it has. At the same time, equation (4.12) is linear in
average income. As such, SWG is relatively more sensitive to mean income than SWA
and less sensitive to inequality.
4.3 Inequality and trade in general equilibrium
To explore the interaction between production, trade and trade policy, and inequality,
we work with a modified dual representation of trade in general equilibrium (Dixit and
Norman, 1980). To do so, we first adopt the following additional set of assumptions:
• Rational behavior by households and firms.
• Complete and perfectly competitive markets.
• Convex technology, with neoclassical production functions.
• Goods are tradable and factors are not.
• Every household has the same neoclassical technology for producing the composite
consumption good.
Given these assumptions, we are able to define the core general equilibrium system for
demand and production in terms of expenditure and revenue functions, with expenditure
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defined in terms of the composite consumption good. Social welfare then follows as a set
of side equations from the core general equilibrium system.
4.3.1 The core general equilibrium system
Because we assume that all households have the same consumption technology defined
with respect to the composite consumption good, we can drop the household index from
consumption and represent aggregate expenditure as a function of aggregate consumption
and prices:
e (p, c) = c · f (p) (4.13)
On the production side, we assume standard neoclassical production functions with
constant returns to scale: xi = gi (vij), where gi (·) is the production function for good i
and vji is the use of factor j in the production of good i. Defining unit input coefficients
as aji we also obtain: 1 ≤ gi (aji). Endowment constraints are then
P
ajixi ≤ vj. From
these conditions, we can define the economy-wide revenue function with respect to goods
prices and endowments. This is represented in equation (4.14).
r (p, v) = max
xi,aji
(X
i
pixi |
X
i
ajixi ≤ vj and 1 ≤ gi (aji) ∀i, j
)
(4.14)
From the envelope theorem and the properties of the revenue function r, factor incomes
and goods production can be expressed in terms of the value of the partial derivatives of
the revenue function, evaluated at the equilibrium set of prices:
∂r (p, v)
∂vj
= wj = wj (p, v) ∀j (4.15)
∂r (p, v)
∂pi
= xi = xi (p, v) ∀i (4.16)
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Taking equations (4.15) and (4.16) in conjunction with equations (4.13) and (4.14),
we can write the general equilibrium system for production, consumption, and trade as
follows:10
chf (p) =
ÃX
j
wj (p, v) · vhj
!
+ ωhτ τm ∀h (4.17)
m =
X
h
ch · f (p)− x (p, v) (4.18)
e (p, c) =
X
h
"ÃX
j
wj (p, v) · vhj
!
+ ωhτ τm
#
(4.19)
p = P ∗ + τ = 1 + τ (4.20)
In equations (4.17) − (4.20), we have assumed the home country imposes a tariff of
τ on imports from the rest of the world, while world prices are normalized to one. In
addition, ωht is the household share of the tariff revenue and v
h
j is the household ownership
share of factor j. In the first equation, household consumption is equal to the household
budget. Equation (4.18) defines imports on which tariff revenue is generated and equation
(4.19) sets economy wide expenditure equal to national income. Together, the system of
four equations has an equally dimensioned set of unknowns: ch,m, e and p.
4.3.2 Household inequality
As explained earlier, the recent literature on trade and the distribution of income has
focused on the functional distribution of income. The functional distribution of income is
also an important building block here for the representation of the household distribution
of income. In equation (4.21) we define factor incomes s, which follow directly from the
endowment stock and the properties of the revenue function.
sj = rvj (p, v) · vj = wjvj (4.21)
10A two-country general equilibrium system can readily be formalized using the same framework.
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Thus, the functional distribution of income is a function of equilibrium prices, prefer-
ences, the production technology and the endowment set. In reduced form, the functional
distribution of income F (s) is then an artefact of the equilibrium matching of preference
and the technology set, given our endowment vector.
F (s) = F (p, v) (4.22)
Using factor incomes wj and the household ownership share of production factors,
ωhj we can readily obtain household income. In addition, we include the assignment of
import tariff revenue, again represented by a household share parameter. Equation (4.23)
presents the basic definition of household income in terms of its primary components.
yh =
ÃX
j
wj · vj · ωhj
!
+ ωhτ τm (4.23)
ch =
yh
pc
(4.24)
where 1 ≥ ωh ≥ 0 and
P
ωhj =
P
ωhτ = 1. In reduced form, the personal distribution
of income F (y) is a consequence of the elements affecting the functional distribution and
the h× j ownership matrix of coefficients ωhj , represented by S:
F (y) = F (p, v, S) (4.25)
Note that social welfare is ultimately a function of the ownership matrix in the econ-
omy, while the impact of trade policy will then depend on the interaction of the underlying
economic structure and the ownership matrix.
4.3.3 Inequality indexes with system fundamentals
We can write our social metrics of the distribution of income —the Atkinson and Gini
indexes— in terms of system fundamentals. Making a substitution from (4.23) into (4.9)
and (4.11), we obtain the following equations:
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IA = 1−



1
n
X
h


n
³P
j wjvjω
h
j
´
+ nωhτ τm
y


1−θ

1
1−θ
IA = 1−


n
−θ
X
h
"
n−1 +
X
j
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢#1−θ

1
1−θ
(4.26)
IG = 1 +
1
n
− 2
n2
X
h
h


n
³P
j wjvjω
h
j
´
+ nωhτ τm
y


IG = 1 +
1
n
− 2
n
X
h
h
"
n−1 +
X
j
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢#
(4.27)
where βj =
wjvj
y represents the national income share of factor and
P
j βj +
τm
y = 1.
In what follows, we apply the additional normalization that each household receives an
equal share of the tariff revenues, so that ωhτ = n
−1.11
The ratio of the household’s income to per capita income, which accounts for income
dispersion, is given by the sum of the differences between the actual ownership share of
factors and equal shares for each household. From equations (4.26) and (4.27), we can
make a substitution back into equations (4.10) and (4.12), yielding social welfare itself as
a function of system fundamentals.
SWA =
·
y
pc
(1− IA)
¸1−θ
SWA =
µ
y
pc
¶1−θ
n−θ
X
h
"
n−1 +
X
j
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢#1−θ
(4.28)
11The distributional impact of tariff revenues can be substantial. This is the emphasis of the paper by
Galor (1994), which includes tariffs in his general equilibrium Overlapping-Generations model.
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SWG =
y
pc
(1− IG)
SWG =
µ
y
pc
¶(
2
n
X
h
h
"
n−1 +
X
j
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢#
− n−1
)
(4.29)
4.4 Trade policy, distribution, and welfare
4.4.1 Generalized effects
From equations (4.28) and (4.29) above, social welfare is a function of the first two mo-
ments of the household distribution of income. This is especially obvious with the Atkin-
son index, as it is actually the weighted variance of income, with inverse income weights,
that provides the variance component of the social welfare function.12 Because the contri-
butions of the mean and variance components of income to social welfare are separable in
equations (4.28) and (4.29), we can decompose the impact of trade policy as well into its
impact on per-capita income (an efficiency effect), and its impact on the variance of in-
come (a distributional effect). Together, they determine the overall social welfare impact.
Formally, differentiating equations (4.28) and (4.29) with respect to tariffs, we obtain the
following equations:
∂SWA
∂τ
= (1− θ)
·
y
pc
(1− IA)
¸−θ
(1− IA)1−θ
µ
∂y
∂τ
− ∂pc
∂τ
y
p2c
¶
− (1− θ)
µ
y
pc
¶1−θ
I−θA
∂IA
∂τ
(4.30)
∂SWG
∂τ
= (1− IG)
·
∂y
∂τ
− ∂pc
∂τ
y
p2c
¸
−
µ
y
pc
¶
∂IG
∂τ
(4.31)
How do we interpret equations (4.30) and (4.31)? The efficiency component is well
known (see for example Dixit and Norman, 1980), and is shown here in equation (4.32).
Basically, the impact of the tariff on per-capita income will depend on the combination of
12While the functional form is different, the social welfare function underlying other income distribution
indexes yields a similar result, though with different weights in the variance component of the welfare
function. The CRRA function yields a particularly clear and parsimonious reduced form.
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terms-of-trade and allocation effects (the first set of terms in square brackets in equation
(4.32)), and tariff revenue (the second set of terms).
∂y
∂τ
=
1
n
X
h
∂yh
∂τ
=
1
n
·
m
µ
1− ∂p
∂τ
¶
+ τ
∂m
∂τ
¸
(4.32)
For a small country, negative allocation effects outweigh the terms-of-trade effects,
so that the impact of the tariff on mean income is strictly negative. Also, for the small
country, the impact on the cost of living will be to raise prices. As such, the real mean-
income effect will be strictly negative for a small country. With a large country, the
combined income and cost-of-living effect, or in other words the real income effect of the
tariff change as represented by the term in square brackets in the equations (4.30) and
(4.31) may be positive or negative depending on the magnitude of terms-of-trade effects.
The impact on household income distribution, the other part of equations (4.30) and
(4.31), follows from differentiation of equations (4.26) and (4.27). This is shown below:
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Note that we also have an inverse income weighting, by a factor of θ, in equation (4.33)
applied to induced changes in income. The weighting of induced changes in income for the
Gini index depends on the ranking of individual households on the relative income scale.
In both cases, the changes in income in turn depend on Stolper-Samuelson derivatives, and
induced price changes that follow from tariff changes. This is expressed in equation (4.35),
where the term ∂βj∂τ depends on system fundamentals and Stolper-Samuelson relationships.
∂βj
∂τ
=
∂wj
∂p
∂p
∂τ
vj
y
− ∂y
∂τ
wjvj
y2
(4.35)
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We can also represent the relationship in elasticity terms: εβj ,τ = εwj ,pεp,τ − εy,τ .
4.4.2 Heckscher-Ohlin inequality effects
Assuming that all households hold a claim on one unit of labor, we can apply equations
(4.33) and (4.34) to a two-factor, two-good Heckscher-Ohlin model. In this framework,
equations (4.36) and (4.37) determine the impact of tariff changes on household inequality.
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Inequality is purely a function of the allocation of capital in this model. At the
same time, the impact of the tariff is then a function of which sector is protected. If
protection leads to an increase in wages and a drop in capital income, inequality is reduced.
Alternatively, if capital income is protected, we will see a rise in inequality.
The social welfare effect, however, will depend on the trade-off between real income
effects following from import protection, and the impact on inequality. In other words,
the trade-off between equity and efficiency. From equations (4.30) and (4.31), this is
ultimately a function of the degree of inequality aversion, combined with the structural
features of the economy and its market power on world markets. For a small country,
real income effects will be strictly negative, while inequality effects may be positive or
negative, depending on the relative endowment structure of the economy. For a large
country, it is possible for both effects to work in the same direction. However, in this
case, note that positive terms-of-trade gains will slow any rise (or slow any fall) in capital
income shares, from equation (4.35). This in turn means that terms of trade effects will
tend to mitigate the inequality effects of protection.
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On the basis of equation (4.35), (4.36) and (4.37), we can summarize our discussion
above with the following observations about import protection and inequality in the 2x2
Heckscher-Ohlin model.
Observation 4.1 In a small labor-abundant Heckscher-Ohlin economy where the poor
receive only or mostly labor income, and where the mean real-income effects of import
protection are negative, the effect of import protection on welfare through mean income
is magnified by the impact through inequality. Because of this magnification effect, net
effects remain unambiguous and negative.
Observation 4.2 In a small, capital-abundant Heckscher-Ohlin economy, where the poor
receive only or mostly labor income, and where the mean real-income effects of import
protection are negative, the effect of import protection on welfare through mean income is
at least partially offset by the impact through inequality. Hence the net welfare effect is
ambiguous. It depends on the specification and parameterization of the underlying social
welfare function.
Observation 4.3 The impact of protection on inequality as measured by the Atkinson
and Gini indexes will be weaker, in a Heckscher-Ohlin economy, for large countries. This
is because of terms of trade effects from equation (4.35), which will dampen the goods-price
to factor-price transmission mechanisms at play.
4.4.3 Inequality effects in the 2x3 Ricardo-Viner model
Next, consider the specific factors model. We can make a similar manipulation of equa-
tions (4.33) and (4.34), like that yielding equations (4.36) and (4.37), for the standard
2-good, 3-factor model. This yields equations (4.38) and (4.39). Again, if we assume that
inequality follows from the ownership pattern of (specific) capital, then in this case a shift
in income shares through protection from more to less concentrated factors (in terms of
the concentration of factor ownership) yields a reduction in inequality. The same points
then follow, as before, with regard to country size and inequality effects in the Heckscher-
Ohlin model. Otherwise, the impact of protection on inequality depends on the pattern
of relative wage and ownership effects.
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We can summarize our results with respect to the Ricardo-Viner model as follows:
Observation 4.4 : In a small Ricardo-Viner country, where any income effects from
tariffs will be negative, protection may still be welfare improving if the induced change in
inequality is large enough. This depends on the assumed functional form and parameter-
ization of the social welfare function. If inequality is not improved, then the worsening
inequality magnifies the negative efficiency effects.
Observation 4.5 : Unlike the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the impact of protection on in-
equality as measured by the Gini or Atkinson index is ambiguous in the Ricardo-Viner
model when capital ownership patterns are the source of inequality. This is because the
degree of concentration of specific-factor ownership (the weights applies in equations (4.38)
and (4.39) to the induced changes in the specific-factor share of income) may vary between
the two sectors, and because the impact on capital income will have opposite sign depending
on the sector protected.
This last observation associates the impact of protection on inequality to differences in
ownership patterns for specific factors. If the ownership of the import-competing specific
factor is sufficiently less concentrated than that for the export-sector, import protection
will reduce inequality. However, if capital in the import-competing sector has relatively
concentrated ownership, it will make the situation worse. For example, in a developing
country where the poor have labor and land, and the rich labor and capital, protection will
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make the concentration of income worse, assuming the sector using capital is an import-
competing sector. On the other hand, if ownership of land is very highly concentrated
relative to capital, import protection may improve the distribution of income.
4.5 The Setting of Trade Policy
In this section, we examine the impact of inequality issues on the determination of import
protection in an endogenous tariff model. We focus on the Heckscher-Ohlin model, where
we obtain unambiguous results with respect to the impact of inequality considerations, in
the region of a political equilibrium, on the observed tariff rate. We also discuss, briefly,
the meaning of our results for endogenous tariff formation in a specific-factors model.
4.5.1 Capital rents
In our 2x2 Hecksher-Ohlin economy, we now assume consumers can be divided between
workers and investors. The latter differentiate themselves by earning capital rents in
addition to their labor earnings. Moreover, we assume that both groups are internally
homogeneous and index them by h = l, k. Thus, we have nk investors and nl workers,
each with real consumption defined as:
cl =
wl + ωlττm
f (p)
(4.40)
ck =
wl + wkn−1k + ω
k
ττm
f (p)
(4.41)
Assuming a CRRA utility function as in equation (4.6) with θ 6= 1, we get:
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Introducing a tariff change, the utility of each representative consumer is modified
according to equations (4.44) and (4.45). We assume that each household is entitled to
the same share of tariff revenue: ωlτ = ω
k
τ = n
−1.
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In a small open labor-abundant economy, we know from the Stolper-Samuelson the-
orem that: ∂wl∂τ < 0,
∂wk
∂τ > 0 and by construction
∂f(p)
∂τ > 0. Therefore, the workers are
hurt by the tariff, both because of the efficiency and the distributional impact of the
tariff. We obtain the optimum tariff for each group by equating (4.44) and (4.45) to zero.
The workers’ optimum tariff is zero, since tariffs reduce their share of total income (itself
decreasing) and increase prices. For the investors, equation (4.46) shows the first order
equilibrium condition.
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The left hand side term represents investor tariff gains (r) that compensate for the
tariff cost (z), which are shown in the right hand side. Note that these costs are the same
as the net welfare effect (folding in tariff revenues) on workers. While r is a combination
of increased capital earnings and the tariff revenue, z includes the rise in the consumer
goods price and the reduction in labor earnings. Moreover, both components are not
monotonically related to tariffs. In particular, ∂r∂τ < 0 and
∂z
∂τ > 0.We depict the investors’
optimal tariff in Figure 4-1 as τ = τ ∗ .
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Figure 4-1: Investor rents with respect to tariff levels
For any given tariff, the net rents are equivalent to the area between both curves. In
the figure, this is equal to the trapezoid connected by points 1, 2, 3 and 4, when τ = τ 1.
From equation (4.46) the optimum tariff τ ∗ for investors is the intersection of r and z.
Beyond this point, the increase in capital rents is offset by the increase in prices and the
decrease in wage earnings.
As a group, investor rents R are given by:
R (τ) = nk
Z
(r − z) dτ (4.47)
where r and z are defined in equation (4.46). Moreover, R (τ) > 0, ∂R(τ)∂τ > 0, and
∂2R(τ)
∂τ2 < 0 over the relevant range.
4.5.2 The government’s maximization problem
At this point, we could invoke a variety of different political economy models to generate
political underpinnings for the setting of an equilibrium tariff in the political marketplace.
These models have been extensively analyzed in the recent literature13, and following
Helpman (1995) we note that many of these can be represented, in reduced form, by the
now standard political support function.
13See for example Helpman (1995) and Grossman and Helpman (2002).
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Direct democracy is a rare political mechanism and generally public policies are de-
cided by representative governments that balance conflicting interests. From Hillman
(1989) we know that when one of the factors is sufficiently concentrated across only a
few households, these individuals can organize to form pressure groups and overcome the
free-rider problem. In such cases, Grossman and Helpman (2002) have demonstrated that
in the reduced form the policy maker has two arguments to consider: the general interest
and the interest of special groups (for example capital owners and unions). The interest
of the government can follow from electoral support when social welfare is increasing and
electoral contributions go with lobbying. For example, in a poor labor-abundant country
investors can offer a contribution ρ (where ρ ≤ R) to induce the policy-maker to increase
import protection.
The precise weight the policy maker assigns to each group is established by her political
support function, as in equation (4.48).
U (τ) = λ1SW (τ) + λ2ρ (τ) (4.48)
where U is the policy-makers utility, where we assumed that the tariff level is the only
policy instrument of the government. The weights λ characterize the political system
(how important are the contributions for the electoral campaign) and the policy-makers
preferences (how she values reelection against more contributions).
Conditional on the particular values of these weights, she maximizes her utility by the
first order condition shown in equation (4.49).
∂U (τ)
∂τ
= λ1
∂SW (τ)
∂τ
+ λ2
∂ρ (τ)
∂τ
= 0 (4.49)
where ∂SW (τ)∂τ has been already defined in equations (4.30) and (4.31) . Since ρ is the
fraction of the capital rents R that are assigned to political contributions, the additional
term ∂ρ(τ)∂τ is directly derived from equation (4.46). Furthermore,
∂ρ(τ)
∂τ > 0 until the
optimum tariff for investors is reached.
The additional element in the political mixture here is the effect of the tariff on social
welfare
³
∂SW (τ)
∂τ
´
, which is not known forehand. The tariff impact on an inequality-
adjusted social welfare function can induce changes to the standard results of the political
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support model. Thus, there is not necessarily a trade-off between both right hand side
terms in equation (4.48) and in some cases they can reinforce each other.
If we analyze small open economies and consider only the social welfare implications,
when the distributional effect of the tariff compensates for the efficiency losses we observe
a positive optimum tariff rate. This can be the case only for capital-abundant countries.
On the other hand, in poor countries the distributional and efficiency effects reinforce
each other and the socially optimum tariff is zero, though the equilibrium rate may be
positive.
When the influence of special interest groups is introduced, the previous partial results
can change. In a rich capital-abundant country, the capital-owners have an incentive to
lower tariffs, and if the workers can organize, they lobby to increase tariffs. The final
outcome depends on the specific rents each group obtains and its political influence. In
labor-abundant countries positive tariffs can be explained by the presence of an effective
lobby, and in capital rich countries they can be explained by equity concerns that partially
overcome free trade lobbying.
These multiple outcomes are summarized in the following observations:
Observation 4.6 : In a Hecksher-Ohlin world, with homogeneous labor owners, concen-
trated capital and a policy-maker that cares about equity and assigns no weight to political
contributions, the government’s optimum tariff is higher in small capital-abundant coun-
tries than in small labor-abundant countries.
Observation 4.7 : In a Hecksher-Ohlin capital-abundant economy, with greater inequal-
ity aversion, capital owners will lobby for lower tariffs, while the government will be more
protectionist because of equity reasons than otherwise. Equity concerns then offset to some
extent pressure for lower tariffs.
Observation 4.8 : In a Hecksher-Ohlin labor-abundant economy, with greater inequality
aversion, the government will favor low tariffs for equity and efficiency reasons, but will be
lobbied by capitalists for higher tariffs. Equity concerns then offset to some extent pressure
for higher tariffs.
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Basically, when the distributional effects are not significant enough to upset the ef-
ficiency losses imposed by the tariff, the common results of the literature emerge and
higher tariffs are directly associated to the weight and the contributions of special in-
terest groups. At the same time though, in the presence of distributional concerns rich
countries tend to impose higher tariffs than otherwise. Relatively high average tariffs
across a subset of capital-rich countries can then be seen as a consequence of inequality
considerations by the policy-maker, as well as the presence of influential unions. In poor
countries positive tariff rates are a direct consequence of the investor lobby overcoming
both equity and efficiency concerns. In developing countries with a political system that
assigns a significantly higher weight to social welfare than average, tariffs should remain
lower than otherwise.
A similar analytical exercise can be carried out with a 2x3 specific-factors model.
In particular, ignoring equity concerns, we have an equilibrium tariff that balances the
efficiency effects of the tariff against the interests of owners of sector 1 and sector 2 capital.
However, unlike the results for the Heckscher-Ohlin model we developed here, we will not
then have unambiguous results when we add inequality to the policy objective mix. This
is because, from Observations 4.4 and 4.5, the inequality impact of a tariff may itself
be ambiguous. If a tariff reduces inequality in the region of the political equilibrium,
we would again expect the equity-conscious government to be more protectionist than
otherwise. If not, we expect the opposite to hold.
4.6 Conclusions
We have explored theoretical linkages between import protection and the household dis-
tribution of income. This complements the existing literature that links trade policy to
factor incomes and the functional distribution of income, which is well developed in the
literature. The main insight of this literature is provided by the Stolper-Samuelson the-
orem and constitutes a first step in our analysis. In a general equilibrium context, tariff
changes ultimately affect the household distribution through variations in ownership pat-
ters in conjunction with Stolper-Samuelson effects. To model ownership structures, we
used the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner trade models. Within both frameworks, we
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are then able to produce theoretical predictions between trade protection, country size,
level of development, and personal income inequality.
Another contribution of this paper is that we examine the formal link between social
welfare and the equilibrium determinants of the distribution of income. Using Sen-type
social welfare functions, we decompose the general equilibrium welfare effects of import
protection into real income level and distribution components. The dispersion component
is estimated using Gini and Atkinson inequality indexes. With these explicit inequality
derivatives we map import protection to inequality-adjusted welfare. In addition, when
standard trade models are employed this framework also yields predictions relating social
welfare with protection, country size and levels of development. In conjunction with the
relevant inequality index, the general form of the decomposition of welfare and inequality
we develop here may also be useful in applied general equilibrium applications focused on
inequality.
Once the distributional effects of trade liberalization are determined, we can apply
endogenous tariff formation models to assess how the optimum tariff is affected by equity
concerns. In representative democratic systems, we find that positive optimum tariffs
can be sustained in capital-abundant countries even when the policy-maker assigns a low
or zero weight to the contributions of special interests groups. In this case, the positive
distributional effect of import protection can offset or compensate the efficiency losses
of reduced trade. In poor countries, characterized by the relative abundance of labor,
positive tariffs are explained by the influence of special interest groups (i.e. capitalists)
that heavily lobby for higher tariffs. Thus, import protection in developing countries
not only diminishes social welfare through efficiency and equity considerations, but also
signals the economic and political weight of the capital-owners.
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4.7 Appendix to Chapter 4
Summary of the variable’s definitions
Variable Definition Variable Definition
n Number of households x Final goods supply function
h Household index g Production function
y Individual income vhj Endowment of factor j owned by h
y Mean income a Unit input coefficients
θ Inequality aversion parameter v Fixed factor endowment
SW Social welfare function r Revenue function
I Inequality index w Factor price
E Equality index m Imports
pc Consumer price τ Import tariff
p Composite price ωhj Share of factor j owned by h
ch Composite consumer good for h ωhτ Share of tariff revenue owned by h
uh Household utility P ∗ World prices
c Aggregate consumption s Factor income
φ Aggregate welfare F Functional distribution of income
ψ Household utility function S Ownership matrix
e Expenditure function βj National income share of factor j
i Final goods index k Capital index
j Production factors index l Labor index
v Factor endowments
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Chapter 5
Trade Policy and the Household
Distribution of Income1
5.1 Introduction
In the early modern literature on economic development, Kuznets (1955, 1963) first noted
the apparent relationship between the household distribution of income and growth.
He stressed that rising income inequality seemed to be a normal process —a “stylized
fact.” Distributions seemed to first worsen and then improve with rising per-capita in-
comes. There has since been a sizeable literature in development economics, starting with
Kuznets, Champernowne (1953), and Tinbergen (1956).
Taken together with the more recent literature on openness and growth, a logical de-
velopment in the recent empirical literature has been the search for three-way linkages
between openness, growth, and the personal/household distribution of income.2 This
includes general empirical evidence on the impact of international trade on income dis-
tribution and poverty in developing countries (McCulloch, Winters and Cirera, 2001;
Winters 2000b). It also includes the growing computational literature on the household
impact of policy reform. Along these lines, Devarajan and van der Mensbrugghe (2000)
1This chapter is based on “Trade Policy and the Household Distribution of Income” by
Francois and Rojas-Romagosa (2004a).
2While the emphasis of this paper is on the personal and household distribution of income, there has
also been a large recent literature on the role of trade in the evolution of the functional distribution of
income. See Richardson (1995), and Feenstra and Hanson (2004).
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have examined the household impact of trade policy reform in South Africa, Hertel et al.
(2000) have explored the impact of multilateral trade liberalization on poverty reduction,
Ianchovichina et al. (2000) have examined reform and distribution in Mexico, Robilliard
et al. (2001) have examined the recent crisis in Indonesia, and Khan has focused on tax
reform in Bangladesh (1997).
The recent econometric work in this area draws on data developed by Deininger and
Squire (1996). Higgins and Williamson (1999) find evidence that demographical sources
are the most important factor for explaining the distribution of income. They also find
that, once one controls for demographic structure and openness to trade, there is strong
evidence for Kuznets’ inverted-u curve. However, the evidence of a link between income
distribution and openness is mixed. Dollar and Kraay (2000) conclude that the income of
the poor tends to grow at the same rate as economy-wide income. In other words, in con-
trast to the Kuznets-U reported elsewhere in the literature (like Higgins and Williamson),
their results suggest that economic growth does not cause a relative deterioration in the
mean income of the poor. In addition, they find that the share of growth following from
trade does not significantly affect the income share of the poor either. Barro (2000) finds
that inequality in developing countries is negatively correlated with economic growth,
while Adams (2003) uses a new dataset to argue that growth is important for poverty
reduction.
In this paper we analyze the impact of trade and tariffs on the observed cross-country
variation in the household distribution of income. We build on results of the literature on
production and the functional distribution of income in the 2x2 and higher-dimensional
manifestations of the 2x2 trade model (Kemp 1956, Mussa 1979, Ethier 1982, Deardorff
1979, 1982) to link import protection to variations in the household distribution of in-
come.3 Working with a new dataset on inequality, we then examine cross-country variation
in inequality with respect to import protection. Results are fully consistent with the pre-
dictions of the factor-intensity model of trade. Our regression results suggest that import
3The theoretical literature closest to the present paper includes Bourguignon and Morrisson (1990)
and Spilimbergo et al. (1999). Both studies use an ownership matrix to write a general function of the
personal income distribution in terms of endowments, tariffs and the ownership structure. A related
paper is Galor (1994). He includes tariffs in his general equilibrium Overlapping-Generations model, but
centers his analysis on the redistributive effects of the tariff revenues. He does not consider the efficiency
and distributional effects caused by the tariffs.
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protection makes income distribution worse for countries in labor-intensive diversification
cones. This relationship shifts to one of falling inequality as incomes rise and we move
to capital-intensive diversification cones. Results also suggest that OLS-based inequality
regressions might best be viewed with some suspicion.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a formal representation
of inequality in general equilibrium. We then explore linkages between trade policies, the
pattern of production, and inequality. This is followed by an econometric assessment of
the linkages between trade policy and the observed pattern of inequality. The last section
offers a summary and conclusions.
5.2 Production and trade in general equilibrium
We start with a dual representation of trade in general equilibrium for a single country.
This involves adopting the following set of assumptions:
• Rational behavior by households and firms;
• Complete and perfectly competitive markets;
• Convex preferences, with neoclassical production functions;
• Convex technology for a composite consumption good;
• Identical and strictly quasi-concave composite good aggregation technologies across
households.
Given these assumptions, we can define the core general equilibrium system for de-
mand and production on the basis of expenditure and revenue functions, with expenditure
defined in terms of the composite consumption good. Income distribution indexes (and
social welfare) are then developed as a set of side equations from the core general equi-
librium system.
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5.2.1 The core general equilibrium system
We assume that all households consume the composite good c. This means we can repre-
sent aggregate expenditure e as a function of aggregate consumption c and prices p. This
is represented by equation (5.1)
e (p, c) = c · f (p) (5.1)
In equation (5.1), f (p) is the homothetic price index for the composite good.
On the production side, we assume standard neoclassical production functions with
constant returns to scale: xi = gi (vij), where gi (·) is the production function for good i
and vij is the use of factor j in the production of good i. If we define unit input coefficients
as aji then we also have: 1 ≤ gi (aji). Endowment constraints are then
P
ajixi ≤ vj. From
these, we can then define the economy-wide revenue function with respect to goods prices
and endowments, as in equation (5.2).
r (p, v) = max
xi,aji
(X
i
pixi |
X
i
ajixi ≤ vj and 1 ≤ gi (aji) ∀i, j
)
(5.2)
From the envelope theorem and the properties of the revenue function r, factor incomes
and goods production can be expressed in terms of the value of the partial derivatives of
the revenue function, evaluated at the equilibrium set of prices:
∂r (p, v)
∂vj
= wj = wj (p, v) ∀j (5.3)
∂r (p, v)
∂pi
= xi = xi (p, v) ∀i (5.4)
We are ultimately interested in making empirical comparisons across countries. Em-
pirically, this implies taking actual world prices as given by the data, and characterizing
individual countries within this set of world prices. Taking equations (5.3) and (5.4)
above in conjunction with equations (5.1) and (5.2), we can write the open-economy gen-
eral equilibrium system for production, consumption, and trade for an individual country
as follows:
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chf (p) =
ÃX
j
wj (p, v) · vhj
!
+ ωhτ τm ∀h (5.5)
m =
X
h
ch · f (p)− x (p, v) (5.6)
e (p, c) =
X
h
"ÃX
j
wj (p, v) · vhj
!
+ ωhτ τm
#
(5.7)
p = P ∗ + τ = 1 + τ (5.8)
In equations (5.5) − (5.8), we have assumed that a tariff of τ is imposed on imports
from the world, while world prices are normalized to one. The term ωhτ is the household
share of tariff revenue, while vh is the household ownership share of factors and ch is
household consumption. We will generally assume that the household share of tariff
income is n−1 where n indexes the number of households. Equation (5.5) sets the value of
household consumption equal to the household budget, equation (5.6) defines imports on
which import tariff revenue is generated, equation (5.7) sets economy wide expenditure
equal to receipts, and equation (5.8) defines the wedge between world and domestic prices.
Together, equations (5.5) − (5.8) define an equally dimensioned set of relationships and
unknowns: ch, c, m and p.
5.2.2 Household Inequality
As noted earlier, both the older and the more recent literature on trade and the distribu-
tion of income have been focused on the functional distribution of income. The functional
distribution of income is also an important building block here for the representation of
the household or personal distribution of income. Starting with factor incomes s, they
follow directly from the endowment stock and the properties of the revenue function, as
represented by equation (5.9).
sj = wjvj = rvj (p, v) · vj (5.9)
In reduced form, the functional distribution of income F (s) is then an artifact of the
equilibrium matching of preferences and the technology set, given our endowment vector.
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F (s) = F (p, v) (5.10)
The household distribution of income follows from the combination of factor incomes
wj, the vector of endowments, and the household ownership share in factors of production,
ωhj . It will also depend on the distribution of tax revenue (tariffs in the present context),
again represented by a household share parameter, this one applied to import tax revenues.
This is shown in equation (5.11), which gives the basic definition of household income in
terms of its primary components. By substitution from equation (5.5), this is also shown
as a function of equilibrium prices, the production technology set, and the endowment
set.
yh =
ÃX
j
wj · vj · ωhj
!
+ ωhτ τm
=
ÃX
j
rvj (p, v) · vj · ωhj
!
+ ωhτ τm (5.11)
ch =
yh
pc
where 1 ≥ ωhj ≥ 0 and
P
ωhj =
P
ωhτ = 1. In reduced form, the household distribution
of income F (y) is a consequence of endowments, the technology set, preferences, the
endowment vector, and the ownership matrix of coefficients ωhj (S). From equation (5.12)
we thus have:
F (y) = F (p, v, S) (5.12)
We introduce two inequality indexes to our analytical framework: the Gini coefficient
IG and the Atkinson index IA. Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences yield
the Atkinson inequality index directly as a natural metric for the income distribution
component of social welfare (see Atkinson 1970). In this sense, Atkinson’s index maps
naturally into a social welfare function and in particular, to Sen’s (1974) preferred defin-
ition of social welfare. In contrast, the Gini coefficient implied social welfare function is
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axiomatic, in that we do not have an obvious mapping, through aggregation, from indi-
vidual preferences to an aggregate social welfare function. This follows because the Gini
coefficient (and hence the implied social welfare function) is rank sensitive. The formal
definitions of these inequality indexes are provided in equations (5.13) and (5.14).
IA = 1−
"
1
n
X
h
µ
yh
y
¶1−θ# 11−θ
(5.13)
IG = 1 +
1
n
− 2
n2y
¡
y1 + 2y2 + ...+ nyn
¢
(5.14)
In equation (5.13), θ corresponds to the coefficient of relative inequality aversion as-
suming CRRA preferences. In equation (5.14) the Gini coefficient is defined as twice the
area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line, where we have arranged households
so that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ... ≥ yn.
We can also write the Atkinson and Gini indexes in terms of system fundamentals.
Making a substitution from (5.9) into (5.13) and (5.14), we obtain equations (5.15) and
(5.16).
IA = 1−



1
n
X
h


n
³P
j rvj (p, v) vjω
h
j
´
+ nωhτ τm
y


1−θ

1
1−θ
IA = 1−


n
−θ
X
h
"
n−1 +
X
j
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢#1−θ

1
1−θ
(5.15)
IG = 1 +
1
n
− 2
n
X
h
h


³P
j rvj (p, v) vjω
h
j
´
+ ωhτ τm
y


IG = 1 +
1
n
− 2
n
X
h
h
"
n−1 +
X
j
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢#
(5.16)
where βj =
wjvj
y , which is the national income share accruing to factor j.
151
5.3 Tariffs and household inequality
5.3.1 Generalized effects
From equations (5.15) and (5.16) above, inequality is a function of the first two moments
of the household distribution of income. This is especially obvious with the Atkinson
index.4
The impact of a tariff on the household income distribution follows from differentiation
of equations (5.15) and (5.16). This is shown in equations (5.17) and (5.18) below.
∂IA
∂τ
= − 1
1− θ


n
−θ
X
h
"ÃX
j
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢!
+ n−1
#1−θ

θ
1−θ

n−θ
X
h
(1− θ)



"ÃX
j
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢!
+ n−1
#−θÃX
j
∂βj
∂τ
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢!



= −n
−θ
1−θ



X
h
"X
j
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢
+ n−1
#1−θ

θ
1−θ
X
h



"X
j
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢
+ n−1
#−θ "X
j
∂βj
∂τ
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢#
 (5.17)
∂IG
∂τ
= −2
n
X
h
h
"X
j
∂βj
∂τ
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢#
(5.18)
Recall that the term βj represents the national income share of factor j. Note that
we also have an inverse income weighting, by a factor of θ, in equation (5.17) applied
to induced changes in the deviation from the mean component of household income —
βj
¡
ωhj − n−1
¢
. The weighting of induced changes in income for the Gini index depends
on the ranking of individual households on the relative income scale. In both cases, the
changes in income in turn depend on Stolper-Samuelson derivatives, and induced price
changes that follow from tariff changes. This set of induced price changes is expressed
4While the functional form is different, the social welfare functions underlying other income distribu-
tion indexes yield a similar result, though with different weights in the variance component of the welfare
function. The CRRA function yields a particularly clear and parsimonious reduced form.
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in equation (5.19), where the term
∂βj
∂τ depends on system fundamentals and consequent
Stolper-Samuelson relationships. The last line of equation (5.19) expresses this relation-
ship in elasticity terms.
βj =
rvjvj
y
⇒
∂βj
∂τ
=
∂rvj
∂p
∂p
∂τ
vj
y
−
rvjvj
y2
∂y
∂τ
(5.19)
εβj ,τ = εrvj ,pεp,τ − εy,τ
5.3.2 Tariffs and Household Inequality in the Heckscher-Ohlin
Model
Consider the application of equations (5.17) and (5.18) to a standard two-factor, two-good
Heckscher-Ohlin model. If we apply the additional normalization that all households hold
a claim on one unit of labor, then our inequality indexes can be manipulated to yield
equations (5.20) and (5.21). (We have also assumed a neutral redistribution of the tariff
revenue).
∂IA
∂τ
= −n
−θ
1−θ
(X
h
£
βk
¡
ωhk − n−1
¢
+ n−1
¤1−θ) θ1−θ
X
h
½£
βk
¡
ωhk − n−1
¢
+ n−1
¤−θ ·∂βk
∂τ
¡
ωhk − n−1
¢¸¾
(5.20)
∂IG
∂τ
= −2
n
X
h
h
·
∂βk
∂τ
¡
ωhk − n−1
¢¸
(5.21)
Inequality is purely a function of the allocation of capital in this model. At the same time,
the impact of the tariff is then a function of which sector is protected. If protection leads
to an increase in wages and a drop in capital income, inequality is reduced. Alternatively,
if capital income is protected, we will see a rise in inequality.
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On the basis of equation (5.20) and (5.21) we can summarize our discussion above with
the following observations about import protection and inequality in a 2x2 Heckscher-
Ohlin economy.
Observation 5.1 : In a labor-rich 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin economy under the assumption
that poorer households by definition derive income only or mostly from labor, then ob-
served inequality as measured by the Gini or Atkinson indexes will be greater, as import
protection in labor rich countries will help capital owners, who receive relatively low weight
in equations (5.20) and (5.21).
Observation 5.2 : In a capital-rich (developed) Heckscher-Ohlin economy, under the
assumption that the poor receive only or mostly labor income, import protection within a
Heckscher-Ohlin economy means a lower observed inequality as measured by the Gini or
Atkinson indexes.
Observation 5.3 : When making comparisons across 2x2 countries at a given set of
world prices (as will be the case for cross-section inequality regressions), Observations
5.1 and 5.2 can be reinterpreted as saying that tariffs will be linked to greater observed
inequality in capital-poor countries and less inequality in capital-rich countries.
While Observation 5.3 has empirical appeal, the classic 2x2 model is actually problem-
atic when we confront it with real data. Countries present a range of relative endowments,
while we might reasonably expect the global trade matrix to include more than two broad
classes of goods. Following Deardorff (1979), if we assume Heckscher-Ohlin technolo-
gies and a range of goods, we can then rank goods by their relative factor intensities in
production. Countries in turn can be ranked by their location in a chain of product di-
versification cones. More labor intensive countries will be located in diversification cones
characterized by more labor intensive goods. We can then generalize Observation 5.3 to
allow for a continuum of goods and factor intensity rankings.
Observation 5.4 : Assuming a Deardorff-type continuum of goods, then when mak-
ing comparisons across countries within a given diversification cone, at a given set of
world prices higher tariffs will be linked to greater observed inequality in cones occupied
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by capital-poor countries and less observed inequality in cones occupied by capital-rich
countries.
Observation 5.5 : Assuming a Deardorff-type continuum of goods, as we move across
diversification cones from more labor-intensive to more capital-intensive goods, the mar-
ginal impact of a tariff on inequality will fall.
5.4 Econometrics
5.4.1 Data
We turn next to an empirical examination of the linkages between import protection
and the household distribution of income. Almost exclusively, the current literature on
openness and household inequality is built on the Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset.
This dataset mixes inequality indexes drawn from income surveys, expenditure surveys;
surveys based on net- and gross- incomes; and household and individual reference units.
The same is true of the household distribution data reported by the World Bank (World
Development Indicators) and the United Nations (Human Development Report). The
assumption is that different income concepts and reference units are broadly comparable.
Actually though, it turns out that they are not, and in many cases they do not even
convey the same broad information set.5
In our data we control for comparability between different sources of household dis-
tribution data. To avoid measurement error problems, we therefore work with inequality
series that combine comparable definitions. To be consistent with our theoretical frame-
work, we use inequality data that we have either estimated directly from gross income
household survey data, or that are reported as coming from gross income household
surveys (where the underlying share data was not available).6 We have two indexes of
inequality, the Atkinson index7 and the Gini coefficient. Because the Gini coefficient is
commonly reported from household surveys, even when the share data is not supplied,
5Atkinson and Brandolini (2001).
6We take the inequality data from the World Income Inequality Database (2000).
7We use θ = 1.
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we have a broader sample of countries with estimated Gini coefficients. These data are
shown in Table 5-1. Values are centered on 1994 (though inequality indexes are taken
from the nearest available year in a 4-year span before and after 1994). Per-capita income
in the sample, in 1995 dollars, ranges from $532 (China) to $40,515 (Japan). The mean
per-capita income is $10,774. The trade-weighted tariff for the sample ranges between
0 percent (Hong Kong) and 43.7 percent (Thailand), with a sample average duty of 9.9
percent. The mean Gini coefficient from our gross household data is .40, with a maximum
and minimum value of .62 (South Africa) and .22 (Slovakia). The mean Atkinson index
from our gross household data is .23, with a maximum and minimum of .53 (South Africa)
and .08 (Ukraine).8
5.4.2 Regression Model and Results
As a starting point, we specify a reduced-form relationship between income level and
inequality, formally known as a Kuznets-type inverted-u relationship. In specifying a
reduced form for inequality in this way, we are building on a broad empirical literature.9
To this, we add an indicator of the trade-weighted import duty. We also include an
interaction term between duties and income levels, to reflect the possible role (as reflected
in Observations 5.3 and 5.5) that relative development levels may play in the interaction
between import tariffs and the distribution of income.
Formally, our estimation equation is as follows:
LIi = a0 + aPCI · yi + aPCI2 · y2i + bT · Ti + bT ·PCI · (Ti · yi) + εi (5.22)
8These data are part of a larger project aimed at evaluating the impact of household data comparability
problems on the current empirical literature on globalization, distribution of income, and poverty. See
Chapter 3.
9See Kanbur (2000) for a recent survey. Following Higgins and Williamson (1999), we can distinguish
two versions of the Kuznets hypothesis in the literature. The original (strong) version presented by
Kuznets (1955), states that labor demand steers income inequality during the development process. On
the other hand, the weak version stressed in the more recent literature recognizes that other factors
can also be involved, and that these can reinforce or offset the basic demand forces at play. Deininger
and Squire (1996, 1998) do not find support for the unconditional Kuznets curve, while Higgins and
Williamson (1999), also using the Deininger and Squire data set, find support for the weak Kuznets
hypothesis.
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where LIi is a logistic transformation of the inequality index I for country i, yi is the
log of per-capita income (PCI), Ti is the weight-average tariff on merchandise imports,
a and b are the coefficients to be estimated, and εi is the error term.
Table 5-2 first presents basic OLS results. The signs on coefficients are all as expected.
However, coefficient estimates are insignificant for the tariff terms in the Gini coefficient
regressions, while the Gini and Atkinson regressions both provide relatively poor fits to
the inequality data. In this sense, initial results are consistent with the broad literature in
this area. In other words, they are disappointing and offers mixed results. However, there
is good reason to be suspicious of OLS results in this context, both in columns A and B in
Table 5-2, and also in the literature in general. It is pretty well recognized that data from
low-income countries tend to be of poorer quality that data from the OECD countries. In
other words, we should expect that low-income country data tend to be noisier. Columns
A and B report Chi-squared test statistics for the hypothesis of homoskedasticity, weighed
against the alternative hypothesis of variance inversely related to level of development as
proxied by income level. These results point strongly to heteroskedasticity, and hence
to the preferability of weighted regressions. It is also worth recalling that the Gini and
Atkinson indexes are based on the same set of income survey results. As such, the error
structure of the Gini-based observations may tell us something about the error of the
error-based regressions. As such, we may improve the accuracy of the our estimates of
coefficient variance by estimating the two equations jointly.
The results of weighted SUR regressions are reported in columns C (Gini) and D
(Atkinson) of Table 5-2. These estimates address both the heteroskedasticity issue, and
the joint nature of the calculation of the Gini and Atkinson indexes. The results for
all coefficients have the expected sign, and are highly significant — in the .001 to .002
range. The import-protection coefficients suggest import protection makes the distribu-
tion of income worse at the margin for countries in labor-intensive diversification cones,
while this relationship shifts to one of falling inequality as incomes rise and we move to
capital-intensive diversification cones. In other words, relative openness helps to improve
inequality for the least developed countries. As such, the basic pattern is consistent with
our discussion of a Heckscher-Ohlin world with a continuum of goods. It fits the predic-
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tion of factor-intensity based trade theory about the linkage between development level,
protection, and the observed household income distribution.
To help interpret these results, Figure 5-1 plots the estimated marginal impact of a
change in the tariff on inequality for the countries in our sample using the Gini coefficient
and Atkinson index estimates from columns C and D of Table 5-2. This involves the
combined effects of coefficients bT and bT ·PCI . Technically, as the regressions are in logs,
this represents an estimate of the elasticity of the logistic transform of the Gini coefficient
or Atkinson index with respect to a change in the power of the tariff T = (1 + t). The
turning point for the index is at a per-capita income of between $5,474 (Gini coefficient)
and $8,780 (Atkinson). Recall that the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to redistribution
in the middle-income ranges, while the Atkinson index is more sensitive to redistribution
at the extremes. The turning points for the different indexes hence relate to inequality
more in the middle of the income distribution (Gini) or at the upper vs. lower extremes
(Atkinson). For countries below this income range, higher import protection is associated
with marginal increases in observed income inequality. For countries above this level,
relatively high import protection implies marginal reductions in observed inequality.10
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we explore the relationship between import protection and the observed
cross-country pattern of the household distribution of income. The theoretical linkages
between import protection and the functional distribution of income (i.e. factor rewards)
are well developed in the literature. Because the functional distribution of income is the
first step in mapping import protection to the household/personal distribution of income,
the existing functional distribution literature also provides insight into how import pro-
tection, through variations in ownership patterns in conjunction with Stolper-Samuelson
effects, ultimately impacts the household distribution of income.
10Burgess (1976) reaches a similar conclusion for the United States, which is obviously one of the
high-income countries in our sample. Working with input-output coefficients and a generalized Leontief
structure, Burgess concludes that higher tariffs raise real wages with respect to the United States.
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On the theoretical side, our contributions in this paper follow from an explicit general
equilibrium formalization of linkages between import protection and standard measures
of household income distribution. These inequality derivatives yield predictions for pat-
terns in the observed variation in trade protection, level of development, and the level of
inequality across countries. On the empirical side, we then work with a set of comparable
inequality indexes (i.e. controlling for income definitions and survey units) to test these
predictions. To do this, we add trade policy indicators to a set of standard Kuznets-U
type inequality regressions. For the present exercise, which is focused on transmission
from functional to household income patterns, gross income survey data has been used.
In addition to the basic pattern of results (inequality-tariff linkages), our estimates also
point to potential estimation problems with OLS-based unconditional Kuznets inequality
regressions.
Regression results point to a highly significant pattern in the data fully consistent
with the theoretical impact of tariffs on inequality in an n-good Heckscher-Ohlin world.
While consistent with the predictions of theory, the pattern that emerges is not fully
consistent with recent anti-globalization rhetoric. We find that in the lowest-income
countries, relatively high import protection is associated with observations of greater
inequality. It is in higher-income countries that higher import protection appears to
improve the gross household distribution of income the most. As such, current import
protection patterns impose welfare costs related to inequality exactly in those countries
least able to offset distribution losses through a functioning social safety net.11
11In addition, if one takes distribution as an important component of social welfare, along the lines of
Atkinson and Sen, then the implications for numerical analysis of trade policy appear to be first- rather
than second-order in developing countries. Crude calculations by the authors not presented here, working
with the estimated coefficients from the inequality regressions, suggest that in some cases adjusting trade
policy assessments for distribution impacts may yield welfare effects on a par with those linked to efficiency
currently stressed in the computational literature on trade policy.
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5.6 Appendix to Chapter 5
Table 5-1: Country data
G i n i  
c o e f f i c i e n t
A t k i n s o n  
in d e x
p e r - c a p i t a  
i n c o m e  1 9 9 4  
( U S $ )
T r a d e  
w e ig h t e d  
im p o r t  t a r i f f
A U S A u s t r a l i a 0 . 4 4 0 0 . 3 1 7 2 0 , 1 9 0 9 .7
B E L B e l g i u m 0 . 3 1 8 0 . 1 7 1 2 6 , 7 0 5 7 .0
B L R B e l a r u s 0 . 2 8 4 0 . 1 2 8 2 , 1 7 2 1 0 . 5
B R A B r a z i l 0 . 5 9 5 - - 4 , 2 9 9 1 7 . 0
C A N C a n a d a 0 . 3 5 0 0 . 2 1 3 1 9 , 3 6 6 8 .0
C H L C h i l e 0 . 5 5 6 0 . 3 9 0 4 , 2 1 2 1 0 . 9
C H N C h i n a 0 . 3 6 8 0 . 2 1 3 5 3 2 4 0 . 6
C O L C o l u m b i a 0 . 5 8 0 0 . 3 6 7 2 , 3 2 6 1 2 . 4
C R I C o s t a  R i c a 0 . 4 5 5 - - 3 , 4 0 8 8 .0
D E U G e r m a n y 0 . 3 4 9 0 . 1 9 7 2 9 , 6 4 5 7 .0
D N K D e n m a r k 0 . 2 8 9 0 . 1 6 2 3 3 , 7 0 1 7 .0
D O M D o m i n i c a n  R e p . 0 . 4 9 0 - - 1 , 4 8 2 1 7 . 7
E C U E c u a d o r 0 . 5 3 0 - - 1 , 5 6 3 8 .5
E S P S p a i n 0 . 3 3 0 0 . 1 6 9 1 4 , 5 2 8 7 .0
E S T E s t o n i a 0 . 3 7 8 - - 3 , 0 6 3 0 .5
F I N F i n l a n d 0 . 2 9 5 0 . 1 6 1 2 4 , 4 7 3 5 .0
G B R G r e a t  B r i t a i n 0 . 4 0 4 0 . 2 9 8 1 8 , 7 7 2 7 .0
H K G H o n g  K o n g 0 . 5 2 0 0 . 2 8 8 2 2 , 3 4 5 0 .0
H N D H o n d u r a s 0 . 5 4 0 - - 6 9 3 7 .5
J P N J a p a n 0 . 3 5 0 - - 4 0 , 5 1 5 1 .5
L T U L i t h u a n i a 0 . 2 4 8 - - 1 , 6 7 7 1 .7
L V A L a t v i a 0 . 2 4 0 - - 1 , 9 4 0 2 .6
M D A M o l d o v a 0 . 2 6 7 - - 7 2 1 2 .7
M E X M e x i c o 0 . 4 7 7 - - 3 , 4 0 6 1 2 . 2
N L D N e t h e r l a n d s 0 . 3 1 6 0 . 1 7 2 2 6 , 3 7 2 7 .0
N O R N o r w a y 0 . 3 0 2 0 . 1 2 0 3 2 , 5 5 3 4 .9
N Z L N e w  Z e a l a n d 0 . 4 0 1 0 . 2 7 0 1 6 , 0 5 6 9 .4
P A N P a n a m a 0 . 5 6 0 - - 3 , 0 0 6 1 1 . 0
P E R P e r u 0 . 4 8 3 - - 2 , 1 3 2 1 6 . 1
P H L P h i l i p p i n e s 0 . 4 6 2 0 . 3 0 2 1 , 0 6 1 2 0 . 4
P O L P o l a n d 0 . 3 0 1 0 . 1 5 0 2 , 6 8 4 1 0 . 1
P R Y P a r a g u a y 0 . 5 9 0 - - 1 , 8 2 7 8 .9
R O M R o m a n i a 0 . 2 8 7 - - 1 , 3 1 0 1 5 . 2
R U S R u s s i a 0 . 2 7 2 0 . 1 1 2 2 , 3 7 6 7 .4
S G P S i n g a p o r e 0 . 4 2 2 0 . 2 6 0 2 3 , 0 1 7 0 .0
S V K S l o v a k i a 0 . 2 1 5 - - 3 , 2 2 0 6 .2
S V L E l  S a l v a d o r 0 . 5 3 0 - - 1 , 6 1 2 8 .7
S V N S l o v e n i a 0 . 2 8 1 0 . 1 1 9 9 , 0 5 3 1 2 . 1
S W E S w e d e n 0 . 3 0 9 0 . 1 7 7 2 6 , 3 8 0 5 .0
T H A T h a i l a n d 0 . 5 3 5 0 . 4 0 1 2 , 6 4 7 4 3 . 7
T W N T a i w a n 0 . 3 2 7 0 . 1 6 3 1 2 , 0 7 0 6 .5
U K R U k r a i n e 0 . 2 3 3 0 . 0 7 9 1 , 0 7 6 6 .3
U S A U n i t e d  S t a t e s 0 . 4 2 4 0 . 2 9 6 2 7 , 3 4 3 4 .4
V E N V e n e z u e l a 0 . 4 7 0 - - 3 , 4 8 2 1 3 . 4
Z A F S o u t h  A f r i c a 0 . 6 2 0 0 . 5 3 8 3 , 8 2 8 1 6 . 9
T a r if f  d a t a  a n d  in c o m e  d a t a  a r e  f r o m  t h e  W o r ld  D e v e lo p m e n t  R e p o r t  ( v a r io u s  is s u e s ) .
I n c o m e  d is t r ib u t io n  d a t a  a r e  f r o m  C h a p t e r  3 .  
" - - " : N o t  a v a ila b le .  T h is  a p p lie s  t o  c a s e s  w h e r e  t h e r e  is  n o  d is t r ib u t io n  s h a r e  in f o r m a t io n .
C o u n t r y
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Table 5-2: Regression results for the Kuznets curve with tariffs
A B C D
a 0 -8.7939 -27.7185 -16.0398 -28.619
(-1.60) (-2.58)**  (-3.18)***  (-3.27)***
a P CI 1.9179 5.7372 3.4302 6.0795
-1.53 (2.39)** (3.07)*** (2.95)***
a P CI2 -0.11 -0.3088 -0.1855 -0.3229
(-1.58) (-2.35)** (-3.06)*** (-2.78)***
b T 5.533 24.8864 28.9728 33.5697
-0.61 (1.78)* (3.80)*** (3.95)***
b T *P CI -0.4243 -2.6333 -3.3658 -3.697
(-0.35) (-1.47) (-3.64)***  (-3.55)***
4.77,  0.029 3.92, 0.048
4.43,  0.035 2.68, 0.100
45 27 45 27
2.31, 0.075 2.78, 0.052
0.1873 0.3359
45 27
40 22
† Regressions are weighted, on the assumption that variance is inversely related to per-capita income.  This is
supported by heteroskedasticity tests shown in columns A and B.  This simply means that data are noisier in 
lower-income countries, due to a mix of measurement error and more variability at lower levels of income in 
factors reflected in the reduced form Kuznets curve.  According to Szroeter’s Chi-squared test statistic for 
homoskedasticity, the hypothesis of variance monotonic in per-capita income is preferred to homoskedasticity
at the .035 level for the Gini-based Kuznets curve and at the .100 level for the Atkinson-based Kuznets 
curve. The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Chi-squared test statistic also supports heteroskedasticity in
 per-capita income (at the .029 and .048 significance levels) for both regressions. 
Regression results shown are for unweighted OLS, and for weighted iterated SUR regressions with robust 
standard errors, where t- and z-test statistics are reported in parentheses.
* means significant at the .10 level for a two-tailed test.
** means significant at the .05 level.
*** means significant at the .01 level.
Intercept
per-capita income
SUR estimates, weighted †
Logistic Gini
Logistic 
Atkinson Logistic Gini
Logistic 
Atkinson
Coefficients
OLS estimates
T*(per-capita income)
Heteroskedasticity tests
squared per-capita income
Tariffs: T= (1+t)
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg ‡
Szroeter’s test ‡
‡ Chi2, Prob>Chi2 w.r.t. income 
Regression statistics
Observations for each index
F, Pr>F -57.07, 0.000
Degrees of freedom 62
R-squared for joint estimate 0.9092
Total observations 72
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Figure 5-1: Estimated marginal impact of tariffs, (1+t), on logistic inequality indexes
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Chapter 6
Income Distribution, Development
and Trade: An Empirical Review
Using a New Inequality Dataset1
6.1 Introduction
In his seminal article of 1955, Kuznets introduced the concept that income inequality
first increases and then decreases during the process of economic development. This hy-
pothesis, now well-known as the Kuznets inverted-u hypothesis, has been central to the
subsequent literature on income inequality. Following Higgins and Williamson (1999) we
can distinguish two versions. The original (strong) version presented by Kuznets argues
that labor demand drives income inequality during the development process. In the early
stages of development, labor-saving technological change and structural change (urban-
ization and industrialization) widens inequality. Later on, these forces slow down and
inequality is gradually reduced. In this unconditional version inequality is driven solely
by labor demand.2 Alternatively, the conditional (weak) version recognizes that other
1This chapter is based on “Income Distribution, Development and Trade: An Empirical
Review Using a New Inequality Dataset” by Francois and Rojas-Romagosa (2004d).
2The influential paper by Lewis (1954) had the same implications. He assumed two sectors, one
traditional with labor surplus and low wages and a modern sector with high wages. Growth was achieved
by moving labor from one sector to the other. Inequality initially increased and then decreased, as a
bigger share of workers received the higher wages of the modern sector.
163
factors can also be involved. These factors can reinforce or offset the basic labor de-
mand forces at play —e.g. demographic transitions, resource endowments, governmental
intervention and trade policy. For example, trade openness can increase the supply of
labor-intensive goods in developed countries and thus decrease the income of unskilled
workers and increase inequality. Therefore, this version of the Kuznets hypothesis is con-
ditional on alternative factors and provides a better theoretical basis to conduct empirical
studies.
There is a substantial literature that tests the continued validity of the original Kuznets’
insight. However, the lack of reliable, comprehensible and consistent inequality data has
seriously restricted the empirical analysis. Of these shortcomings, the most relevant has
been the lack of comprehensive inequality time-series data. The hypothesis is meant to
analysis the long-term relationship embodied in any development process and no single
country has a long enough time-series that can gauge such a process. For instance, in
countries that are already developed, the series do not go further back in time.3 For
developing countries inequality data are even scarcer and since they by definition are not
developed yet, one can only partially test the hypothesis. These limitations have given
rise to the use of cross-country regressions, which assume that each country’s income level
can proxy for the development stages of a prototypical economy. The use of cross-country
regressions has well known drawbacks and it is an imperfect substitute for time-series
analysis. Nonetheless, given the strong inequality data limitations it is the most widely
used methodology.4
A second drawback of the earlier literature was that many studies used unreliable
sources. This includes information driven from regional —not national— country surveys,
and surveys not measuring all income sources. An important step toward addressing these
issues was taken by Deininger and Squire (1996), who compiled a dataset that considered
only inequality observations that fulfilled certain basic quality criteria. In addition, their
dataset was larger and more comprehensive than previously available compilations. This
has allowed the use of pooled estimation techniques.
3The longest series is from the United States and starts in 1944.
4The alternative approach is to use case-studies, as in the original paper by Kuznets.
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Kanbur (2000) claims that the consensus on the distributional effects of growth has
cycled in the postwar period.5 However, the most recent empirical work in this area
has been reshaped by the introduction of the Deininger and Squire inequality dataset
(henceforth referred as DS), which has spurred the appearance of new studies that cast
some doubt on earlier work. For this reason, one can divide the empirical literature in
broad terms into sets dated before and after the appearance of the DS dataset. Using this
particular inequality dataset, Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998), Higgins and Williamson
(1999) and Barro (2000), among others, have tested for the presence of the Kuznets curve
in a cross-section of countries.
Most recently, the DS has itself been found to have important limitations. Atkinson
and Brandolini (2001) have criticized the consistency of the DS dataset and observe that
the loose use of different inequality concepts (e.g. mixing net income, gross income, and
expenditure observations) can lead to important changes in apparent inequality levels
and patterns in OECD countries. In Chapter 3 we have conducted a similar analysis
with regard to the consistent use of inequality definitions and reference units for a sample
expanded to include developing countries in addition to the OECD. That paper also
concludes that it is inadequate at best and misleading at worst to mix different inequality
concepts. The additional measurement errors introduced by combining these concepts
cannot be readily corrected by the use of fixed adjustments or dummy variables, as was
proposed by Deininger and Squire.
To avoid these problems, in Chapter 3 we have constructed an alternative inequal-
ity dataset that consistently uses inequality concepts and reference units. Moreover,
the dataset includes estimates of Atkinson indexes from inequality grouped data. This
provides an alternative inequality indicator that can complement the widely used Gini
coefficient.
Using this dataset, the aim of this paper is to reassess the empirical results concerning
the Kuznets curve found in the recent literature that were based on the DS dataset.
In addition, we also reexamine the relation between trade openness and inequality. We
follow the empirical specifications used in the literature and we complement this with the
5Kanbur surveys the literature until they Deininger and Squire dataset appeared in 1996.
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Atkinson index and with weighted linear regressions that help correct for the fact that
inequality data measurement errors are associated with the level of development.
In line with the previous findings of the literature, we also conclude that the Kuznets
hypothesis is an empirical regularity. Moreover, when income levels (the standard proxy
for development level) are complemented with other inequality determinants we are able to
explain a substantial portion of the cross-country variation in within-country inequality.
At the same time, we find only weak support for the influence of trade openness with
respect to inequality, when measured by three different indicators. Finally, the use of
the Atkinson index (which is sensitive to income changes at the extremes) yields similar
results to those of the Gini coefficient (which is sensitive to income changes around the
mean).
Because our data extends into the very recent past, we are also able to examine
recent inequality trends in the higher-income range, where we are pushing well beyond
the income/development levels that underpinned earlier work. In this regard, we confirm
recent findings by Atkinson (2003) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) that inequality
has been raising in countries at the highest income levels. Empirically, this appears as a
significant cubic trend in inequality data. This outcome can be explained by the recent
inequality trends in OECD countries. This does not directly contradict the Kuznets
hypothesis, as the pattern persists across the sample range he had to work with. What
it does suggest is that inequality does not monotonically decrease after a certain point
on the development path. Rather, the industrialized countries have experienced a recent
surge in income dispersion. Instead of the simple inverted-u pattern, recent inequality
trends suggest a more complex tilde-pattern.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical specifications
applied in the literature that used the DS dataset and the suggested inequality determi-
nants used. In the following section we replicate these specifications using an expanded
and improved dataset. In addition, we perform some robustness tests, modify the basic
specification to deal with the fact that measurement errors are closely associated with
income levels in this kind of data, and use the Atkinson index to corroborate the results
found with the Gini coefficient. Section 4 analyzes the recent inequality trends in highly
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industrialized countries and how it affects the Kuznets hypothesis. We conclude in Section
5.
6.2 Empirical review
The first tests using the new DS dataset found no support for the unconditional Kuznets
curve (Deininger and Squire, 1996 and 1998). However, these authors used a time-series
of four observations (for four decades) to test the within-country evidence. Arguably, this
may be too short a time-series to account for development processes. It is not surprising
that Li et al. (1998) report that the unconditional relationship holds better in the cross-
section test than in the within-country regressions.
The conditional version has been tested in Higgins and Williamson (1999). As ad-
ditional explanatory variables they use cohort size (as a demographic variable) and the
Sachs and Warner index (as a trade policy variable). They find strong support for the
weak Kuznets hypothesis. The results of Barro (2000) confirm these findings. He adds
schooling variables, dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and reports that
the curve is a clear empirical regularity, across countries and over time.6 He also reports
that openness is a significant inequality determinant, but surprisingly his results contra-
dict the standard trade theory conclusions. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that
tariff reductions unambiguously benefit the owners of the country’s abundant factor and
hurt the scarce factor. Thus, tariff reductions in labor-abundant developing countries
should reduce income inequality, with the reverse effect in capital-abundant rich countries
(Stolper and Samuelson, 1941).
In the rest of this paper we test both versions of the Kuznets hypothesis, focusing
on the distributional effects of trade openness. In the next subsection we start with the
empirical specifications used in Higgins and Williamson, and Barro.
6Litwin (1998) does not find any evidence for the conditional version when she uses a sample with
only developing countries. This can point to the fact that a whole world sample must be used in order
to capture the entire curve.
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6.2.1 Empirical specifications
There are several ways in which to specify the panel-data regressions and to order the
observations. A common feature of cross-country inequality observations is its unbalanced
nature, i.e. there are many countries with few scattered observations and some others with
complete or almost complete time-series. The later is common for OECD countries, while
the former is representative of developing countries. To avoid assigning a higher weight to
countries with more inequality observations, we follow Higgins and Williamson (1999) and
Barro (2000), and organize the data by decades. However both studies diverge in the way
they estimate the decadal observations. Higgins and Williamson use decadal averages,
while Barro uses values centered on 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. In what follows, we use
both approaches.
Moreover, the basic specification has different regressions for each decade, instead
of having a regression for each country varying in time, as is the common practice in
panel-data estimations. Thus, we estimate a panel of four regressions, with each separate
regression having a number of observations equal to the number of countries:
Gi_60 = α+ β1 (logGDP )i_60 + β2 (logGDP )
2
i_60 + γDi_60 + εi_60
...
...
...
...
...
...
Gi_90 = α+ β1 (logGDP )i_90 + β2(logGDP )
2
i_90 + γDi_90 + εi_90 (6.1)
where Gi_d is the Gini coefficient for country i in decade d. GDP is gross domestic
product per capita7 and D is the vector of inequality determinants, which can include
trade openness indicators. Note that in this basic specification, the estimated coefficients
are constant over decade and country.
Another divergence between both studies is the estimation technique employed. Hig-
gins and Williamson use random-effects regressions, while Barro uses feasible generalized
least squares (FGLS) that account for heteroskedasticity, and temporally and spatial cor-
7The use GDP per capita logs is a common practice to capture the differences in development levels
and to isolate the fact that growth is a compound rate process. The income data is taken from the Penn
World Tables, version 6.1.
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related errors.8 Nevertheless, Beck and Katz (1995) have shown that for samples typically
used in social sciences (many sections with few time observations) FGLS yield a small
gain in the estimation efficiency, but produce overconfident standard errors. Therefore,
we use instead correlated panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to take account for the
contemporaneous correlation of the standard errors between decades.9 In addition, we
later assume a specific form of heteroskedasticity and model it directly into the PCSEs
estimations. Comparing the random-effects and PCSEs results, both generate identical
coefficients estimates but different standard errors.
To sum up, we have four basic specifications, which vary by the way data is organized
(year centered or decadal average) and the estimation method (random-effects and PC-
SEs). In addition, we introduce other tests to the data as in Barro (2000). For instance,
we assess if the estimated coefficients are stable over time, and we use fixed country effects
to capture country-specific non-observable characteristics.
6.2.2 Inequality determinants
Besides the two income variables that assess the Kuznets hypothesis, we can include
additional inequality determinants and check for the conditional Kuznets curve. Unfortu-
nately, we lack a formal model to explain income inequality and to analyze the rich variety
of interrelations between different economic variables and income inequality (Atkinson,
1997). Thus, we do not have a theoretical basis on which to choose inequality determi-
nants, and we follow the literature and present some suggested indicators.
To obtain a consistent panel set, we estimate these inequality determinant variables
using decadal averages and year centered values.10
8Barro denotes this estimation technique as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), although it is
formally not a SUR procedure.
9We employ a Breusch-Pagan LM test of the independence of the errors across panels and in all
specifications we rejected the null hypothesis.
10In particular, we use only values that are not more than four year apart from the initial year of each
decade.
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6.2.2.1 Educational attainment
As in Barro (2000) we include the average years of schooling in the total population over
age 15 at three different levels: primary, secondary and higher education.11 We expect that
the primary and secondary education coefficients are negative and that higher education
has a positive impact on inequality.
6.2.2.2 Country dummies
We add three different country-specific dummy variables: socialist or ex-socialist coun-
tries, Latin American countries and Sub-Saharan African countries. It is expected that
socialist countries have significant less inequality, given the strong redistributional poli-
cies practiced in these societies. On the other hand, the other two types of countries
have above average inequality, but the specific reasons for this pattern are not easy to
explain. Barro tries to explain their significance by introducing colonial heritage and
religious affiliation.12
6.2.2.3 Demographic factors
Higgins and Williamson argue that cohort size is a fundamental inequality determinant.
The basic idea is that fat cohorts are associated with lower earnings and when these
cohorts are located in the middle of the demographic distribution it smooths the lifetime
pattern of earnings. On the contrary, when fat cohorts are associated with the youngest
population, then it tends to exacerbate the differences in earnings between different age
groups and thus, increases inequality.
They proxy cohort size by the proportion of the adult population between 40 and 59
years and name this variable “mature”.13
11This data is taken from Barro and Lee (1994 and 2001).
12Nevertheless, he does not present these results and uses both dummies throughout his estimations.
13We estimate this variable with data from the United Nations (Population Division of the Department
of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2002
Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp).
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6.2.2.4 Democracy and institutional variables
We use a subjective measure of electoral rights (democracy index) from the Freedom
House.14 Barro also includes a subjective indicator measuring the maintenance of the
rule of law, but the earliest value available is for 1982 and thus, we do not use it. The
same limitation is present for the corruption index that is also compiled by Political Risk
services.
Thus, we only use the democracy index and in general, we expect that more elec-
toral freedom decreases inequality, once we have accounted for the presence of socialist
countries.
6.2.2.5 Trade openness indicators
Finally, we introduce three different trade openness indicators. There are a number of
important analytical and practical problems involved when measuring trade openness. As
explained by Berg and Krueger (2003), the main concern is about policies that distort
market allocations and there can be many instruments that can achieve this; among others,
tariffs and non-tariffs barriers (NTBs), and discriminatory exchange rates. However, one
must also keep in mind that there a possible trade policy substitutions that cannot be
monitored by a single variable indicator.
Direct policy measures estimate average tariffs and NTBs and can be directly related
to trade policies. However, there is no average tariffs data available for the four decades
we are analyzing. In particular, UNCTAD and WTO data on tariffs is only available for
the 1990s.15 Another approach is to take into account the possible substitution between
measures. Higgins and Williamson use the Sachs and Warner index to measure openness
in this fashion.16
14Where the index varies from 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest degree of freedom).
15In Chapter 5 we use these tariff data to estimate the impact of trade openness on inequality for a
cross-country sample centered around 1994.
16Sachs and Warner (1995) try to capture any substitution policies by looking at five different trade
outcomes. They construct a dummy variable for openness based on those countries that pass each of
the five different trade policy tests. If any of the previous criteria is not met, the economy is considered
to be closed and the index is assigned a value of zero. This approach has several drawbacks (Rodríguez
and Rodrik, 2000). First, being a dummy variable one cannot differentiate degrees of openness. Second,
some of the index components do not relate directly to trade liberalization. For instance, Hanson and
Harrison (1999) remark that the black market premium measures factors other than trade policy. There
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Alternatively, openness can be measured using trade volumes, i.e. (X+M)GDP . This is
a useful indicator of trade outcomes, but not necessarily of trade policy (Dollar and
Kraay, 2004). In fact, this particular measure can be influenced by a number of country
characteristics that are not related to trade policy at all.
Therefore, Barro filters this measure to account for these country-specific characteris-
tics.17 In particular, the adjusted trade volume variable is filtered by country size, since it
is generally accepted that larger countries trade relatively less and thus, an outcome-based
openness indicator must take this into account. Country size is represented by the logs
of population and land area and formally, we estimate the following panel system:
TVi_60 = α+ β1 logPopi_60 + β2 logLandi + εi_60
...
...
...
...
...
TVi_90 = α+ β1 logPopi_90 + β2 logLandi + εi_90 (6.2)
where TVi_d is the ratio of trade volume (X +M) with respect to GDP in country i
for decade d; Pop is population and Land is the country’s land area in square kilometers.18
In (6.2) we use coefficients for decades and countries, and both estimated coefficients
are negative and statistically significant. However, we try several different specifications
which do not alter significantly the results.19 Finally, εi_d is the adjusted trade volume
openness variable to be used in the inequality regressions.
has also been criticism in the use of the marketing board component and the independence of the tariff
and quota measures with regard to the aggregated measure.
17However, Berg and Krueger (2003) argue that the empirical models used in these regressions are still
not sufficiently accurate to identify the residual with policy.
18The trade volume and population data is taken from PWT (version 6.1) and the land data from the
WDI.
19The system was both estimated using OLS and PCSEs, and with common and decade specific pop-
ulation coefficients, as well as with decade specific constant terms. However, the results do not change
significantly and the residuals are almost perfectly correlated for all specifications. Finally, we use the
best fitted specifications, i.e., the LS and common coefficients results for the year-centered variables and
an iterative GLS regression with correlated errors and heteroskedasticity for decade-specific population
coefficients for the decadal-average variables.
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Finally, we include an openness indicator that has not been used previously in the
literature. In particular, we take the ratio of import duties (MD) to total imports and
construct the following variable:
LMD = log
µ
1 +
MD
100
¶
(6.3)
Using the World Development Indicators20 we estimate this ratio for the last three
decades.21 This variable reports collected tariffs and is implicitly weighted by trade.
Nevertheless, this is an imperfect indicator since it does not take into consideration that
high tariffs may completely deter imports, and thus, no tariff is effectively collected.
Summarizing, there is no ideal openness indicator and each group of measures has
its own problems and limitations (Edwards, 1998). A strategy to overcome this has
been to test the robustness of the results using different indicators.22 Nevertheless, the
measurement error induced by the openness indicators can be significant and most be
considered when conducting empirical research.
6.2.2.6 Distributional effects of trade
Standard trade theory derived from the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model predicts
that tariffs and other measures that hinder trade, have distributional effects that are
conditional on the factor-abundance of each country. In particular, the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem states that price changes produced by tariff reductions unambiguously benefit the
owners of the country’s abundant factor and hurts the owners of the scarce factor. Thus,
tariff reductions in labor-abundant developing countries should reduce income inequality,
with the reverse effect in capital-abundant rich countries. Further, if we assume that the
relative scarcity of factors in the world is represented by a continuum of countries with
different relative factor allocations, then the level of income can proxy for factor-scarcity.
For instance, very poor countries are assumed to be mainly unskilled labor abundant
and less poor countries have more skilled labor. Thus, the combination of an openness
20World Bank, CD version.
21There was no data for the 1960s. We use a simple chain calculation: import duties (as a percentage
of total revenue) times total revenues (as a percentage of GDP) divided by total imports (as a percentage
of GDP).
22Among others, Levine and Renelt (1992); Edwards (1997, 1998); and Greenaway et al. (1998).
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indicator with the level of income of the economy can assess the particular distributional
effect of trade for each country. From our panel system, we include a trade openness
indicator in the following way:
Gi_d = α+ β1 (logGDP )i_d + β2 (logGDP )
2
i_d + γDi_d +
δ1Openi_d + δ2
h
Openi_d ∗ (logGDP )i_60
i
+ εi_d (6.4)
Using the estimated coefficients we can obtain the estimated marginal distributional
effect of an increase in openness:
∂G
∂Open
= δ1 + δ2 (logGDP ) (6.5)
To be consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson generalization, we must have δ1 < 0
and δ2 > 0. In other words, poor countries that increase openness should experiment a
reduction in inequality. Using the empirical specification outlined above and our new
inequality dataset, we can test if the theorem is confirmed by the data.
6.3 Reassessment using the new inequality dataset
With the previously specified panel systems and variables, we reassessed the previous
inequality results when using our new dataset. We first introduce this dataset and explain
the main differences with DS and then we present the results of our estimations.
6.3.1 New inequality data23
There are substantial difficulties concerning the empirical measurement of inequality. The
most notorious is the lack of an institution that can assure data quality and consistency
over time and across countries. In other words, an equivalent to the United Nations Sys-
tem of National Accounts, which provides macroeconomic statistics that are constructed
23This section is based on the work presented in Chapter 3.
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by national agencies and are reasonably consistent over time and countries. In the ab-
sence of such an institution, some organizations have constructed “secondary” datasets, of
which the most notorious are the World Bank (DS), the World Income Inequality Data-
base (WIID, 2000) and the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). These datasets compile
available national inequality statistics and perform quality assessments to all the data ob-
servations. This has been an important first step towards the creation of internationally
comparable inequality time series. Nevertheless, important caveats remain, which have
to be addressed.
Inequality observations can be separated in three distinctive characteristics: concept
measured, reference unit and source. In general, most of the observations measure one
of three main concepts (Expenditure, Gross and Net income), there are several reference
unit types (e.g. person, household, household equivalent) and a time series can be made
up of different sources. The approached used by DS was to freely mix different definitions
in order to construct the longest possible time series.24 The implicit differences are then
corrected by the use of fixed adjustments or the inclusion of dummy variables as regressors.
This practice has been used in the studies mentioned in the empirical review.
However, Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), using a sample of OECD countries, have
forcefully demonstrated that such combination of different concepts and reference units
can seriously alter the levels and inequality trends of the data. Moreover, the use of fixed
adjustments does not render the series comparable in many cases and furthermore, can
introduce additional noise in data already rich in measurement errors. In our own research
we have found similar problems when a broader sample of countries is analyzed and also
conclude that the use of the DS dataset is not recommendable.
To avoid the additional measurement errors introduced by the combination of different
definitions, we use the comprehensive dataset compiled in the WIID25 and we construct
inequality series that use consistently the same concept and reference unit when possible
or alternative definitions that have been proven to be comparable for the specific country
in question. Strictly speaking, our dataset does not include “new” observations, but
24The do try to be consistent in the use of concepts when possible, but in many cases a particular
time-series mixes different concepts.
25This secondary dataset was based on the DS dataset but has been updated and includes more
inequality observations, even those initially rejected by the DS quality criteria.
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arranges the existing data in a consistent way in order to reduce the measurement error
induced by the combination of diverse inequality definitions. In doing so, we have created
three main series, which differentiate themselves by the concept used: Gross-household,
Net-household and Expenditure-person. Table 6-1 summarizes the characteristics of each
inequality series.
Table 6-1: Characteristics of the three main inequality series
D S - a c c e p t
G i ni S ha r e  
d a t a
G i ni S ha r e  
d a t a
G i ni S ha r e  
d a t a
G ini S ha r e  
d a t a
B A S I C  s e r i e s
     Co unt ries 4 9 3 8 2 7 2 5 6 9 6 3 14 5 12 6 115
     Ob servat io ns 4 2 7 3 2 6 2 8 8 2 4 1 18 9 159 9 0 4 72 6 6 9 3
     A verag e o b s. 8 .71 8 .58 10 .6 7 9 .6 4 2 .74 2 .52 6 .2 3 5.76 6 .0 3
     OECD co unt ries 2 9 % 3 9 % 70 % 72 % 1% 2 % 2 3 % 2 7% 17%
E X T E N D E D  s e r i e s
     Co unt ries 9 5 70 4 7 4 3 8 5 75 2 2 7 18 8 115
     Ob servat io ns 6 3 4 4 4 5 4 3 3 3 76 2 54 2 0 5 13 2 1 10 2 6 6 9 3
     A verag e o b s. 6 .6 7 6 .3 6 9 .2 1 8 .74 2 .9 9 2 .73 5.8 2 5.4 6 6 .0 3
     OECD co unt ries 17% 2 3 % 4 3 % 4 4 % 1% 1% 16 % 19 % 17%
T o t a l  f o r  t he
t hr e e  s e r i e s
G r o s s  I nc o me N e t  I nc o me E x p e nd i t ur e
Ho us e ho l d Ho us e ho l d P e r s o n
There a two different types of series, regarding the level of comparability criteria used.
In the “basic” series, we include observations for which we are confident about their com-
parability, with respect to each concept and reference unit; whereas the “extended” series
only considers definitions over which we are less confident.26 This approach diminishes
the measurement error present in the inequality data. Nevertheless, we do not address
all measurement issues and many of the problems embedded in inequality data that have
been extensively addressed by Atkinson and Brandolini are still present. Therefore, the
data most be considered with some reservations.
This said, we use the inequality series which is more similar to the DS dataset: the
Gross-Household-extended series. This data, in relation to the DS-accept series is com-
26For example, the extended series for Gross-Household can include Gross-person observations or Mon-
etary Gross Income-Household observations. We are uncertain if these different definitions can be com-
pared, but the inclusion of these observations can increase the number of observations provided by the
basic series.
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parable in number of observations, average number of observations per country and the
representativeness of OECD countries. However, the DS series has more countries and
this implies a smaller number of observations in our panel set.27
Another important consideration related to inequality measurement, is that there are
several indicators that measure inequality and there is no consensus in favor of any par-
ticular index.28 Although the Gini coefficient is the most commonly used indicator, there
are many more inequality indexes that can be employed. Alternatively, distribution share
analysis (i.e. quintiles and deciles information) can also be used. The main difficulty
involved is that an inequality index reduces the information provided by a whole distrib-
ution function to a single value. This simplification is helpful, but necessarily disregards
information. There are several inequality indexes suggested in the literature, but a conve-
nient choice is to select an index that complements the information provided by the widely
used Gini coefficient. In particular, since this coefficient is more sensitive to transfers in
the middle of the income distribution and less sensitive to transfers at the extremes, it
is convenient to include an index that can solve for this limitation. Such an index is
provided by Atkinson (1970), which has an inequality aversion measurement parameter
that controls for the sensitivity of transfers at the extremes.
Therefore, in addition to correcting for the combination of different definitions in the
DS dataset, we construct Atkinson indexes from the inequality share data. Since most
of the sources only report Gini coefficients and grouped income shares, we must first
estimate the income distribution from grouped data and then estimate the inequality
indexes. Specifically, we use parametric estimation of Lorenz curves to obtain the entire
income distribution, and use these estimates to calculate four different Atkinson indexes.
With these alternative inequality indexes we conveniently complement the information
provided by the Gini coefficient and can run the same panel estimations to check for the
robustness of the results.
27It is important to note that Barro uses mainly the DS dataset, but also includes some inequality
observations (mainly for the 1960s) which are not considered by DS because they lack a clear reference
to the primary source. We go along with Barro and consider that the inclusion of these observations is
important to enlarge the series, even if it increases the uncertainty about the quality of the data.
28A comprehensive survey of the topic can be found in Cowell (2000).
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6.3.2 Replication results
We first analyze the results using the year centered and random-effects specification.29 For
this particular case, our sample size is of 82 countries, 15 of which are OECD countries
and the number of countries per decade is 36, 40, 42 and 59 for the 1990s. Table 6-2
presents the results.
Table 6-2: Random-effects GLS estimations, years centered on 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990
D e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le : G in i  c o e ffic ie n t (G ro ss-h o u se h o ld  e x te n d e d  se r ie s)
(1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 )
lo g  (G D P ) 5 6 .0 3 9 3 5 .5 4 1 4 8 .9 1 1 5 3 .0 1 3 5 3 .3 9 3 5 3 .1 8 6
[1 2 .3 7 8 ]*** [9 .8 2 5 ]*** [1 4 .1 7 7 ]*** [1 1 .9 1 5 ]*** [1 2 .2 1 9 ]*** [1 2 .4 1 7 ]***
lo g  (G D P ) s q u a re d -3 .5 2 9 -2 .2 5 6 -2 .8 7 8 -3 .1 6 8 -3 .1 9 1 -3 .1 7 7
[0 .7 3 4 ]*** [0 .5 8 4 ]*** [0 .8 4 5 ]*** [0 .7 0 6 ]*** [0 .7 2 5 ]*** [0 .7 4 0 ]***
D u m m y :  S o c ia lis t -1 2 .8 7 4 -1 4 .3 0 2 -1 5 .7 2 6 -1 5 .7 7 8 -1 5 .7 6 8
[1 .5 4 7 ]*** [2 .9 0 6 ]*** [1 .7 2 7 ]*** [1 .7 6 8 ]*** [1 .7 7 6 ]***
D u m m y :  L a t in  A m e ric a 9 .1 3 7 5 .5 8 2 6 .0 3 2 6 .0 4 0 6 .0 1 7
[1 .2 8 9 ]*** [1 .4 8 9 ]*** [1 .4 3 3 ]*** [1 .4 3 8 ]*** [1 .4 6 0 ]***
D u m m y :  S u b -S a h .  A fric a 8 .6 7 5 8 .8 3 9 5 .9 4 5 5 .9 5 1 5 .9 3 1
[2 .0 7 9 ]*** [2 .9 3 7 ]*** [2 .1 9 7 ]*** [2 .2 0 4 ]*** [2 .2 2 0 ]***
P rim a ry  s c h o o lin g -0 .5 2 7
[0 .6 0 6 ]
S e c o n d a ry  s c h o o lin g -1 .4 7 2
[0 .8 3 6 ]*
H ig h e r s c h o o lin g 6 .1 3 0
[3 .6 8 6 ]*
D e m o c ra c y  in d e x 0 .9 1 9 1 .0 1 5 1 .0 1 3 1 .0 2 1
[0 .3 2 7 ]*** [0 .3 1 9 ]*** [0 .3 2 1 ]*** [0 .3 3 2 ]***
M a tu re -3 3 .8 2 3 -3 4 .2 5 2 -3 3 .6 7 9 -3 4 .2 6 2
[1 7 .2 8 9 ]* [1 5 .7 6 3 ]** [1 6 .2 6 9 ]** [1 7 .2 5 4 ]**
A d j.  Tra d e  vo l.  (A TV ) 0 .1 8 8 1 .3 6 0
[1 .2 5 2 ] [1 1 .3 2 3 ]
A TV * lo g  (G D P ) -0 .1 4 3
[1 .3 7 7 ]
O b s e rva t io n s 1 7 7 1 7 7 1 4 2 1 6 0 1 6 0 1 6 0
R -s q u a re d 0 .1 9 3 0 .6 2 5 0 .6 7 8 0 .6 8 4 0 .6 8 4 0 .6 8 4
No te s : Co n s ta n t te r ms  a r e  n o t r e p o r te d . S ta n d a r d  e r r o r s  in  b r a c ke ts .  
                * s ig n if ic a n t a t 1 0 %  ; ** s ig n if ic a n t a t 5 %  ; *** s ig n if ic a n t a t 1 %
A first conclusion is that the income variables have the sign and significance expected
from the Kuznets hypothesis. The coefficients are robust to the different specifications,
although the levels vary in some cases. In particular, we find evidence of both the un-
conditional and conditional hypothesis. However, the unconditional version has a low
29Using a Hausman specification test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are
the same for the random-effects and fixed-effects models. However, given that our panels are representing
decades and not countries, a fixed-effect model controls for differences in decades, not in countries. To
check for country-specific fixed-effects we use a different specification below. In what follows, we use the
random-effects, but the results do not change if a fixed-effects model is used.
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explanatory power, which is much increased by the inclusion of the dummy variables,
which have the expected sign and are all significant throughout.
The educational attainment variables are not significant, though they have the ex-
pected sign. Only higher schooling is positive and significant in some specifications, but
it is not robust to the inclusion of other control variables. The democracy index and
the demographic variable are also significant. It is important to note that an increase
in electoral freedoms is associated with less inequality. On the other hand, a more ma-
ture population is related with less income dispersion, in accordance to the cohort size
hypothesis.
Finally, the trade openness variables are not significant in any specification. The table
reports only the adjusted trade volume variable, but the other two variables (Sachs and
Warner index, and import duties as a ratio of total imports) are not significant either.
This is true for both the cases were the variable appears alone or in conjunction with the
log of GDP per capita.
Table 6-3: Linear regression, PCSEs, years centered on 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990
D e p e n d e n t v a r ia b le : G in i  c o e ffic ie n t (G ro ss-h o u se h o ld  e x te n d e d  se r ie s)
(1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 )
lo g  (G D P ) 5 6 .0 3 9 3 5 .5 4 1 4 8 .9 1 1 5 3 .0 1 3 5 3 .3 9 3 5 3 .1 8 6
[1 4 .9 2 0 ]*** [1 1 .5 3 4 ]*** [1 5 .3 4 9 ]*** [1 3 .3 9 7 ]*** [1 3 .6 6 5 ]*** [1 3 .8 8 4 ]***
lo g  (G D P ) s q u a re d -3 .5 2 9 -2 .2 5 6 -2 . 8 7 8 -3 .1 6 8 -3 .1 9 1 -3 .1 7 7
[0 .8 8 7 ]*** [0 .6 7 8 ]*** [0 .9 0 2 ]*** [0 .7 8 8 ]*** [0 .8 0 6 ]*** [0 .8 2 2 ]***
D u m m y :  S o c ia l is t -1 2 .8 7 4 -1 4 .3 0 2 -1 5 .7 2 6 -1 5 . 7 7 8 -1 5 .7 6 8
[1 .5 9 0 ]*** [2 .6 9 3 ]*** [1 .5 4 3 ]*** [1 .5 8 9 ]*** [1 .5 8 8 ]***
D u m m y :  L a t in  A m e ric a 9 .1 3 7 5 . 5 8 2 6 .0 3 2 6 .0 4 0 6 .0 1 7
[1 .6 5 9 ]*** [1 .7 0 9 ]*** [1 .6 1 8 ]*** [1 .6 2 0 ]*** [1 .6 2 4 ]***
D u m m y :  S u b -S a h .  A fric a 8 .6 7 5 8 . 8 3 9 5 .9 4 5 5 .9 5 1 5 .9 3 1
[2 .4 8 8 ]*** [3 .1 6 7 ]*** [2 .5 4 7 ]** [2 .5 4 6 ]** [2 .5 6 8 ]**
P rim a ry  s c h o o lin g -0 . 5 2 7
[0 .6 8 5 ]
S e c o n d a ry  s c h o o lin g -1 . 4 7 2
[0 .8 8 7 ]*
H ig h e r s c h o o lin g 6 . 1 3 0
[3 .4 2 6 ]*
D e m o c ra c y  in d e x 0 . 9 1 9 1 .0 1 5 1 .0 1 3 1 .0 2 1
[0 .3 5 6 ]*** [0 .3 4 0 ]*** [0 .3 4 1 ]*** [0 .3 5 3 ]***
M a tu re -3 3 .8 2 3 -3 4 .2 5 2 -3 3 . 6 7 9 -3 4 .2 6 2
[1 8 .5 4 3 ]* [1 6 .8 8 9 ]** [1 7 .5 2 3 ]* [1 8 .0 9 6 ]*
A d j.  Tra d e  vo l .  (A TV ) 0 .1 8 8 1 .3 6 0
[1 .4 4 9 ] [1 1 .9 5 1 ]
A TV * lo g  (G D P ) -0 .1 4 3
[1 .4 1 3 ]
O b s e rva t io n s 1 7 7 1 7 7 1 4 2 1 6 0 1 6 0 1 6 0
R -s q u a re d 0 .1 9 4 0 .6 2 5 0 .6 7 8 0 . 6 8 4 0 .6 8 4 0 .6 8 4
No te s : Co n s ta n t te r ms  a r e  n o t r e p o r te d . S ta n d a r d  e r r o r s  in  b r a c ke ts .  
            * s ig n if ic a n t a t 1 0 %  ; **  s ig n if ic a n t a t 5 %  ; ***  s ig n if ic a n t a t 1 %
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In Table 6-3 we present the results that are fully comparable with the specification of
Barro. Here we use again year centered on the beginning of each decade, but now we use
PCSEs to take into account contemporaneous correlations of the errors between panels.
Again, we find significant and robust Kuznets variables, the dummy variables are all
significant while the schooling variables are not. Furthermore, the openness indicators
are once more not significant in any specification. The results do not change when the
schooling variables are included with the openness indicators, as originally tested by
Barro and where he found significant openness indicators that contradicted the Stolper-
Samuelson results. We do not find any such evidence using our consistent inequality
dataset. One possible explanation for the contrasting results can be the sample size and
composition. We have fewer observations (142 against 214) and in average 15 countries
less per decade.30 Another possibility is that his results were a artifice of the DS inequality
dataset he used.
We turn our attention now to the results when decadal averages are used (Table 6-4).
Our sample size in this case is of 81 countries, 14 of which are OECD countries and the
number of countries per decade varies from 43 (1960s) to 57 (1990s). A first difference
from both data specifications is that the number of observations is increased when decadal
averages are used.
We find again that the income variables are significant and robust to different specifi-
cations. Of the schooling variables, only higher education is significant, but only in certain
specifications. The democracy index is also insignificant, while mature is significant in
most of the specifications. In this Table we have included the Sachs and Warner index,
which was the openness indicator used by Higgins and Williamson. Nevertheless, none
of the three openness indicators are significant in any kind of specification. The last two
columns use GDP per worker, instead of per capita and also include decadal dummies
(not reported). These changes were added to compare directly with the estimations of
Higgins and Williamson and it finds the same results as these authors: only the condi-
tional hypothesis is valid, cohort size is an important inequality determinant and trade
30This sample differences are the consequence of Barro using Gini coefficients defined for other concepts
than gross income (i.e. Net income and expenditure).
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Table 6-4: Random-effects GLS estimations, decadal averages
De pe nde nt va ria ble : Gini coe fficie nt (Gross-house hold e x te nde d se rie s)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log (GDP) 56.190 32.354 51.975 39.783 39.528 44.811 17.300 36.172
[11.765]*** [8.712]*** [14.479]*** [9.236]*** [10.605]*** [14.540]*** [13.066] [11.079]***
log (GDP) squared -3.505 -2.079 -3.112 -2.455 -2.434 -2.784 -0.948 -2.000
[0.695]*** [0.517]*** [0.866]*** [0.549]*** [0.630]*** [0.911]*** [0.706] [0.604]***
Dum my: Soc ialis t -11.657 -10.232 -12.101 -10.181 -10.037 -12.719
[1.268]*** [2.551]*** [1.368]*** [2.539]*** [2.560]*** [2.015]***
Dum my: Latin Am erica 9.379 6.624 7.261 6.900 6.947 7.665
[1.198]*** [1.453]*** [1.306]*** [1.598]*** [1.604]*** [1.892]***
Dum my: Sub-Sah. A frica 11.860 10.168 11.668 11.612 11.563 11.871
[2.343]*** [2.824]*** [2.297]*** [2.551]*** [2.559]*** [2.713]***
P rim ary  schooling -0.837
[0.579]
Secondary  schooling -1.046
[0.726]
Higher schooling 8.226
[3.423]**
Dem ocracy  index 0.372
[0.358]
M ature -29.124 -32.926 -41.179 -42.773 -38.450
[18.691] [14.594]** [18.756]** [19.039]** [17.567]**
SW  index 0.412 1.292
[1.595] [2.426]
SW  * log (GDP) -10.537
[20.621]
Observations 193 193 154 184 152 152 187 178
R-squared 0.187 0.669 0.698 0.695 0.618 0.619 0.122 0.699
Notes : Cons tant terms  are not reported. Standard errors  in brackets . 
            * s ignif icant at 10%  ; ** s ignif icant at 5%  ; *** s ignif icant at 1%
openness is not significant (not reported). However, we follow the common practice and
prefer per capita levels as an indicator of development levels.
When PCSEs are employed the basic results remain unchanged, and thus, we do
not show these results. However, an important difference is that the mature variable
is not robust to different specifications in this case. This is not an isolated case and
in general, we found that the inequality determinants are not robust to the different
specifications. Almost in all regressions they have the expected effect on income inequality,
but their levels and significance vary. A possible explanation is the correlation of some
of these determinants with the income variables, which can introduce multicollinearity in
the equations.
Regressing the equation with the inequality determinants and without the dummy
variables, we find that the explanatory power is similar, but lower than the specification
where only dummy variables are used. Thus, these dummy variables can be acting as
a composite variable that agglomerates different characteristics that affect inequality in
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different ways for each country. This simplest solution, therefore, is to include only the
dummy variables, which increase the explanatory power of the regressions to levels that
are not significantly changed by the inclusion of the other inequality determinants.
6.3.3 Time stability tests
In this section we test if the estimated coefficients are stable over time. Hence, we estimate
individual coefficients for each decade and run a Wald test to check if the four decadal
coefficients are equal. For the particular case where we test the stability of the income
variables, the panel-data specification is given by:
Gi_60 = α+ β1_60 (logGDP )i_60 + β2_60 (logGDP )
2
i_60 + γDi_60 + εi_60
...
...
...
...
...
...
Gi_90 = α+ β1_90 (logGDP )i_90 + β2_90(logGDP )
2
i_90 + γDi_90 + εi_90 (6.6)
For the cases where other inequality determinants are tested, then the vector γ has
decade-specific terms and the β coefficients are stable over time.
Table 6-5 reports the time stability tests for the Kuznets hypothesis variables. For
both specifications the Wald test of equal coefficients over decades is not rejected. This is
also the case for the unconditional curve and when only the dummy variables are included
(not reported).
The following table shows the same test when the Latin America dummy, mature and
the democracy index coefficient vary for each decade (Table 6-6). We held constant the
other two dummy variables because of sample problems.31 Again, from the stability test
we can conclude that these three variables are relatively stable over different decades.32
31The Sub-Saharan Africa dummy varies from 8 countries per decade to zero, while the socialist dummy
has one or two observations for the first three decades and more than twenty for the 1990s. In both cases
it does not make sense to compare the coefficients when the samples are so diverse between decades.
32Although in the last column the mature variable fails the Wald test.
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Table 6-5: Time stability test, PCSEs: income variables
D e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e : G i n i  c o e ff i c i e n t
y e a r c e n t . d e c .  a ve ra g e
lo g  (G D P )
          β 1 _ 6 0 4 6 . 3 3 1 5 3 . 7 1 6
[1 6 .8 6 2 ]* * * [1 3 .7 4 6 ]* * *
          β 1 _ 7 0 4 8 . 5 3 6 5 2 . 9 6 9
[1 6 .2 1 5 ]* * * [1 3 .2 9 8 ]* * *
          β 1 _ 8 0 4 7 . 7 0 9 5 1 . 1 4 6
[1 6 .0 0 7 ]* * * [1 2 .9 7 1 ]* * *
          β 1 _ 9 0 4 6 . 8 7 7 4 9 . 8 8 5
[1 5 .5 6 1 ]* * * [1 2 .7 2 5 ]* * *
lo g  (G D P p w ) s q u a re d
          β 2 _ 6 0 -2 . 6 4 8 -3 . 3 3 4
[1 .0 7 5 ]** [0 .8 6 6 ]* **
          β 2 _ 7 0 -2 . 9 2 -3 . 2 7
[0 .9 8 8 ]** * [0 .8 0 6 ]* **
          β 2 _ 8 0 -2 . 8 5 3 -3 . 0 7 2
[0 .9 5 5 ]** * [0 .7 6 6 ]* **
          β 2 _ 9 0 -2 . 7 3 3 -2 . 9 0 5
[0 .9 0 6 ]** * [0 .7 4 0 ]* **
D u m m y :  S o c ia l is t -1 5 . 2 9 7 -1 1 . 7 6 5
[1 .7 9 6 ]** * [1 .8 4 7 ]* **
D u m m y :  L a t in  A m e ric a 5 . 8 9 1 6 . 4 3 6
[1 .6 2 9 ]** * [1 .6 1 6 ]* **
D u m m y :  S u b -S a h .  A fr ic a 6 . 1 0 3 1 1 . 1 5 9
[2 .6 3 2 ]** [2 .7 5 2 ]* **
D e m o c ra c y  in d e x 0 . 9 9 2
[0 .3 4 0 ]** *
M a t u re -5 1 . 3 9 3 -4 5 . 7 5 9
[2 0 .5 6 3 ]* * [1 8 .1 2 4 ]* *
O b s e rva t io n s 1 6 0 1 8 4
C h i2  t e s t :  β 1 's  a re  e q u a l 2 . 0 9 5 . 4 2
          P ro b  >  c h i2 0 . 4 6 0 . 1 2
C h i2  t e s t :  β 2 's  a re  e q u a l 2 . 5 6 5 . 8 9
          P ro b  >  c h i2 0 . 5 5 0 . 1 4
N o te s :  C o n s ta n t  te r m s  a r e  n o t r e p o r te d .  S ta n d a r d  e r r o r s  in  b r a c ke ts .  
               *  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  1 0 %  ; * *  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  5 %  ;  * * *  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  1 %
6.3.4 Fixed country effects
To allow for unobserved country characteristics, we introduce a country specific constant
in the panel system (6.1) , so α is then a vector of country-specific terms (αi) , which
are constant over time. We use only countries with at least two observations, which do
not have to be adjacent.33 The dummy variables are dropped since they do not change
over time. In general, this particular specification captures only the time-series variations
within countries.
We do not report the results, but as expected, the income variables are not significant
in this specification, although they remain with the same signs. Four decades is not a long
33This leaves a sample of 40 countries for the year centered series and 41 when decadal averages are
used.
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Table 6-6: Time stability test, PCSEs: other inequality determinants
enough time span to measure changes in development levels. Furthermore, the exclusion
of between country effects, which accounts for much of the inequality differences, leaves
little variance in the sample to be exploited.
On the other hand, the mature and democracy variables are neither significant. This
can also be a direct consequence of the small change these variables experience over
time in each country. Nevertheless, in this specification the education variables become
significant. Secondary schooling has a negative and significant effect on inequality, while
higher schooling is also significant but has a positive effect. Such results suggest that
educational variables are important inequality determinants to explain within country
inequality over time. Furthermore, when we conducted time stability tests including
schooling variables, only higher schooling had significant decadal coefficients, but only for
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the last two decades.34 These results are consistent with the explanation that risen wage
inequality in the USA and the UK —and increased unskilled unemployment in other OECD
countries— is associated with skilled biased technological change, and that such an effect
has occur after the 1980s. Nevertheless, this remark is qualified by the empirical use of
overall income inequality, instead of wage inequality. Even when the use of gross income
as the measured concept, however, is the closest possible definition to wage divergence,
we still have to assume that both types of inequality are closely correlated.
6.3.5 Heteroskedasticity corrected regressions
An important characteristic of cross-country data is that richer countries tend to produce
better statistics than poorer ones. Hence, measurement error can be associated with
the level of development. Using this insight, one can correct for heteroskedasticity by
weighting the error term by GDP per capita levels.
Table 6-7 presents the results of such weighting in the PCSEs regressions when the
data is centered on the initial year of the decade. A first observation is that the uncon-
ditional Kuznets curve disappears. Nevertheless, the conditional version is still present,
although is not as robust as before. In addition, schooling variables are now significant
and with the expected effects: secondary schooling reduces inequality, while higher edu-
cation enhances it. The results from the democracy index and the mature variable do not
change from previous specifications. Finally, we find once more that trade openness has
little explanatory power over inequality. In the table we show the results for the adjusted
trade volume indicator, but in general, the other two openness measures yield the same
outcome.
In the last column we present the only significant result when trade openness is in-
cluded. The import duty variable is significant and positive, only when included alone
(without the combined effect of GDP per capita). Thus, there is a monotonic relation-
ship between import duties and inequality: higher duties associated with higher income
inequality levels. This result can be explained by a strong negative correlation between
this indicator and the income variables. For instance, developed countries are less reliant
34The low significance in the first two decades is the reason the coefficient is not significant overall.
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Table 6-7: Weighted linear regression, PCSEs, year centered on 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e :  G i n i  c o e f f i c i e n t  ( G r o s s -h o u se h o l d  e x te n d e d  se r i e s )
( 1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 )
lo g  (G D P ) 2 2 . 6 8 7 2 0 . 3 9 8 4 1 . 9 1 1 3 2 . 8 5 3 3 3 . 3 2 6 3 2 . 4 9 1 2 0 . 6 9 8
[2 0 .0 5 1 ] [ 1 3 .9 0 4 ] [ 1 7 .2 0 0 ] * * [1 6 .3 0 1 ] * * [ 1 7 .2 6 7 ] * [ 1 7 .4 4 9 ] * [1 7 .5 4 4 ]
lo g  (G D P )  s q u a re d -1 . 6 1 7 -1 . 3 7 0 -2 . 4 8 9 -2 . 0 0 0 -2 . 0 3 0 -1 . 9 7 6 -1 . 1 8 4
[1 .1 3 4 ] [ 0 . 7 8 5 ] * [ 0 . 9 7 6 ] * * [ 0 . 9 3 0 ] * * [0 . 9 9 7 ] * * [1 . 0 1 0 ] * [ 0 .9 9 7 ]
D u m m y :  S o c ia l i s t -1 3 . 1 9 9 -1 2 . 1 0 2 -1 4 . 4 3 3 -1 4 . 4 4 6 -1 4 . 4 4 3 -1 3 . 4 7 7
[1 .4 8 5 ] * * * [ 2 .0 9 2 ] * * * [ 1 . 6 6 6 ] * * * [ 1 . 6 7 1 ] * * * [1 .6 6 7 ] * * * [ 1 . 6 8 4 ] * * *
D u m m y :  L a t in  A m e r i c a 9 . 9 8 2 6 . 1 0 8 6 . 7 5 5 6 . 7 8 6 6 . 7 4 8 5 . 7 3 9
[1 .5 5 8 ] * * * [ 1 .6 7 8 ] * * * [ 1 . 6 8 3 ] * * * [ 1 . 7 0 9 ] * * * [1 .7 0 6 ] * * * [ 1 . 7 1 2 ] * * *
D u m m y :  S u b -S a h .  A fr i c a 1 1 . 7 4 6 1 2 . 5 5 8 1 1 . 7 9 0 1 1 . 8 5 3 1 1 . 7 3 8 1 6 . 5 3 4
[2 .8 9 3 ] * * * [ 3 .7 2 5 ] * * * [ 3 . 7 0 9 ] * * * [ 3 . 7 8 5 ] * * * [3 .8 0 4 ] * * * [ 3 . 8 0 1 ] * * *
P r im a ry  s c h o o l in g -1 . 0 2 9
[0 .5 4 7 ] *
S e c o n d a ry  s c h o o l in g -1 . 3 9 4 -1 . 4 3 3 -1 . 4 2 6 -1 . 4 4 9 -1 . 2 7 7
[0 .6 2 1 ] * * [ 0 . 6 3 7 ] * * [0 . 6 4 5 ] * * [ 0 . 6 5 1 ] * * [0 .6 3 1 ] * *
H ig h e r  s c h o o l in g 8 . 5 7 3 6 . 5 5 5 6 . 6 0 2 6 . 5 4 1 4 . 8 1 3
[2 .2 8 8 ] * * * [ 2 . 1 4 0 ] * * * [ 2 . 1 7 5 ] * * * [2 .1 6 5 ] * * * [2 .0 8 6 ] * *
D e m o c ra c y  in d e x 0 . 6 9 9 0 . 7 7 8 0 . 7 6 8 0 . 7 8 8 0 . 8 4 3
[0 .3 6 1 ] * [ 0 . 3 6 9 ] * * [0 . 3 8 7 ] * * [ 0 . 3 9 1 ] * * [0 .3 6 9 ] * *
M a t u re -2 8 . 3 3 6 -3 1 . 5 7 6 -3 0 . 8 9 7 -3 2 . 2 4 1 -4 5 . 9 5 9
[1 4 .2 9 6 ] * * [1 4 .3 1 2 ] * * [ 1 5 .9 8 7 ] * [ 1 6 .2 6 6 ] * * [ 1 5 .3 0 4 ] * * *
A d j .  T ra d e  vo l .  (A T V ) 0 . 1 3 5 4 . 8 5 6
[1 .4 8 4 ] [ 1 3 .9 8 7 ]
A T V * lo g  (G D P ) -0 . 5 2 3
[1 .5 1 5 ]
L o g  M D 2 8 . 6 1 1
[ 1 4 . 0 5 4 ] * *
O b s e rva t io n s 1 7 7 1 7 7 1 4 2 1 4 3 1 4 3 1 4 3 1 0 5
N o te s :  C o n s ta n t  t e r m s  a r e  n o t  r e p o r t e d .  S ta n d a r d  e r r o r s  in  b r a c k e t s .   
         *  s ig n i fi c a n t  a t  1 0 %  ;  * *  s ig n i fi c a n t  a t  5 %  ;  * * *  s ig n i fi c a n t  a t  1 %
on import duties as a source of governmental revenue. In fact, for most OECD countries
the import duties are zero.35 Under these circumstances, where positive import duties
are strongly associated with poorer countries, the results do not contradict the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem. These results are in general robust to the use of decadal averages
and the Atkinson index, as shown in other tables below.
Nevertheless, since the other two openness indicators do not pick the same effects,
and in general, are insignificant for a majority of the specifications, we are skeptical of
the direct effect of openness on inequality. In any case, the evidence suggests that the
direction of the trade openness effect is the expected one under standard trade theory.
When we analyze the data organized by decadal averages (Table 6-8), the Kuznets
hypothesis is less significant than before. The unconditional version is again not signif-
icant, and the conditional version disappears in some specifications. For instance, the
35This may also reflect that this specific openness measure only considers collected duties and excludes
the impact of high tariffs and NTBs on import outcomes.
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Table 6-8: Weighted linear regression, PCSEs, decadal averages
D e p e n d e n t va ria b le : G in i  co e ffic ie n t (G ro ss-h o u se h o ld  e x te n d e d  se rie s)
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 ) (9 )
log (G D P ) 8.765 2.444 31.963 41.335 41.835 42.398 6.608 3.907 -5.097
[20 .382] [14.329] [18 .890]* [18 .871 ]** [18 .808]** [18 .715 ]** [14 .071] [14 .114] [17 .855]
log (G D P ) s quared -0 .797 -0 .349 -1.953 -2.565 -2 .617 -2 .646 -0 .596 -0 .442 0 .183
[1 .148] [0 .810 ] [1 .082]* [1 .072 ]** [1 .069 ]** [1 .064]** [0 .796 ] [0 .800 ] [1 .007 ]
D um m y : S oc ia lis t -11.200 -9.527 -10 .061 -10 .195 -10 .220 -11 .440 -11.033 -9.425
[1 .735]*** [2 .246]*** [2 .229 ]*** [2 .216]*** [2 .211]*** [1 .632 ]*** [1 .633 ]*** [1 .869 ]***
D um m y : La t in  A m eric a 10.344 7 .690 8.396 8.511 8 .566 10.283 10.648 10.209
[1 .653]*** [1 .720]*** [1 .644 ]*** [1 .635]*** [1 .634]*** [1 .587 ]*** [1 .697 ]*** [1 .893 ]***
D um m y : S ub-S ah. A fric a 16.873 13.118 13.998 14.167 13.921 16.665 17.657 19.020
[3 .945]*** [4 .291]*** [4 .403 ]*** [4 .361]*** [4 .373]*** [3 .789 ]*** [3 .784 ]*** [4 .917 ]***
P rim ary  s c hoo ling -1.059 -1.147 -1 .068 -1 .080
[0 .529]** [0 .539 ]** [0 .539 ]** [0 .536]**
S ec ondary  s c hoo ling -0.956
[0 .580]*
H igher s c hooling 10.097 9.948 10.107 10.158
[2 .609]*** [2 .554 ]*** [2 .536]*** [2 .523]***
D em oc rac y  index 0 .870 1.020 0.836 0 .850
[0 .402]** [0 .405 ]** [0 .423 ]** [0 .422]**
M ature -18 .675
[15 .845]
A dj.  Trade vo l.  (A TV ) 1 .573 12.082 3.719 -31.119
[1 .477 ] [21 .059] [1 .299 ]*** [17 .704]*
A TV *log (G D P ) -1 .098 3.613
[2 .202 ] [1 .840]**
Log M D 51.931
[17.875 ]***
O bs ervat ions 193 193 154 154 154 154 193 193 122
Notes : Cons tan t te rms  a re  no t repor ted . S tandard  e r ro rs  in  b rac ke ts .  
                * s ign if ic an t a t 10%  ; ** s ign if ic an t a t 5%  ; *** s ign if ic an t a t 1%
conditional version is valid only when the democracy index is included. These results
can be the consequence of multicollinearity between the inequality determinants variable.
When only the dummy variables are included, the Kuznets curve is not significant.
Besides these results, we also have that the adjusted trade volume variable is significant
for the first time. However, the outcome is not robust to different specifications, and
neither when we use year centered data or the Atkinson index. If there is any effect at
all, this variable has again the expected direction according to standard trade theory and
increased openness levels reduces income inequality in poor countries and increases it in
richer economies.
In general, the correction for heteroskedasticity changes some of the main outcomes.
This contrasts with the results of Barro (2000) who does not report any significant change
when the measurement error is corrected to account for income levels.
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6.3.6 Atkinson index results
In this last subsection we introduce the Atkinson index, which complements the informa-
tion provided by the Gini coefficient. Formally, the Atkinson index is a family of indicators
that diverge on the value of the relative inequality aversion parameter θ.36
The higher θ the more weight is given to the extremes of the income distribution.
However, the index is also more volatile to small changes on the extremes (especially
when θ > 1). Thus, the Atkinson indicator is usually estimated using values between 0.5
and 1, following the estimation of the associated relative risk aversion parameter from the
macro literature. In this paper we use θ = 1 throughout.37
Table 6-9: Linear regression, PCSEs, decadal averages
Dependent variable: Atkinson index (Gross-household extended series)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log (GDP) 59.774 31.955 68.680 36.801 29.050 10.045 -7.585 30.990 6.608 -53.231
[19.791]*** [14.300]** [24.478]*** [15.894]** [20.501] [28.868] [22.015] [32.233] [24.684] [27.228]*
log (GDP) squared -3.727 -2.023 -4.123 -2.345 -1.717 -0.914 0.233 -1.966 -0.635 2.925
[1.155]*** [0.833]** [1.422]*** [0.937]** [1.187] [1.608] [1.233] [1.817] [1.402] [1.522]*
Dummy: Socialist -10.072 -11.784 -9.785 -10.471 -10.352 -11.119 -11.092 -8.061
[2.166]*** [3.223]*** [2.417]*** [2.282]*** [2.682]*** [3.148]*** [3.028]*** [2.718]***
Dummy: Latin America 11.990 9.961 12.152 9.827 12.611 10.974 12.579 12.506
[2.094]*** [2.297]*** [2.274]*** [1.963]*** [2.117]*** [2.509]*** [2.443]*** [2.225]***
Dummy: Sub-Sah. Africa 24.450 23.518 23.649 29.296 27.392 24.933 26.152 33.264
[4.093]*** [4.749]*** [4.598]*** [5.144]*** [5.640]*** [6.191]*** [6.628]*** [6.971]***
Primary schooling -1.186 -1.009
[0.793] [0.692]
Secondary schooling -0.959 -1.080
[0.903] [0.740]
Higher schooling 11.798 4.296 11.970 5.203
[3.968]*** [3.824] [3.399]*** [3.250]
Democracy index 0.399 0.786
[0.596] [0.627]
Mature 8.335 10.255
[26.499] [21.611]
Log Md 68.100 77.367
[20.130]*** [22.176]***
Observations 135 135 113 127 81 135 135 113 127 81
R-squared 0.199 0.644 0.672 0.614 0.737
Notes: Constant terms are not reported. Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
Unweighted regressions Weighted regressions
In Table 6-9 we present the results when PCSEs are used with both the unweighted
and weighted regressions, and the data is organized by decadal averages. As observed,
36See Atkinson (1970).
37In a previous study, we found that higher values of theta are too volatile and θ = 0.5 does not have
much variance. On the contrary, with θ = 1 we have a comparable index to the Gini with respect to
levels and variance (Chapter 3).
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the conditional and unconditional Kuznets curve is only significant when unweighted
regressions are used. This result is similar to the one found for the Gini coefficient. On
the other hand, other inequality determinants are in this case not significant. In particular,
the mature variable even changes the direction of its effect on inequality. Higher schooling
is the only variable that is significant, but only when combined with the other inequality
determinants. On the other hand, we only find a direct relationship between import duties
and inequality, while the other openness indicators are not significant (we do not report
these results).
Table 6-10: Linear regression, PCSEs, years centered on 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990
Dependent variable: Atkinson index  (Gross-household extended series)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log (GDP) 74.695 51.032 71.037 81.516 39.529 42.664 29.700 44.464 29.116 -9.521
[19.163]*** [17.030]*** [22.842]*** [20.506]*** [19.644]** [26.200] [20.549] [26.051]* [22.520] [24.765]
log (GDP) squared -4.626 -3.128 -4.165 -4.865 -2.295 -2.812 -1.880 -2.665 -1.834 0.501
[1.126]*** [0.990]*** [1.331]*** [1.190]*** [1.137]** [1.473]* [1.150] [1.464]* [1.277] [1.377]
Dummy: Socialist -12.291 -16.691 -15.956 -17.117 -13.592 -14.475 -14.735 -14.506
[2.555]*** [3.735]*** [2.863]*** [2.581]*** [2.511]*** [2.998]*** [2.673]*** [2.418]***
Dummy: Latin America 10.847 7.303 8.310 8.509 12.223 8.751 11.569 11.420
[2.174]*** [2.261]*** [2.070]*** [1.856]*** [1.979]*** [2.331]*** [2.118]*** [1.882]***
Dummy: Sub-Sah. Africa 12.143 10.814 7.847 23.516 17.890 16.691 19.046 24.770
[3.957]*** [4.641]** [3.943]** [4.496]*** [4.838]*** [5.224]*** [5.325]*** [5.383]***
Primary schooling -0.708 -0.684
[0.907] [0.728]
Secondary schooling -1.543 -1.479 -1.333
[1.097] [0.795]* [0.855]
Higher schooling 7.120 8.099 5.620
[4.319]* [3.010]*** [3.032]*
Democracy index 0.888 0.950 1.148 0.586 1.214
[0.517]* [0.540]* [0.494]** [0.516] [0.522]**
Mature -18.431 -20.564
[24.102] [20.458]
Log MD 51.127 50.741
[17.280]*** [19.004]***
Observations 136 136 116 122 86 136 136 116 127 86
R-squared 0.228 0.525 0.624 0.570 0.746
Notes: Constant terms are not reported. Standard errors in brackets.  * s ignificant at 10% ; ** s ignificant at 5% ; *** s ignificant at 1%
Unweighted regressions Weighted regressions
Finally, the results for the year centered data are shown in Table 6-10. As in the
previous table, we find again that the income variables are not significant when weighted
regressions are used and in general, most of the inequality determinants drop their sig-
nificance. Import duties are again significant when combined with the democracy index
(as was the case in Table 6-7) or when only the dummy variables are included. This
specification also provides the best fit and is valid even when the errors are weighted by
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GDP per capita. Nevertheless, the other openness indicators are again insignificant and
the result can be a consequence of the characteristics of the collected duties variable and
not of trade openness itself.
6.4 The OECD challenge to the Kuznets hypothesis
In general, we have found strong empirical support for the Kuznets curve. The only
specification in which the results were not conclusive was when we weighted the regressions
by income, reflecting the likely association of measurement errors and development levels.
However, this apparent contradiction can be explained by the recent rise of inequality in
OECD countries and the introduction of a cubic function to account for this event.
The inequality pattern of OECD countries in the last two decades has changed. As
observed in other studies (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000; Atkinson, 2003; Chapter 2),
there is an measurable increase in the inequality levels in rich countries that contrasts with
the previous decreasing trend for the 1960s and 1970s. This has produced a U-pattern of
inequality in OECD countries for the last four decades. When we run the regressions using
only OECD countries the signs of the income variables reverse —indicating a U-pattern.
Table 6-11: OECD countries, PCSEs
Gini Atkinson Gini Atkinson Gini Atkinson Gini Atkinson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log (GDP) -94.528 -133.554 -20.995 30.439 -371.264 -327.488 -146.542 -118.159
[126.743] [181.526] [69.086] [97.245] [86.401]*** [95.936]*** [79.181]* [98.280]
log (GDP) squared 4.844 6.766 0.850 -1.977 19.094 16.786 7.385 5.913
[6.598] [9.440] [3.679] [5.163] [4.529]*** [5.023]*** [4.208]* [5.192]
Observations 54 51 47 44 55 49 47 42
R-squared 0.031 0.058 0.154 0.157 0.348 0.275 0.285 0.198
Notes: Constant terms are not reported. Standard errors in brackets. 
               * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
Gross Income Net Income
Dec. Average Year centered Dec. Average Year centered
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In Table 6-11 we present these results. Although the coefficients are not significant
when inequality indexes defined for gross income, they are significant when net income
is used. Given the relevant redistribution policies that characterize most of the OECD
countries, inequality based on net income is a better concept to measure income dispersion.
Thus, we see that there has been a reversal of the inequality trend and this can be enough
to explain our results when using weighted regressions.
Furthermore, this reversal of the effects of the income variables can be influencing our
results, since the weighted regressions assign more importance to inequality observations
from OECD countries. To assess this possibility we introduce a cubic income function
and we present the results in Table 6-12.
Table 6-12: Cubic income function using weighted linear regressions and PCSEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log (GDP) 1005.91 674.65 758.46 409.33 1036.12 670.97 944.62 587.55
[221.48]*** [155.69]*** [214.46]*** [155.00]*** [316.78]*** [241.35]*** [289.68]*** [238.22]**
log (GDP) squared -116.61 -78.26 -87.19 -46.52 -119.13 -77.81 -106.92 -66.09
[25.74]*** [17.99]*** [24.97]*** [17.88]*** [36.46]*** [27.68]*** [33.43]*** [27.26]**
log (GDP) cubic 4.45 2.99 3.29 1.74 4.51 2.97 3.98 2.45
[0.99]*** [0.69]*** [0.96]*** [0.68]** [1.39]*** [1.05]*** [1.28]*** [1.04]**
Dummy: Socialist -10.91 -12.85 -9.81 -13.05
[1.61]*** [1.42]*** [2.51]*** [2.35]***
Dummy: Latin America 9.25 9.44 11.51 11.47
[1.53]*** [1.50]*** [2.03]*** [1.92]***
Dummy: Sub-Sah. Africa 17.68 12.45 27.89 19.09
[3.75]*** [2.86]*** [5.44]*** [4.74]***
Observations 193 193 177 177 135 135 136 136
Low income peak 2,368 2,320 2,380 2,508 2,506 2,362 2,747 2,993
High income hollow 16,243 16,516 19,377 23,087 17,801 16,190 21,835 21,925
Notes: Constant terms are not reported. Standard errors in brackets. 
            * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%
Gini Coefficient Atkinson index
Dec. Average Year centered Dec. Average Year centered
It is clear that the cubic function is present in our data. This specification is robust
for all the different eight combinations of the conditional and unconditional curve using
either data organized by decadal averages or centered on the first year of the decade, as
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well as for both inequality indexes. In addition, we report the two income level turning
points for which the inequality trends change direction.
Figure 6-1: Gini coefficient and log(GDP per capita), cuadratic and cubic trends, decadal
average data, weighted regressions and PCSEs,
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In Figure 6-1 we plot the estimated quadratic and cubic functions with respect to
the logs of GDP per capita and the unexplained part of the Gini coefficient when it is
adjusted to account for the effect of the dummy variables. The cubic function itself does
not contradict the Kuznets hypothesis, but adds an increasing trend after a certain high
income threshold level is reached. Moreover, we organized the data by decade, and it can
be observed that this threshold level has only been surpassed by some countries in the
1980s and especially in the 1990s. In fact, when we estimated the quadratic functions
without the last decade, both income variables are again valid.
Finally, in Figure 6-2 we present the scatter plot when the Atkinson index is presented.
For this case, we can draw the same conclusions as for the Gini coefficient. Note that
both quadratic specifications have a bad fit into the data and for the Atkinson, we even
have a slight U-pattern.
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Figure 6-2: Atkinson index and log(GDP per capita), cuadratic and cubic trends, decadal
average data, weighted regressions and PCSEs
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6.5 Summary and conclusions
We use an improved inequality dataset that consistently uses the concept measured and
thus, reduces the measurement error implicit in the widely used DS dataset. Following pre-
vious empirical specifications to test for inequality determinants (Higgins andWilliamson,
1999; Barro, 2000) we use panel estimations for four decades and a representative sample
of countries. We find clear support for the Kuznets hypothesis, for both the conditional
and the unconditional version. Furthermore, this result is consistent over time, econo-
metric techniques and two different ways to organize the data.
Additional inequality determinants also produce similar outcomes to previous studies.
In particular, cohort size, democracy, schooling and dummy variables for socialist, Latin
American and Sub-Saharan countries are generally significant and exhibit the expected
effects. However, these determinants are not robust and they are correlated with the
income variables, which creates possible multicollinearity problems when they are included
in the regressions alone or together. A simple solution is to include only the dummy
variables, which account for much of the increase of explanatory power characteristic of
the conditional Kuznets version.
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More importantly, we do not find evidence that trade openness influences inequality
in a significant way. We use three different openness indicators and combine them with
income levels to account for cross-country endowment differences. The Sachs and Warner
index and the adjusted trade volume variable fail to report a measurable influence on
the household distribution of income. Only the log of collected import duties has a
direct and significant influence in some specifications, but the effect is not robust. If any,
the distributional effects of more import duties present the expected direction predicted
from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Another reason of this lack of influence, is that
openness measurement is not adequately captured by the Sachs and Warner index, trade
adjusted variables and the share of collected duties with respect to imports. Direct tariff
indicators are only available for the 1990s and in a related study (Chapter 5) we used a
cross-country estimation centered around 1994 and found that average tariffs significantly
affect inequality as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
An improved feature of our econometric estimations is that we weight regressions to
account for the fact that inequality statistics (and other statistics in general) are better
assessed in developed countries. When the error terms are weighted by GDP per capita
levels, the Kuznets hypothesis is somehow modified. The quadratic function is no longer
valid, but instead, a cubic function is highly significant and robust to all specifications.
This behavior can be explained by the recent inequality trend in OECD countries, where
income dispersion has been increasing. Since the observations from these rich countries
have more weight, it can account for a new inequality phenomena, that of a tilde-pattern
where income inequality increases after a certain development level is attained.
These results do not contradict the original Kuznets effect, since for a range of incomes
the curve is clearly discernible and statistically significant, but it may be a sign that
highly-industrialized information driven economies may be experimenting new inequality
consequences from changes in labor demand. In particular, this can be related to the surge
of skilled-labor demand widely reported in the literature. On the other hand, the decline
of the welfare state in some OECD countries can also be contributing to this inequality
outcome.
Throughout the different empirical specifications, we employ the Atkinson index to
assess the robustness of the results obtained from the Gini coefficient as an inequality
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indicator. In general, the results remain unchanged and this provides use with more
confidence in our conclusions.
Finally, we concur with the previous empirical studies that used the DS dataset and
find that the Kuznets hypothesis is a significant empirical regularity. However, the recent
increase of income inequality in OECD countries may be challenging this view and in
particular, points to the fact that a monotonic decrease in income dispersion is not a result
of economic development and new labor demand forces can be reversing this pattern.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Implications
The interaction between international trade and income inequality is an old topic of
economic research, but the recent surge of economic globalization has revived academic
and public interest. Concretely, the observation that wage dispersion in industrialized
economies has increased in the last decades has spurred economic debate in OECD coun-
tries about the impact of trade liberalization. In addition, recent policy reforms in some
developing countries have increased the interest on the possible effects of trade liberaliza-
tion on the personal distribution of income.
The main purpose of this dissertation has been to analyze how trade openness affects
income inequality from a global perspective. To perform this analysis we have assembled
a new income inequality data, built a general equilibrium trade model that links tariff
shifts with changes in household inequality, and tested the theoretical propositions derived
from these models. In the following sections we analyze some of these issues in detail.
First, we discuss different inequality empirical problems, diverse theoretical frameworks,
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Kuznets hypothesis. Furthermore, most of the
chapters include important policy implications, and these are summarized in the last
section.
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7.1 Income inequality data and the reassessment of
old empirical issues
The study of income inequality has been discouraged by serious data limitations. In
general, personal income is not easily estimated and remains a sensitive issue when con-
ducting household surveys. Moreover, such household income surveys are not regularly
carried out in most countries and the comparability of observations between countries is
exacerbated by the absence of an international institution that can guide and standardize
the format of these surveys.
Under these circumstances, income inequality datasets are characterized by a rather
heterogeneous compilation of observations. The intrinsic characteristics of each national
survey, the concept measured (i.e. net income, gross income, expenditure), the reference
unit (e.g. person, household, household equivalent) and the primary information source
(national agencies or particular research studies) are only the main issues that can differ-
entiate and qualify diverse inequality observations. Such disparities between household
income surveys increase the measurement error intrinsic to personal income assessment.
In Chapter 3 we take on existing secondary inequality datasets and aim to reduce this
particular type of measurement error. The changes we introduce are based on the recom-
mendations of Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), who criticized previous datasets. In this
chapter we conduct a comparability analysis between different grouping assumptions and
conclude that it is not a sound practice to freely mix different concepts and reference units.
Using this result, the new dataset we compile is characterized by different inequality-time
series that diverge on the concept measured and the reference unit. In particular, we
have three main series: Gross Income/Household, Net Income/Household and Expen-
diture/Person. Each series conveys complementary information that can be useful for
different purposes. For instance, in Chapter 5 we use the Gross Income/Household series,
which is an income concept that fits better in the analysis of the distributional effects of
tariff protection, before any governmental redistribution policies are applied. When such
governmental policies are to be considered the net income series is more relevant.
Another important distinction between the series is the country coverage. The expen-
diture series is almost entirely constituted by developing countries, while the net income
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series has a majority of OECD countries. Finally, the gross income series presents a bal-
anced sample of countries and is comparable in this respect to the widely used secondary
dataset compiled by the World Bank (Deininger and Squire, 1996).
A separate contribution of Chapter 3 is the use of parametric estimations of the Lorenz
curve. For those inequality observations that provide sufficiently disaggregated informa-
tion, we use seven different Lorenz curve models to estimate the best fit. Employing these
estimates we obtain the whole income distribution, and with this information we calculate
Atkinson indices of inequality and absolute poverty estimations.
Collapsing the information of a distribution into a single inequality index is a simpli-
fication that can overshadow particular inequality changes. While the Gini coefficient is
the most widely used inequality measure, it assigns relatively more weight to changes in
the middle of the distribution. A constant Gini coefficient over time can be ignoring im-
portant implicit inequality changes. Alternatively, the Atkinson family of indexes weighs
more heavily the changes at the extremes of the distributions and thus, complements the
information provided by the Gini coefficient. When we use both inequality indexes in
empirical tests, we increase the robustness of the results.
The use of this improved inequality dataset is the cornerstone and main empirical con-
tribution of the studies detailed in Chapters 5 and 6. As explained below, in Chapter 5 we
test the main implication of the Stolper-Samuelson theoremwhen it is formally generalized
to study household inequality. We find empirical support for the theorem’s predictions
and additionally, we can reconcile the apparent anomaly that middle-income countries
have not experienced inequality improvements with increased trade openness. However,
the lack of import tariff data limited the scope of the analysis and we were constrained to
perform cross-country regressions centered in 1994. Although the disadvantages of these
kinds of cross-country studies is widely recognized, we obtain a high degree of explana-
tory power when the error terms are associated with the per-capita income levels of each
country. This econometric specification takes advantage of the fact that the quality of
national statistics can be directly associated with the level of development of each coun-
try. In particular, we expect that rich countries produce higher quality observations than
low-income countries, which cannot devote many resources to the compilation of national
statistics.
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In our econometric estimations we used the Kuznets hypothesis as an important in-
equality determinant to control for country differences. Chapter 6 is devoted to the
empirical testing of this hypothesis. Kuznets associated inequality levels with per-capita
income levels in the form of an inverted-u relationship. The most recent literature has
documented the empirical validity of the Kuznets curve and it is regarded as a central in-
equality determinant. We confirm these previous findings when we use our new inequality
dataset and when we control the error term for income levels. Furthermore, the results
prevail when using the cross-country regressions of Chapter 5 or when we introduce panel
estimations in Chapter 6. The interesting result of this chapter, however, is the emer-
gence of a cubic relationship between income levels and income inequality when our panel
regressions control for heteroskedasticity. This new pattern does not refute the Kuznets
curve, but expands it to include the new trend of increased income dispersion experienced
in highly industrialized economies. This observation confirms the recent observed pattern
of increased personal and functional income inequality in OECD countries.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we also test the Stolper-Samuelson predictions using panel esti-
mation. However, the lack of a long enough import tariff time-series and the statistically
insignificance of the alternative openness measures we employ, provides an inconclusive
test of the theorem. In this respect, the use of the new inequality dataset does not add any
additional information to the existing literature. While some studies find either a positive
or negative relationship, the bulk of the research points to an insignificant impact of trade
liberalization on income inequality.
7.2 Income inequality, social welfare and trade
Income inequality is mostly associated with social justice and equity issues. Indeed,
a vast literature has been devoted to study the social choice and ethical implications of
income inequality.1 However, while we generally regard inequality as an economic malaise,
economists seldom consider it in social welfare estimations. As explained by Sen (1997)
this a result of the preponderance of the Pareto condition in social choice theory. He
argues that to make distributional judgments in welfare economics, the Pareto condition
1See for example Sen (1992, 1997).
199
must be excluded. That this condition is widely accepted and rarely questioned confirms
the fact that economics has an almost single-minded concern with efficiency and is less
concerned with distributional evaluations. Therefore, income inequality is often regarded
as a necessary or acceptable drawback of economic policies aimed at increasing growth.
In Chapter 3 we move away from this standard approach and explicitly incorporate
inequality considerations into social welfare estimations. Following the “veil of ignorance”
insight first proposed by Harsanyi (1953, 1955), we can include distributional consider-
ations into a Sen-type social welfare function. Formally, we directly associate income
inequality measures with different social welfare functions.
We then embed this inequality indexes in a formal general equilibrium trade frame-
work. Hence, we can trace the inequality and social welfare implications of diverse eco-
nomic polices through the general equilibrium results. In particular, we map the distrib-
utional effects of import tariff changes. The use of an ownership matrix allows us to link
the functional and the personal distribution of income. Standard trade models can be
associated with specific ownership structure and thus, we obtain a series of distributional
predictions from the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson and the Ricardo-Viner models.
Within the HOS framework, we are able to generalize the Stolper-Samuelson results to
the household distribution of income. In an economy with two production factors, one of
them equally distributed (labor or unskilled labor) and the other concentrated (capital or
skilled labor) the main predictions of the theorem still hold. The distributional effects of a
Ricardo-Viner economy with an additional concentrated factor are, however, ambivalent.
When the ownership matrix is better approximated by this three-factor approach we need
more information about the distribution of the specific factors within the population to
obtain less ambiguous results. As we already mentioned, the predictions obtained from
both trade models are tested in Chapter 5 using the new income inequality dataset.
In Chapter 4 we analyze the social welfare implications of tariff protection. The in-
sights obtained are then applied to study the theoretical setting of endogenous tariff for-
mation. The efficiency properties of import protection are well studied in the literature.
For instance, complete trade liberalization is the efficient trade policy for a small country.
However, the widespread use of import protection instruments in many countries contra-
dicts these theoretical predictions. One explanation can be that policy makers care about
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inequality-adjusted social welfare. In this context, the changes associated with import
tariffs are more complex, i.e. the development level of each country is now relevant. In
capital-abundant rich countries the social welfare distributional impact of a tariff increase
is expected to be positive, while the inverse effect applies to labor-abundant poor coun-
tries. The distributional effects in middle-income countries that are not globally labor
or capital-abundant are uncertain. Thus, in developed countries the distributional gains
can compensate the negative efficiency losses associated with import protection and it is
reasonable to assume that policy makers in these countries have incentives to maintain
positive import tariff levels.
The favored explanation in the literature, however, is that policy makers do not only
care about social welfare, but also about the political contributions of special interest
groups (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). While the main forces behind the political sup-
port function remain, we complement the basic results of this political economy model
with the inclusion of a inequality-adjusted social welfare function. The policy implications
of this addition are explained in the corresponding section below.
7.3 The Stolper-Samuelson theorem
Despite being published more than 60 years ago, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem remains
the central theoretical result linking trade with income distribution. In its original form,
the theorem predicts the effect of tariff protection on the functional distribution of income.
However, a generalization of its predictions to the personal distribution of income can be
extracted using a rough simplification: poor countries are labor-abundant and labor is
equally distributed, while rich countries are capital abundant and this production factor
can be unequally distributed. In Chapter 4 we constructed a formal representation of
this simplification, where we can relate tariff changes in a HOS environment directly to
personal income inequality variations. In this context, the common perception based on
the Stolper-Samuelson predictions is that trade improves income inequality in poor labor-
abundant countries and deteriorates it in rich capital-abundant economies. Our literature
survey illustrated how the theorem has been empirically tested with contradictory results.
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Much of this dissertation has aimed at analyzing and expanding the theoretical impli-
cations of this theorem, while using a new income inequality dataset to conduct empirical
tests. In Chapter 2 we have presented the main results of the trade and wages debate
and in general, the basic consensus is that the Stolper-Samuelson predictions have been
confirmed by the facts. However, the relatively low volume of trade between both groups
of countries (north-south trade) can only partially explain the significant increase in wage
inequality. Alternative explanations, such as skilled-biased technological change and out-
sourcing activities are regarded as more relevant determinants of the wage experience in
OECD countries. Connecting these results with the observation presented in Chapters
3 and 6 that the personal distribution of income has also been deteriorating in highly-
industrialized countries (mainly in the United States and the United Kingdom), one can
generalize the conclusions of the wage debate to the household distribution of income.
In particular, the empirical results of Chapter 5 using personal income inequality data
support the Stolper-Samuelson predictions for capital-abundant countries.
The literature that analyzes the experience of developing countries is less conclusive.
One possible explanation is the heterogeneity of economies that are bundled in this group.
For instance, the endowment characteristics of middle-income and low-income countries
are different. This fact can explain the apparent anomaly cited in the literature to refute
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. E.g., that the Southeast Asian experience of the 1960s
and 1970s confirmed the predictions, while the Latin-America inequality experience of
the 1980s and 1990s has contradicted it (Davis, 1996; Robbins, 1996a and 1996b). When
assessed in relation to the whole world and not only with respect to richer countries,
middle income countries (which characterize most of the Latin-American economies) are
not labor-abundant. They can either be characterized as natural resource abundant or
grouped in an intermediate diversification cone that is between the two polarized cones
used in the original theorem. In Chapter 5 we view the world as a continuum of countries,
each with different endowments that monotonically relate per-capita income levels with
increased capital abundance. Within this context, the empirical results suggest that the
main predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem are supported when generalized to
include the household distribution of income. Low-income countries benefit the most,
in terms of inequality improvements, when import tariffs are reduced. The results for
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middle-income economies are uncertain and the richest countries present increased income
inequality with trade liberalization.
Furthermore, the satisfactory goodness of fit of the regressions suggests that the HOS
assumptions are a good approximation to real-world behavior. We reviewed in Chapter 2
the simplicity of these assumptions and how they have been constantly challenged in the
literature. The strong empirical results support the use of this model, in particular, the
small country assumption. Terms of trade effects are usually invoked to justify import
protection; however, in an ever more integrated world economy these effects may have
small aggregate long-run effects.
However, we can recall that the present surge of income dispersion in OECD countries
has been associated with other economic events, such as the gradual dismantling of the
welfare state (Atkinson, 2003) and skilled-biased technological change. Furthermore, rich
countries possess capable social-safety networks that can deal with the potential income
reduction of the bottom deciles of the distribution. It is precisely the lack of such func-
tioning networks in low-income countries that emphasizes the negative income inequality
and poverty effects of trade protection for this type of economies.
In Chapter 6 we use a panel estimations approach to assess the impact of trade policy
on the household distribution. The inconvenience, however, is that we lack import tariff
data for years before 1990. Thus, we are constrained to use other trade openness indicators
during the four decade periods ranging from 1960 to 1990. In Chapter 2 we have explained
the limitations of these alternative openness measures (i.e. Sachs and Warner index,
adjusted volume of trade) and the expectation is that their combined use can increase
the robustness of the estimations. Nevertheless, neither index has a significant impact
on inequality under different specifications. We are uncertain if this outcome is a result
of the intrinsic shortcomings of the indexes or if indeed, trade openness has a negligible
impact on the personal income distribution. Thus, our findings add another uncertain
answer to the existing contradictory and non-conclusive results present in the rest of the
literature. This is not a direct contradiction of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, but may
be a result of other inequality determinants being more important and overshadowing the
trade effects.
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To sum up this section, our empirical results have mainly confirmed the effect of a
tariff change predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The use of alternative trade
openness variables suggests that the distributional effects of trade are not significant.
7.4 The Kuznets curve
Another old economic idea that has survived until present time is the Kuznets hypothesis.
In his seminal article, Kuznets (1955) observed that the distribution of income deteriorated
in early stages of development and later began to improve after a certain threshold was
crossed. The Kuznets hypothesis has been used in two different contexts.
First, it has been employed as a mechanism to explain dissimilar inequality levels
between countries. As pointed in Chapter 3, within-country inequality is relatively stable
in comparison to between-country income dispersion. When we introduced a quadratic
income form in our inequality regressions in Chapters 5 and 6, these Kuznets variables are
highly significant and robust to different econometric specification. Thus, income levels
are an important and significant inequality determinant. These results confirm previous
findings (Higgins and Williamson, 1999; Barro, 2000) pointing to the empirical relevance
of the Kuznets curve and its stability over time.2
Secondly, the derived inverted-u relationship between per-capita income levels and
inequality has been a central association often used to predict the distributional effects
of growth. Low-income countries that experience accelerated growth are expected to
encounter an increase in inequality until the threshold income level is attained. However,
this initial trade-off between growth and inequality is not perceived as implicitly negative,
but as a direct consequence of some specific sectors or economic groups taking off in the
development process. Once this economic modernization encompasses most of society and
public safety-nets are installed, additional growth spells are expected to decrease income
inequality.
2We already mentioned that in Chapter 6 we found a cubic relation between per-capita income levels
and inequality. This result does not contradict the Kuznets hypothesis, but points to a new phenomenon
of increased inequality in highly industrialized countries. A possible explanation of this new development
is the influence of skill-biased technological change on the functional distribution of income.
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Despite its simplicity and empirical strength, there are some drawbacks to the Kuznets
curve. Theoretically, it is not a formally constructed model based on solid microeconomic
foundations. In its original unconditional version, shifts in labor demand are implicitly
used to explain the inequality pattern. The conditional version includes additional vari-
ables —such as schooling, demographic factors and trade— that can affect labor demand and
indirectly, income distribution. However, other factors may be at work and the income
variables can then be only proxying these underlying forces.
Most notably, political and institutional variables are absent from the analysis. The
government has a decisive role in the redistribution of income. It controls a wide range
of instruments that can alter the final income of each household (e.g. taxes, transfers,
privatizations, nationalizations, subsidies and import tariffs). In addition, political and
social institutions may also have a significant influence on how income is distributed.
Among others, the rule of law, corruption levels, unions bargaining power and labor
market legislation. However, it is not far-fetched to think that these political and social
variables are correlated with income levels and thus, the Kuznets hypothesis creates the
right predictions albeit using an alternative explanation.
The Kuznets curve has also an important empirical downside. Assuming that economic
development is a long run process, the hypothesis has to be tested using the evolution of
inequality in a single country for a long period of time. We lack such lengthy inequal-
ity time-series and we have to use panel data estimations as an empirical substitution.
Cross-country regressions have been widely criticized because of unobservable differences
between countries. The use of pooled data can usually correct for this problem, but we
cannot be certain that the unobservable variables are not also changing over time.
In fact, the statistical significance of three dummy variables in the regressions of
Chapter 6 highlights both the theoretical and empirical weaknesses. The socialist country
dummy asserts that income inequality is significantly lower in these countries when income
levels are controlled for. However, we can explain this result given the preponderant role
that the government was given in these societies and the ideological bias it had towards
equity issues. The other two dummy variables are less easily explained. Latin-American
and Sub-Saharan countries have above average inequality levels after income levels are
considered. Barro (2000) has used additional explanatory variables to elucidate this effect,
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but without results. Therefore, there are some underlying variables that significantly
affect inequality levels of which we cannot provide details; more than the fact that they
are geographically concentrated in these two regions.
In summary, the Kuznets curve is a useful device to understand inequality levels and
to think on how inequality changes over time. However, the lack of a solid theoretical basis
about how inequality is determined and how it interacts with growth (Atkinson, 1970),
limits its use for policy recommendations. In particular, the recent surge of inequality
in OECD countries and the experience of Latin-American and Sub-Saharan countries are
clear examples of these limitations.
7.5 Policy Implications
The wide concern on how globalization affects social and economic conditions is a broad
question that we have partially analyzed in this research study. Although we have limited
our attention to the effects of trade liberalization and have not covered an inclusive concept
of globalization, some important policy implications can be drawn.
It is important to bear in mind that we are analyzing the marginal distributional effects
of trade. While diverse inequality determinants have been suggested, we have already ex-
plained that per-capita income levels are the preferred inequality determinant used in the
literature. Even when the Kuznets hypothesis can be proxying for other variables, trade
is not regarded as a significant factor altering the level of income inequality. Thus, we are
not considering how trade protection establishes inequality levels, but rather how changes
in trade policy affect the existing distribution of income, which is mainly determined by
other factors.
Moreover, there are multiple instruments a government can use to modify existing
trade flows, e.g. tariffs, non-tariffs barriers (NTBs), discriminatory exchange rates and
more recently, contingent protection and sanitary standards. Generally, several instru-
ments are used at the same time, but they can also act as substitutes. These policy con-
ditions make it extremely hard to measure trade openness and liberalization programs.
Several measures have been proposed in the literature, with more or less success.
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However, the Stolper-Samuelson predictions were originally designed to assess the
impact on factor wages driven by a change in final prices. When international prices
are normalized and transport costs ignored, domestic price changes are induced by an
import tariff increase. Hence, the use of weighted average tariffs is the most consistent
empirical setting to test the theorem’s predictions. In Chapter 5 we have shown that the
cross-country empirical evidence for 1994 clearly supports the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
The policy implications of this outcome are clear. The poorer the country, the more
incentives it has to reduce tariff protection. These incentives are reduced as per-capita
income levels increase and for some middle-income countries it may prove that import
protection does not have any positive distributional effects. Thus, import protection neg-
atively affects the income of the poorer members in low-income countries. This negative
outcome is reinforced by the inadequate public safety-nets present in these countries,
which cannot compensate for income losses of its poorer members.
Positive tariffs under these circumstances can then be explained by endogenous tariff
formation models. The influence of special interest groups is well researched in the liter-
ature (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). These groups lobby for tariff levels that benefit
them directly and the policy makers subsides to their demands in relation to the weight
he assigns to political contributions and the amount offered by the interest group. In
Chapter 4 we have analyzed how these basic results can change when the policy maker
includes equity issues in his objective function using an inequality-adjusted social welfare
function. We found in this setting that in rich capital-abundant countries the positive
distributional impact of tariffs increases the incentives to raise tariffs. On the contrary,
in labor-abundant poor countries tariffs affect negatively social welfare, both by efficiency
and distributional losses. In these countries, positive tariffs are explained by the lobby
efforts of capital owners.
When broader trade openness indicators are used, the results are less informative. In
our panel estimations of Chapter 6, we do not find any significant relationship between
income inequality and the Sachs and Warner index or the adjusted volume of trade in-
dicator. These openness indicators contain a wider set of information and this can be
concealing the direct distributional influence of trade liberalization. Another possibility
is that the marginal effect of trade is negligible and other inequality determinants are
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more relevant to explain distributional changes. However, we do not find any support for
the hypothesis that trade deteriorates the personal distribution of income.
In summary, we found theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis
that trade liberalization benefits the income distribution of low-income countries. Data
constraints have limited our analysis and thus, these results are not conclusive. However,
we are more confident about the result that the marginal effect of trade openness is small
and does not influence negatively income inequality in these countries. If one believes
that trade has a positive impact on growth then trade liberalization can be regarded as a
positive policy for developing countries.
For industrialized economies, the positive impact of tariff protection is also empirically
supported. This confirms the main results of the trade and wages debate, which assign a
positive but minor role to trade in the recent spell of wage and personal income dispersion.
In these countries, however, advanced social security networks can better cope with income
losses in poorer households, while the country benefits from improved efficiency through
increased international trade.
Notwithstanding, we lack an integrated theory that can deal with the interaction
between income distribution and other relevant economic variables. Within these lim-
itations, the remarks produced in this dissertation apply to general trends observed in
a cross-country sample. Income inequality determination and its dynamics are a theo-
retical area under development and the general analysis we have conducted here cannot
substitute for comprehensive country-specific studies that integrate historical, political
and social factors.
208
References
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson (2001). “The Colonial Origins of Compar-
ative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 91(5):
1369-1401.
Adams, R.H. Jr (2003). “Economic Growth, Inequality, and Poverty,” World Bank
Policy Research Paper 2972, February.
Agénor, P.R. (2003). “Does Globalization Hurt the Poor?” World Bank Development
Research Group Working Paper 2922.
Aghion, P., E. Caroli and C. García-Peñalosa (1999). “Inequality and Economic Growth:
The Perspective of the New Growth Theories,” Journal of Economic Literature, 37:
1615-60.
Alcalá, F. and A. Ciccone (2004). “Trade and Productivity,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 119(2): 613-646.
Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1996). “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and In-
vestment,” European Economic Review, 40(6): 1203-28.
Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994). “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 109(2): 465-90.
Amiel, Y. and F. Cowell (1999). Thinking about Inequality: Personal Judgment and
Income Distributions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Atkinson, A. (1970). “On the Measurement of Inequality,” Journal of Economic Theory,
2: 244-63.
Atkinson, A. (1997). “Bringing Income Distribution in from the Cold,” Economic Jour-
nal, 107: 297-321.
Atkinson, A. (2003). “Income Inequality in OECD Countries: Data and Explanations.”
Revised version of the paper presented at the CESifo conference on “Globalization,
Inequality and Well-Being” in Munich, November 8-9, 2002.
Atkinson, A. and F. Bourguignon (2000). “Income Distribution and Economics,” in
Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol. 1, edited by A. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon.
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
209
Atkinson, A. and A. Brandolini (2001). “Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of “Secondary”
Data-Sets: Income Inequality in OECD Countries,” Journal of Economic Literature,
39: 771-99.
Atkinson, A., L. Rainwater and T.M. Smeeding (1995). Income Distribution in OECD
countries. Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study. OECD, Paris.
Baldwin, R. (1992). “Measurable Dynamic Gains from Trade,” Journal of Political
Economy, 100(1): 162-174.
Baldwin, R. (2003). “Openness and Growth: What’s the Empirical Relationship,”
NBER Working Paper 9578.
Baldwin, R. and G. Cain (1997). “Shifts in US Relative and Absolute Wages: The Role
of Trade, Technology and Factor Endowments,” NBER Working Paper 5934.
Banerjee, A. and E. Duflo (2003). “Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?”
Journal of Economic Growth, 8(3): 267-99.
Bannister, G.J. and K. Thugge (2001). “International Trade and Poverty Alleviation,”
IMF Working Paper WP/01/54.
Barro, R. (2000). “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries,” Journal of Economic
Growth, 5(1): 5-32.
Barro, R. and J. W. Lee (1994). “Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries,” mimeo.
Barro, R. and J. W. Lee (2001). “International Data on Educational Attainment: Up-
dates and Implications,” Oxford Economic Papers, 3: 541-563.
Beck, N. and J.N. Katz (1995). “What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-
Section Data,” American Political Science Review, 89(3): 634-47.
Ben-David, D. (1993). “Equalizing Exchange: Trade Liberalization and Income Con-
vergence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3): 653-79.
Ben-David, D. (1996). “Trade and Convergence among Countries,” Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 40: 279-98.
Ben-David, D. (1998). “International Trade and the Growth of Nations,” mimeo, World
Bank.
Ben-David, D., H. Nordström and A. Winters (2000). Trade, Income Disparity and
Poverty. WTO Special Study 5, Geneva.
Berg, A. and A. Krueger (2003). “Trade, Growth, and Poverty: A Selective Survey,”
IMF Working Paper WP/03/30.
Berman, E., J. Bound and Z. Griliches (1994). “Changes in the Demand for Skilled
Labor within U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey of Manufactures,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2): 367-98.
210
Bhagwati, J. (1959). “Protection, Real Wages and Real Incomes,” Economic Journal,
69(276): 733-48.
Bhagwati, J. (1978). Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes.
Ballinger, Cambridge.
Bhagwati, J. (1998). “External Sector and Income Distribution,” in Income Distribution
and High-Quality Growth, edited by V. Tanzi and K. Chu. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Bhagwati, J. and V.H. Dehejia (1994). “Freer Trade and Wages of the Unskilled —
Is Marx Striking Again?” in Trade and Wages: Leveling Wages Down?, edited by
Bhagwati, J. and M.H. Kosters. AEI Press, Washington D.C.
Bhagwati, J. and T.N. Srinivasan (2001a). “Outward Orientation and Development:
Are Revisionist Right?” in Trade, Development and Political Economy: Essays in Ho-
nour of Anne Krueger, edited by D. Lal and R. Shape. Palgrave, London.
Bhagwati, J. and T.N. Srinivasan (2001b). “Trade and Poverty in Poor Countries,”
mimeo, Yale University.
Bound, J. and G. Johnson (1992). “Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980s:
An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations,” American Economic Review, 82: 371-372.
Borjas, G. (1994). “The Economics of Immigration,” Journal of Economic Literature,
32(4): 1667-1717.
Borjas, G., R.B. Freeman, and L.F. Katz (1992). “On the Labor Market Impacts of Im-
migration and Trade,” in Immigration and the Work Force: Economic Consequences for
the United States and Source Areas, edited by G. Borjas and R.B. Freeman. University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Borjas, G.J. and V.A. Ramey (1995). “Foreign Competition, Market Power, and Wage
Inequality,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 60(4): 1075-1110.
Bound, J. and G. Johnson (1992). “Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980’s: An
Evaluation of Alternative Explanations,” American Economic Review, 82(3): 371-92.
Bourguignon, F. and C. Morrisson (1989). External Trade and Income Distribution.
OECD, Paris.
Bourguignon, F. and C. Morrisson (1990). “Income Distribution, Development and
Foreign Trade: A Cross-Sectional Analysis,” European Economic Review, 34 (6): 1113-
32.
Bourguignon, F. and C. Morrisson (2002). “Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-
1992,” American Economic Review, 92(4): 727-44.
Bruno, M., M. Ravallion and L. Squire (1998). “Equity and Growth in Developing
Countries: Old and New Perspectives on Policy Issues,” in Income Distribution and
High-Quality Growth, edited by V. Tanzi and K.Y. Chu. MIT Press, Cambridge.
211
Burgess, D.F. (1976). “Tariffs and Income Distribution: Some Empirical Evidence for
the United States,” Journal of Political Economy, 84(1): 17-46.
Burniaux, J., T. Dang, D. Fore, M. Förster, M. Mira D’Ercole and H. Oxley (1998).
“Income Distribution and Poverty in Selected OECD Countries,” OECD Economics
Department, Working Paper No. 189.
Burtless, G. (1995). “International Trade and the Rise in Earnings Inequality,” Journal
of Economic Literature, 33: 800-816.
Bussolo, M. and. H. Solignac Lecomte (1999). “Trade Liberalization and Poverty,”
Overseas Development Institute Poverty Briefing 6, December.
Champernowne, D.G. (1953). “A Model of Income Distribution,” Economic Journal,
63: 318-51.
Chen, S., G. Datt and M. Ravallion (1998). “POVCAL: A Program for Calculating
Poverty Measures from Grouped Data,” World Bank Policy Research Department.
Chen, S. and M. Ravallion (2001). “How Did the World’s Poorest Fare in the 1990s?”
Review of Income and Wealth, 47: 283-300.
Chen, S. and M. Ravallion (2004). “How Have the World’s Poorest Fare since the Early
1980s?” mimeo, World Bank.
Clerides, S, S. Lach and J. Tybout (1998). “Is ‘Learning-by-Exporting’ Important?
Micro-Dynamic Evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 113(3): 903-47.
Cline, W.R. (1997). Trade and Income Distribution. Institute for International Eco-
nomics, Washington D.C.
Coe, D. T. and E. Helpman (1995). “International R&D Spillovers,”European Economic
Review, 39(5): 859-87.
Cornia, G. (1999). “Liberalization, Globalization and Income Distribution,” WIDER
Working Paper 157, United Nations University.
Cowell, F.A. (1995). Measuring Inequality. 2nd Ed. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel
Hempstead.
Cowell, F.A. (2000). “Measurement of Inequality,” in Handbook of Income Distribution,
Vol. 1, edited by A. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Currie, J. and. A. Harrison (1997). “Sharing the Costs: The Impact of Trade Reform
on Capital and Labor in Morocco,” Journal of Labor Economics, 15(3): S44-S71.
Dalton, H. (1920). “The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes,” Economic Journal,
30(9): 348-361.
Datt, G. (1998). “Computational Tools for Poverty Measurement and Analysis,” Food
Consumption and Nutrition Division, International Food Policy Research Institute,
FCND Discussion Paper No. 50.
212
Davis, S.J. and J. Haltiwanger (1991). “Wage Dispersion Between and Within U.S.
Manufacturing Plants, 1963-86,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeco-
nomics: 115-200.
Davis, D. (1996). “Trade Liberalization and Income Distribution,” NBER Working
Paper 5693.
Deardorff, A. (1979). “Weak Links in the Chain of Comparative Advantage,” Journal
of International Economics, 9: 197-209.
Deardorff, A. (1982). “A Note on the General Validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theo-
rem,” American Economic Review, 72(3): 683-94.
Deardorff, A. (1993). “Overview of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem,” in The Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem: A Golden Jubilee, edited by A. Deardorff and R. Stern. University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Deardorff, A. (1998). “Technology, Trade, and Increasing Inequality: Does the Cause
Matter for the Cure?” Working Paper No. 428, Research Seminar in International Eco-
nomics, University of Michigan.
Deardorff, A. and D.S. Hakura (1994). “Trade and Wages — What Are the Questions?”
in Trade and Wages: Leveling Wages Down?, edited by J. Bhagwati and M.H. Kosters.
AEI Press, Washington DC.
Deardorff, A. and R. Stern, eds. (1994). The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: A Golden
Jubilee. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Deaton, A. (2002). “Is World Poverty Falling?” Finance and Development, 39(2).
Deininger, K. and L. Squire (1996). “A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality,”
World Bank Economic Review, 10 (2): 565-91.
Deininger, K. and L. Squire (1998). “New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality
and Growth,” Journal of Development Economics, 57(2): 259-88.
Deininger, K. and L. Squire (2002). “Revisiting Inequality: New Data, New Results,”
The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, Distinguished Lecture Series No. 18.
Desjonqueres, T., S. Machin and J. van Reenan (1999). “Another Nail in the Coffin?
Or Can the Trade Based Explanation of Changing Skill Structures be Resurrected?”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101: 533-54.
Devarajan, S. and D. van der Mensbrugghe (2000). “Trade Reform in South Africa:
Impacts on Households.” Presented at the conference on Poverty and the International
Economy, organized by the World Bank and the Parliamentary Commission on Swedish
Policy for Global Development, held in Stockholm, October.
Dixit, A.K. and V. Norman (1980). Theory of International Trade. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge.
213
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2002). “Growth Is Good for the Poor,” Journal of Economic
Growth, 7(3): 195-225.
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2003). “Institutions, Trade, and Growth,” Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 50(1): 133-62.
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2004). “Trade, Growth and Poverty,” Economic Journal, 114:
F22-F49.
Edwards, S. (1997). “Trade Policy, Growth and Income Distribution,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 87 (2): 205-10.
Edwards, S. (1998). “Openness, Productivity and Growth: What DoWe Really Know?”
Economic Journal, 108: 383-398.
Easterly, W.R. and R. Levine (2001). “What Have We Learned from a Decade of Em-
pirical Research on Growth? It’s Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth
Models,” World Bank Economic Review, 15(2): 177-219.
Ethier, W.J. (1982). “The General Role of Factor Intensity in the Theorems of Inter-
national Trade,” Economic Letters, 10: 337-342.
Ethier, W.J. (1984) “Higher Dimensional Issues in Trade Theory,” in The Handbook of
International Economics, Vol. 1, edited by R. Jones and P. Kenen. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Feenstra, R. and G. Hanson (1995a). “Foreign Investment, Outsourcing and Relative
Wages,” NBER Working Paper 5121.
Feenstra, R. and G. Hanson (1995b). “Foreign Direct Investment and Relative Wages:
Evidence from Mexico’s Maquiladoras,” NBER Working Paper 5122.
Feenstra, R. and G. Hanson (1996). “Globalization, Outsourcing, andWage Inequality,”
American Economic Review, 86(2): 240-245.
Feenstra, R. and G. Hanson (1997). “Productivity Measurement and the Impact of
Trade and Technology on Wages: Estimates for the US,” NBER Working Paper 6052.
Feenstra, R. and G. Hanson (2004). “Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality:
A Survey of Trade and Wages,” in Handbook of International Trade, edited by K. Choi
and J. Harrigan. Basil Blackwell, London.
Feliciano, Z. (2001). “Workers and Trade Liberalization: The Impact of Trade Reforms
in Mexico on Wages and Employment,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 55(1):
95-115.
Fields, G. (1991). “Growth and Income Distribution,” in Essays on Poverty, Equity
and Growth, edited by G. Psacharopolous. Pergamon Press, Oxford.
Fischer, R.D. (2001). “The Evolution of Inequality after Trade Liberalization,” Journal
of Development Economics, 66: 555-79.
Francois, J.F. (1996). “Trade, Labour Force Growth, and Wages,” Economic Journal,
106(439): 1586-1609.
214
Francois, J.F. and D. Nelson (1998). “Trade, Technology, and Wages: General Equilib-
rium Mechanics,” Economic Journal, 108: 1483-99.
Francois, J.F. and H. Rojas-Romagosa (2004a). “Trade Policy and the Household Dis-
tribution of Income,” Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI-2004-051/2 and CEPR
Discussion Paper 4436.
Francois, J.F. and H. Rojas-Romagosa (2004b). “Household Inequality, Welfare, and
the Setting of Trade Policy,” Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI-2004-086/2 and
CEPR Discussion Paper 4624.
Francois, J.F. and H. Rojas-Romagosa (2004c). “The Construction and Interpretation
of Combined Cross-Section and Time-Series Income Inequality Datasets,” Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Paper.
Francois, J.F. and H. Rojas-Romagosa (2004d). “Income Distribution, Development
and Trade: An Empirical Review Using a New Inequality Dataset,” Tinbergen Institute
Discussion Paper.
Frankel, J. and D. Romer (1999). “Does Trade Cause Growth?” American Economic
Review, 89(3): 379-99.
Freeman, R.B. (1991). “How Much Has the De-Unionization Contributed to the Rise
in Male Earnings Inequality?” NBER Working Paper 3826.
Galor, O. (1994). “Tariffs, Income Distribution and Welfare in a Small Overlapping-
Generations Economy.” International Economic Review, 35: 173-192.
Ghura, D., C.A. Leite, and C. Tsangarides (2002). “Is Growth Enough? Macroeconomic
Policy and Poverty Reduction,” IMF Working Paper WP/02/118.
Gottschalk, P. and T.M. Smeeding (2000). “Empirical Evidence on Income Inequality
in Industrialized Countries,” in Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol. 1, edited by A.
Atkinson and F. Bourguignon. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Greenaway, D., W. Morgan and P. Wright (1998). “Trade Reform, Adjustment and
Growth: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?” Economic Journal, 108: 1547-61.
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2002). Interest Groups and Trade Policy. Princeton
University Press, New Jersey.
Hall, R. and C. Jones (1999). “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output
Per Worker Than Others?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114: 83-116.
Hallward-Driemeier, M. (2001). “Openness, Firms, and Competition,” mimeo, World
Bank.
Hanson, G. and A. Harrison (1995). “Trade, Technology, ad Wage Inequality,” NBER
Working Paper 5110.
Hanson, G. and A. Harrison (1999). “Who Gains from Trade Reform? Some Remaining
Puzzles,” NBER Working Paper 6915.
215
Harrison, A. and A. Revenga (1995). “The Effects of Trade Policy Reform: What Do
We Really Know?” NBER Working Paper 5225.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1953). “Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of
Risk-Taking,” Journal of Political Economics, 61(5): 434-35.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1955). “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal Com-
parisons of Utility,” Journal of Political Economics, 63(4): 309-21.
Helpman, E. (1995). “Politics and Trade Policy,” NBER Working Paper 5309.
Helpman, E. and P. Krugman (1985). Market Structure and Foreign Trade. MIT Press,
Cambridge.
Hertel, T.W., Preckel, P.V. and J.A.L. Cranfield (2000). “Multilateral Trade Liberal-
ization and Poverty Reduction,” Purdue: Center for Global Trade Analysis, October.
Higgins, M. and J. Williamson (1999). “Explaining Inequality theWorld Round: Cohort
Size, Kuznets Curves and Openness,” NBER Working Paper 7224.
Hillman, A.L. (1989). The Political Economy of Protection. Harwood Publishers, Lon-
don.
Ianchovichina, E., A. Nicita, and I. Soloaga (2000). “Trade Reform and Household
Welfare : The Case of Mexico,” World Bank, DECRG-Trade. August.
Kakwani, N. (1980). “On a Class of Poverty Measures,” Econometrica, 48(2): 437-46.
Kakwani, N. and N. Podder (1973). “On the Estimation of Lorenz Curves fromGrouped
Observations,” International Economic Review, 14(2): 278-92.
Kakwani, N. and N. Podder (1976). “Efficient Estimation of the Lorenz Curve and Asso-
ciated Inequality Measures fromGrouped Observations,” Econometrica, 44(1): 137-148.
Kanbur, R. (2000). “Income Distribution and Development,” in Handbook of Income
Distribution, A. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon, eds. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Kanbur, R. (2001). “Economic Policy, Distribution and Poverty: The Nature of the
Disagreements,” World Development, 29(6): 1083-94.
Katz, L. and K.M. Murphy (1992). “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply
and Demand Factors,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1): 35-78.
Kemp, M.C. (1956). “Tariffs, Income and Distribution,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 70(1): 1390155.
Khan, F. (1997). “Household Disaggregation,” In Applied Methods for Trade Policy
Analysis: A Handbook, edited by J.F. Francois and K. Reinert. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Kolm, S. (1969). “The Optimal Production of Social Justice,” in Public Economics
edited by J. Margolis and H. Guitton. Macmillan, New York.
216
Kolm, S. (1976). “Unequal Inequalities I and II,” Journal of Economic Theory, 12:
416-442; 13: 82-111.
Krueger, A. (1978). Liberalization Attempts and Consequences. Ballinger, Cambridge.
Kruger, D. (2000). “Redistribution Effects of Agricultural Incentives Policies in
Nicaragua,” background paper for the Nicaragua Poverty Assessment 2000. World
Bank.
Krugman, P. (1981). “Intraindustry Specialization and the Gains from Trade,” Journal
of Political Economy, 89: 959-73.
Krugman, P. (1995a). “Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 327-77.
Krugman, P. (1995b). “Technology, Trade, and Factor Prices,” NBER Working Paper
5355.
Krugman, P. and R. Lawrence (1994). “Trade, Jobs and Wages,” Scientific American,
270(4): 44-49.
Kuznets, S. (1955). “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” American Economic
Review, 45: 1-28.
Kuznets, S. (1963). “Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations,” Eco-
nomic Development and Cultural Change, 12: 1-80.
Lambert, P. (1993). The Distribution and Redistribution of Income. Second ed.
Manchester University Press, Manchester.
Lawrence, R. and M. Slaughter (1993). “International Trade and American Wages in
the 1980s: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Microeconomics, 2: 161-226.
Leamer, E. (1993). “Wage Effects of a US-Mexican Free Trade Agreement,” in The
Mexico-US Free Trade Agreement, edited by P.M. Garber. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Leamer, E. (1994). “Trade, Wages and Revolving Door Ideas,” NBER Working Paper
4716.
Leamer, E. (1996). “In Search of Stolper-Samuelson Effects on US Wages,” NBER
Working Paper 5427.
Leamer, E. and J. Levinsohn (1995). “International Trade Theory: The Evidence,” in
Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3, edited by G. Grossman and K. Rogoff.
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Leamer, E., H. Maul, S. Rodríguez and P. Schott (1999). “Does Natural Resources
Abundance Increase Latin American Income Inequality?” Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 59: 3-42.
Levine, R and D. Renelt (1992). “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth
Regressions,” American Economic Review, 82(4): 942-63.
217
Lewis, W.A. (1954). “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor,”
Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies, 22: 139-81.
Li, H., L. Squire and H. Zou (1998). “Explaining International and Intertemporal Vari-
ations in Income Inequality,” Economic Journal, 108: 26-43.
Lindert, P. and J. Williamson (2001). “Does Globalization Make the World More Un-
equal?” NBER Working Paper 8228.
Litwin, C. (1998). “Trade and Income Distribution in Developing Countries,” Working
Papers in Economics No. 9, Department of Economics, Göteborg University.
Lundberg, M. and L. Squire (2003). “The Simultaneous Evolution of Growth and In-
equality,” Economic Journal, 113: 326-44.
Lustig, N. (2000). “Crisis and the Poor: Socially Responsible Macroeconomics,” Sus-
tainable Development Department Technical Paper POV-108, Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank.
Markusen, J.R. and A.J. Venables (1996). “Multinational Production, Skilled Labor,
and Real Wages,” NBER Working Paper 5483.
McCulloch, N., A. Winters and X. Cirera (2001). Trade Liberalization and Poverty:
A Handbook. Centre for Economic Policy Research and Department for International
Development. London.
Metzler, L. (1949). “Tariffs, the Terms of Trade, and the Distribution of National
Income,” Journal of Political Economy, 57 (1): 1-29.
Milanovic, B. (2002). “True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First Calcula-
tion Based on Household Surveys Alone,” Economic Journal, 112: 51-92.
Mincer, J. (1991). “Human Capital, Technology, and The Wage Structure: What Do
Time Series Show?” NBER Working Paper 3581.
Murphy, K.M. and F. Welch (1992). “The Structure of Wages,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 107(1): 285-326.
Mussa, M. (1979). “The Two-Sector Model in Terms of its Dual: A Geometric Exposi-
tion,” Journal of International Economics, 9: 513-526.
Neary, P.J. (2001). “Competition, Trade andWages,” mimeo, University College Dublin
and CEPR.
Oliveira-Martins, J. (1994). “Market Structure, Trade and Industry Wages,” OECD
Economic Studies, 22: 131-154.
Ortega, P., G. Martín, A. Fernández, M. Ladoux and A. García. (1991). “A New Func-
tional Form for Estimating Lorenz Curves,” Review of Income and Wealth, 37(4): 447-
52.
Panagariya, A. (1980). “Variable Returns to Scale in General Equilibrium Theory Once
Again,” Journal of International Economics, 10: 499-526.
218
Paukert, F. (1973). “Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development: A Survey
of Evidence,” International Labour Review, 108(2): 97-125.
Perotti, R. (1996). “Growth, Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data
Say,” Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2): 149-87.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1994). “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?” American
Economic Review, 84(3): 600-21.
Puga, D. and A.J. Venables (1997). “Trading Arrangements and Industrial Develop-
ment,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1787.
Quah, D. (2002). “One-Third of the World’s Growth and Inequality,” CEPR Discussion
Paper No. 3316.
Rasche, R.H., J. Gaffney, A.Y. Koo and N. Obst (1980). “Functional Forms for Esti-
mating the Lorenz Curve,” Econometrica, 48: 1061-62.
Ravallion, M. (2001). “Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages,”
World Development, 29: 1803-15.
Ravallion, M. (2003). “The Debate on Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: WhyMea-
surement Matters,” World Bank Development Research Group Working Paper 3038.
Ravallion, M. (2004). “Pessimistic on Poverty?” The Economist, April 10.
Ravallion, M. and S. Chen (1997). “What Can New Survey Data Tell Us about Recent
Changes in Living Standards in Developing and Transitional Economies?”World Bank
Economic Review, 11: 357-82.
Ravallion, M., G. Datt and D. van de Walle (1991). “Qualifying Absolute Poverty in
the Developing World,” Review of Income and Wealth, 37: 345-361.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press, Cambridge.
Revenga, A. (1992). “Exporting Jobs?: The Impact of Import Competition on Em-
ployment and Wages in US Manufacturing,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1):
255-84.
Revenga, A. (1997). “Employment and Wage Effects of Trade Liberalization: The Case
of Mexican Manufacturing,” Journal of Labor Economics, 15(3): S20-S43.
Richardson, J.D. (1995). “Income Inequality and Trade: How to Think, What to Con-
clude,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9: 33-35.
Robbins, D. (1996a). “HOS Hits Facts: Facts Win; Evidence on Trade and Wages in
the Developing World,” Development Discussion Paper No. 557. Harvard Institute for
International Development, Harvard University.
Robbins, D. (1996b). “Stolper-Samuelson (Lost) in the Tropics? Trade Liberalization
and Wages in Colombia: 1976-1994,” Development Discussion Paper No. 563, Harvard
Institute for International Development, Harvard University.
219
Robilliard, S., F. Bourguignon and S. Robinson (2001). “Crisis and Income Distribution:
A Micro-Macro Model for Indonesia,” mimeo, World Bank.
Robinson, J. (2000). “Where Does Inequality Come From? Ideas and Implications for
Latin America,” Mimeo, OECD.
Rodríguez, F. and D. Rodrik (2001). “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s
Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,” in Macroeconomics Annual 2000, edited by B.
Bernanke and K. Rogoff. MIT Press for NBER, Cambridge.
Rodrik, D. (1997). Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Institute for International Eco-
nomics, Washington D.C.
Rodrik, D. (1999). “Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict,
and Growth Collapses,” Journal of Economic Growth, 4: 385-412.
Rodrik, D. (2000). “Comment on ‘Trade, Growth and Poverty’ by D. Dollar and A.
Kraay,” mimeo, Harvard University.
Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian and F. Trebbi (2002). “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,” NBER Work-
ing Paper 9305.
Roemer, M. and M.K. Gugerty (1997). “Does Economic Growth Reduce Poverty?”
CAER II Discussion Paper 5. Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard
University.
Sachs, J. and H. Shatz (1994). “Trade and Jobs in USManufacturing,”Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 1: 1-84.
Sachs, J. and H. Shatz (1996). “International Trade and Wage Inequality in the United
States: Some New Results,” Development Discussion Paper 524, Harvard Institute for
International Development, Harvard University.
Sachs, J. and A. Warner (1995). “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integra-
tion,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1-117.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997). “I Just Ran Two Million Regressions,” American Economic
Review, 87(2): 178-83.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (2002a). “The Disturbing ‘Rise’ in Global Income Inequality.” NBER
Working Paper 8904.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (2002b). “The World Distribution of Income (Estimated from Indi-
vidual Country Distributions).” NBER Working Paper 8933.
Sarabia, J.-M., E. Castillo and D.J. Slottje (1999). “An Ordered Family of Lorenz
Curves,” Journal of Econometrics, 91: 43-60.
Sen, A. K. (1974). “Informational Bases of Alternative Welfare Approaches: Aggrega-
tion of Income Distribution,” Journal of Public Economics, 3: 387-403.
Sen, A.K. (1976). “Real National Income,” Review of Economic Studies, 43: 19-39.
220
Sen, A.K. (1992). Inequality Reexamined. Oxford University Press, New York.
Sen, A.K. (1997). On Economic Inequality. Second ed., Clarendon Press, New York.
Sen, A.K. (2002). “Globalization and Poverty,” Transcript of lecture given at Santa
Clara University, October.
Shorrocks, A. (1983). “Ranking Income Distributions,” Economica, 50: 3-17.
Slaughter, M. (1995). “Multinational Corporations, Outsourcing, and American Wage
Divergence,” NBER Working Paper 5253.
Slaughter, M. (1998). “International Trade and Labour-Market Outcomes: Results,
Questions, and Policy Options,” Economic Journal, 108: 1452-62.
Slaughter, M. (2001). “Trade Liberalization and Per Capita Income Convergence: A
Difference-in-Differences Analysis,” Journal of International Economics, 55(1): 203-28.
Spilimbergo, A., J. Londoño and M. Székely (1999). “Income Distribution, Factor En-
dowments, and Trade Openness,” Journal of Development Economics, 59: 77-101.
Srinivasan, T.N. (2001). Trade, Development, and Growth. Essays in International Eco-
nomics 225. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalization and its Discontents. W.W. Norton & Company, New
York.
Stolper, W. and P.A. Samuelson (1941). “Protection and Real Wages,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 9(1): 58-73.
Svedberg, P. (2001). “Income Distribution Across Countries: How is it Measured and
What Do the Results Show?” Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm
University. Seminar Paper No. 698.
Tinbergen, J. (1956). “On the Theory of Income Distribution”, Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv, 77(2): 155-173.
Turrini, A. (2002). “International Trade and Labour Market Performance: Major Find-
ings and Open Questions,” Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study
Series No. 20. UNCTAD.
Tybout, J. (1992). “Researching the Trade/Productivity Link: New Directions,”World
Bank Economic Review, 6(2): 189-211.
UNU/WIDER-UNDP (2000). World Income Inequality Database, Version 1.0, 12 Sep-
tember 2000.
Villaseñor, J.A. and B.C. Arnold (1989). “Elliptical Lorenz Curves,” Journal of Econo-
metrics, 40(2): 327-38.
Williamson, J.G. (1998). “Globalization and the Labor Market: Using History to In-
form Policy,” in Growth, Inequality and Globalization, edited by P. Aghion and J.G.
Williamson. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
221
Winters, A. (2000a). “Trade, Trade Policy and Poverty: What are the Links?” CEPR
Research Paper 2382.
Winters, A. (2000b). “Trade Liberalization and Poverty,” mimeo, Center for Economic
Performance, London School of Economics.
Winters, A. (2004). “Trade Liberalization and Economic Performance: An Overview,”
Economic Journal, 114: F4-F21.
Wood, A. (1994). North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes
in a Skill-Driven World. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Wood, A. (1995). “How Trade Hurt Unskilled Workers,” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 9: 57-80.
Wood, A. (1997). “Openness and Wage Inequality in Developing Countries: The Latin
American Challenge to East Asian Conventional Wisdom,”World Bank Economic Re-
view, 11 (1): 33-57.
Wood, A. (1998). “Globalization and the Rise of LabourMarket Inequalities,” Economic
Journal, 108: 1463-82.
World Bank (1987). World Development Report 1987. Oxford University Press, New
York.
World Bank (2001).World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. Oxford
University Press, New York.
World Bank (2002). Globalization, Growth, and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World
Economy. Oxford University Press, New York.
222
The Tinbergen Institute is the Institute for Economic Research, which was founded
in 1987 by the Faculties of Economics and Econometrics of the Erasmus Universiteit
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The Institute
is named after the late Professor Jan Tinbergen, Dutch Nobel Prize laureate in economics
in 1969. The Tinbergen Institute is located in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The following
books recently appeared in the Tinbergen Institute Research Series:
298. E. WIERSMA, Non-financial performance measures: An empirical analysis of
a change in a firm’s performance measurement system.
299. M. MEKONNENAKALU, Projects for shareholder value: A capital budgeting
perspective.
300. S. ROSSETTO, Optimal timing of strategic financial decisions.
301. P.W. VAN FOREEST, Essays in financial economics.
302. A. SIEGMANN, Optimal financial decision making under loss averse prefer-
ences.
303. A. VAN DER HORST, Government interference in a dynamic economy.
304. A.P. RUSSO, The sustainable development of heritage cities and their regions:
Analysis, policy, governance.
305. G.A.W. GRIFFIOEN, Technical analysis in financial markets.
306. I.S. LAMMERS, In conflict, een geschiedenis van kennismanagement.
307. O.L. LISTES, Stochastic programming approaches for strategic logistics prob-
lems.
308. A.T. DE BLAEIJ, The value of a statistical life in road safety.
309. S.H.K. WUYTS, Partner selection in business markets. A structural embed-
dedness perspective.
310. H.C. DEKKER, Control of inter-organizational relationships: The effects of
appropriation concerns, coordination requirements and social embeddedness.
311. I.V. OSSOKINA, Environmental policy and environment-saving technologies.
Economic aspects of policy making under uncertainty.
312. D. BROUNEN, Real estate securitization and corporate strategy: From bricks
to bucks.
223
313. J.M.P. DEKOK, Human resource management within small and medium-sized
enterprises.
314. T. VERHAGEN, Towards understanding online purchase behavior.
315. R. HOEKSTRA, Structural change of the physical economy. Decomposition
analysis of physical and hybrid-units input-output tables.
316. R.K. AIDIS, By law and by custom: Factors affecting small and medium sized
enterprises during the transition in Lithuania.
317. S. MANZAN, Essays in nonlinear economic dynamics.
318. K. OLTMER, Agricultural policy, land use and environmental effects: Studies
in quantitative research synthesis.
319. H.J. HORBEEK, The elastic workfloor. About the implementation of internal
flexibility arrangements.
320. P. HOUWELING, Empirical studies on credit markets.
321. E. MENDYS, Essays on network economics.
322. J. NOAILLY, Coevolutionary modeling for sustainable economic development.
323. Y.V. VELD-MERKOULOVA, Essays on futures markets and corporate spin-
offs.
324. F.J. WILLE, Auditing using Bayesian decision analysis.
325. D. HUISMAN, Integrated and dynamic vehicle and crew scheduling.
326. S. WANG, Global climate change policies: An analysis of CDM policies with
an adapted GTAP model.
327. M.W. VAN GELDEREN, Opportunity entry performance. Studies of entre-
preneurship and small business.
328. W. VAN WINDEN, Essays on urban ICT policies.
329. G.J. KULA, Optimal retirement decision.
330. R.J. IMESON, Economic analysis and modeling of fisheries management in
complex marine ecosystems.
331. M. DEKKER, Risk, resettlement and relations: Social security in rural Zim-
babwe.
332. A. MULATU, Relative stringency of environmental regulation and interna-
tional competitiveness.
224
333. C.M. VAN VEELEN, Survival of the fair: Modelling the evolution of altruism,
fairness and morality.
334. R. PHISALAPHONG, The impact of economic integration programs on inward
foreign direct investment.
335. A.H. NÖTEBERG, The medium matters: The impact of electronic commu-
nication media and evidence strength on belief revision during auditor-client
inquiry.
336. M. MASTROGIACOMO, Retirement, expectations and realizations. Essays
on the Netherlands and Italy.
337. E. KENJOH, Balancing work and family life in Japan and four European coun-
tries: Econometric analyses on mothers’ employment and timing of maternity.
338. A.H. BRUMMANS, Adoption and diffusion of EDI in multilateral networks of
organizations.
339. K. STAAL, Voting, public goods and violence.
340. R.H.J. MOSCH, The economic effects of trust. Theory and empirical evidence.
341. F. ESCHENBACH, The impact of banks and asset markets on economic
growth and fiscal stability.
342. D. LI, On extreme value approximation to tails of distribution functions.
343. S. VAN DER HOOG, Disequilibrium dynamics.
344. B. BRYS, Tax-arbitrage in the Netherlands evaluation of the capital income
tax reform of January 1, 2001.
345. E. PRUZHANSKY, Topics in game theory.
346. P.D.M.L. CARDOSO, The future of old-age pensions: Its implosion and ex-
plosion.
347. C.J.H. BOSSINK, To go or not to go. . . ? International relocation willingness
of dual-career couples.
348. R.D. VAN OEST, Essays on quantitative marketing models and Monte Carlo
integration methods.
225
